



WASHINGTON REPORT

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Washington, July 13, 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

WR 64-26

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK 1964

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

On June 20 the President issued his Proclamation of Captive Nations Week, designating the week of July 12-18, 1964, as the period for the annual nation-wide observance and urging all Americans "to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty." The proclamation is a response to Public Law 86-90 which Congress passed as the Captive Nations Week Resolution in July, 1959. As in the past five years and in accordance with the spirit and content of this law, Americans across the Nation will conduct various activities aimed at making this Sixth Observance of Captive Nations Week the most impressive and instructive one yet.

The Johnson proclamation is not substantially different from the one released by President Kennedy last year, and in one respect it is even weaker. President Kennedy's proclamation at least specified the time-honored American principle of national self-determination for all the captive nations, including the dozen in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the current proclamation repeats a serious error of omission found in the previous Kennedy declaration. Evidently for the purpose of accommodating "good" Communists as against "bad" ones, no mention is made of Communism as a tool of ideologic deception and, as in the earlier Eisenhower proclamations, the ultimate and determining reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is completely overlooked.

It is no secret that since 1959, when Khrushchev furiously denounced Congress' action, certain elements in the Department of State have attempted in a variety of ways to play down the resolution and, indeed, the whole captive nations issue. Down to the present, they have succeeded in influencing our Chief Executives to issue relatively weak proclamations that bear only a general similarity to the resolution. In large measure they have also been responsible for the late timing of the successive proclamations which gives inadequate encouragement to our citizens in preparing for the observances. Under President Kennedy, this technique was coupled with the maneuver of a concurrent presidential news release designed to submerge the proclamation in the press.

Editor's Note: Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky is a professor of economics at Georgetown University. He is the author of the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) which was passed by Congress in 1959. This resolution provides that the third week of July be set aside each year to remind the world of the nations held in bondage by Russian imperialism. Dr. Dobriansky is also a member of the American Security Council's Strategy Staff.

REC-98100-425828-88

NOT RECORDED
25 JUL 21 1964

Whereas presidential proclamations for the observance of United Nations Day, Constitution Week and other events are issued six months in advance, those for Captive Nations Week have consistently been released on the very eve of the observance. The one in 1960 was issued after the Week had begun. At the beginning of each year, the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington turns to the White House for an early presidential proclamation, and every year the grand stall is methodically initiated. This year has been no exception.

However, such as it is, the record has been broken by the Johnson Proclamation. It was issued three weeks in advance of the Week. But the circumstances surrounding the issuance are noteworthy. The proclamation was released at 4 p.m. on a Saturday when few or no reporters are regularly about the White House. For the time being, the intended result was realized: few papers in the country mentioned the proclamation and there was no upsetting reaction from Moscow. Our appeasing policy of silence was properly served.

Why the Captive Nations are de-emphasized.

These facts are intertwined with the Government's policy of silence regarding the captive nations. One obvious explanation is the Administration's dominant political desire not to irritate Khrushchev with any recital of truths that would keep our citizens and the world mindful of the fate of the long list of captive nations. In the spirit of "peaceful coexistence," while the Russian dictator freely speaks out in Egypt against "U.S. imperialism" and "bourgeois nationalism" and in Scandinavia attempts to justify the enslavement of the non-Russian Baltic nations, our officials remain mute about the captive nations for fear the Khrushchev would be disturbed by the patent truth. Heard often and long enough without refutation, the Russian fables will be believed by millions all over the world.

Another reason offered for the de-emphasis on Captive Nations Week is the need for improving relations and reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. Last year, Moscow raised the question "Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States?" (The New Times, January 23, 1963). Some in our Government would like to oblige the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists on this score. Khrushchev has already found outspoken supporters for this unilateral psycho-political disarmament in our country. For example, George F. Kennan, who enjoys a brilliant reputation for success through successive error, severely criticizes the Captive Nations Week Resolution in his recent book On Dealing with the Communist World. He makes the observation that the resolution "has freed no captive nations, nor is it likely to do so."

It is obvious that, like proclamations, no resolution will free anyone anywhere. By its very nature, a resolution is an ideological commitment that necessitates action and implementation; and this requires not only reason but also will. It is because we have not expressed an official will to implement the captive nations resolution that absolutely no progress has been made toward the eventual liberation and freedom of the captive nations.

In our protracted failure to garner the necessary will to defeat Moscow in the Cold War, we have now arrived at the irrational position of believing that world tensions will evaporate the less we say or do about the captive nations. In fact, many in our Government have begun to indulge in the self-hypnotism of imputing nationalism to Communist re-

gimes in Europe and Asia with the wishful hope of weaning them away from colonialist Moscow.

With a grave lack of imagination, not to say logic, these political hypnotists would have us believe that any Communist regime, including Tito's, Mao's, or Castro's, could long endure with real independence and without ultimate reliance on the non-monolithic power of the Soviet Union. What's more, there is a marked strain of naivete in this self-hypnotic position, namely that the Gomulkas, Kadars, and Gheorghiu-Dejs are foolish enough not to be aware of this basic reality of ultimate dependence on Moscow. Regardless of how long their leashes may be, the survival of their regimes depends on the Russian imperium.

The fundamental intellectual error underlying the present policy of silence is the unfounded imputation of nationalism to the totalitarian, unrepresentative Communist regimes, which significantly preach "socialist patriotism" in opposition to what peoples of the captive nations cherish as basic principle -- patriotic nationalism. The great dangers of this error are many: our neglect of the captive nations people in favor of their imposed, totalitarian governments; assist the further entrenchment of these regimes by aid and imprudent trade; the self-defeating provision of a "breather" for colonialist Moscow at a time when we should be capitalizing on imperial Russian troubles; and by avoiding positive and offensive policies. This won't be the first time we have contributed heavily to the preservation and growth of the Soviet Russian Empire to our own national detriment.

Fortunately, in all sections of our country Americans are dedicated to the ideals of the resolution passed by Congress in 1959. They seek its implementation and firmly oppose the policy of silence, accommodation, and illusory interdependence with the Soviet Russian Empire. The captive nations movement has grown so that the majority of our States formally proclaim the Week and every major city holds an annual observance. In Congress, support for the resolution's implementation steadily increases.

Who's Next?

Still, many of our citizens are unfamiliar with the long list of captive nations. It is a misconception to think that the only captive nations are in Central Europe. Actually, the majority of them are in the Soviet Union and Asia. It is this valid image of the Soviet Union, as a prison house of captive nations, that horrifies Khrushchev. On the psycho-political front in the Cold War, we could with relatively little effort demolish Soviet Russian propaganda by concentrating on the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR and exposing to the world the Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism that alone hold that artificial state together. The USSR has never been a monolith, and this real image is not exactly a pretty one for millions in the Free World to behold: a minority elite in a minority nation of some 110 million Russians holding, with an assortment of non-Russian quislings, the reins of a vast empire and virtually bulldozing the rest of the world with illusory power.

The road we are now traveling and the rate at which we are going lead logically to the question "Who's Next?" in the roll call of captive nations. During Captive Nations Week, every thinking American should become familiar with the following roster of captive nations:

Country and People

Country and People	Year of Communist Domination
Armenia	1920
Azerbaijan	1920
Byelorussia	1920
Cossackia	1920
Georgia	1920
Idel-Ural	1920
North Caucasia	1920
Democratic Republic of Far East (Siberyaks)	1920
Ukraine	1920
Turkistan	1922
Estonia	1940
Latvia	1940
Lithuania	1940
Albania	1946
Bulgaria	1946
Outer Mongolia	1946
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc. in Yugoslavia	1946
Poland	1947
Rumania	1947
Czecho-Slovakia	1948
North Korea	1948
Hungary	1949
East Germany	1949
Mainland China	1949
Tibet	1951
North Viet-Nam	1954
Cuba	1960

Who's Next?

Lev E. Dobriansky

REC'D - FBI - JUSTICE
JUL 13 1964 PH '64

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Intelligence Editor	Major General Garrison B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Foreign Editor	Frank J. Johnson
Internal Security Editor	Lee R. Pennington
International Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
National Editor	William Gill
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published four times monthly by the American Security Council. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Special subscription rates available to educators, students, clergy and members. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Loyd Wright
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)
General Mark Clark
Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag
Dr. Anthony J. Bouscaren
Anthony Harrigan
Dr. Anthony Kubek
Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

Bennett Archambault
Lloyd L. Austin
Charles S. Craigmile
Robert Donner
Henry Duque
Wade Fetzer, Jr.
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.
Robert W. Galvin
Fred M. Gillies

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

REC'D - FBI - JUSTICE
JUL 13 1964 PH '64

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
 Washington Bureau: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
 Western Office: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

July 27, 1964

AB
The attached publication was sent to
the Director by the American
Security Council, 123 North Wacker,
Chicago, Illinois.

Reference is made to the FBI on
page 2.

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR _____
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DELAHAN
MR. EVANS
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN _____
MR. SULLIVAN _____
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

1-1
DAF

crt

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
W/ OUT
7/27

100-425828-
NOT RECORDED

16 JUL 29 1964 10 08 20 04

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/HC

19
AUG 3 1964 *Sp1mac/HC*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1med/SC


100-195728

ENCLOSURE



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

123 North Wacker, Chicago, Illinois 60606



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7MCH/ie

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

9 DIRECTOR

9 JUL 27 1964



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/2/87 BY SP/medha

Washington, July 27, 1964

WR 64-28

Q-CLEARANCE vs CONVERGENCE

In an era dominated by the twin follies of accommodation and convergence, serious questions are being raised about the nation's internal security programs. These questions have far-reaching implications, not only for Government, but for private industry as well.

Basically, the question boils down to this: How can the United States continue to justify internal measures that display our distrust of Communism while simultaneously pursuing foreign policies based more and more on an implicit trust in Communism's leaders in Moscow?

The dichotomy is self evident. But schizo-like, the U.S. insists on riding both horns of the dilemma. Thus, on the one hand our disarmament negotiators place child-like faith in the word of Nikita Khrushchev by waiving inspection rights on a nuclear test ban, the orbiting of nuclear weapons, and the production of enriched plutonium and uranium. On the other hand, we continue to profess a deep and abiding suspicion regarding the minions Khrushchev assigns to ferret out our armament secrets.

Has the present prevailing climate of accommodation affected America's efforts to protect its military-industrial plant from infiltration by Communists, ideological sympathizers, or other security risks? Some observers believe that an article published in the May issue of THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS points unmistakably in that direction.

The article was written by Harold P. Green, a Washington attorney with rather impressive credentials in the field of security. While with the Atomic Energy Commission's legal division from 1950-54, Mr. Green handled a number of security cases and drew up the statement of charges in the most famous of them all -- the Oppenheimer Case. Subsequently, he was counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Government Re-organization and in 1955 authored the measure which led to the creation of the Commission on Government Security. Since then he has specialized in defending persons accused of being security risks and, he says, has yet to lose one of these cases.

Using statistical data on the history of the AEC's Q-Clearance program, Mr. Green contends in his article that: "The overall attitude of security officials has changed

NR before 89

perceptibly. Six years ago, most would have described their basic mission as keeping subversives and security risks out of sensitive positions. Today they would say: "Our mission is to clear people."

The AEC is charged with protecting some of America's most sensitive military secrets. But Mr. Green claims that "a person with substantially derogatory information in his background has a much greater chance of obtaining an AEC Q-Clearance than a 'secret' clearance from almost any other government agency." To support this, he says that he is "personally aware of several cases in which the AEC has granted clearance to persons unable to obtain clearance in other agencies or persons who were discharged on security grounds by other agencies; or cases in which grave security problems were found by other agencies in the background of persons previously cleared by the AEC with full knowledge of the derogatory information which so troubled other agencies."

"All along the line," says Green, "the AEC security program has acquired a greater degree of sophistication, understanding, compassion, and courage."

In a recent interview, Mr. Green told me that he had not intended to single out the AEC in his article, although changes he said were made by the BULLETIN'S editors after he approved the proofs, certainly had that effect. "The essence of my argument," he said, "is that the AEC program is illustrative of what is happening throughout Government security programs."

He emphasizes that this "amazing transformation" actually began during the latter years of the Eisenhower Administration. "I handle a lot of security cases and I can say with certainty that there are cases being cleared today in all agencies of Government that couldn't possibly have been cleared ten years ago," Mr. Green said. Then he added: "I think this is a good thing."

During one of our talks, he stressed that he is "sympathetic" with a sound security program. However, from his point of view "there are no blacks and whites in security cases, only varying shades of gray." (Mr. Green admits that he became disenchanted with the conduct of the Oppenheimer Case after he wrote the statement of charges and as a result put his previous decision to depart from the AEC on a "crash basis.") He said that security programs are predicated on the assumption "that you can tell from a person's past behavior whether he is apt to indulge in espionage." In his opinion this is "entirely false."

Curious as to whether the AEC security people shared this view, I drove out last week to the AEC headquarters near Germantown, Maryland, with Lee R. Pennington, a 25-year veteran of the FBI who now serves as chief of the American Security Council's Washington Bureau and Internal Security Editor of the WASHINGTON REPORT. In a lengthy conference with Admiral J. A. Waters, Director of the AEC's Division of Security, and Robert E. Tharp, Assistant Director of Personnel Security, we found that they definitely do not subscribe to Harold Green's thesis.

"I don't think", said Mr. Tharp, "that there is any basis for the claim that we have changed, mellowed, or become more 'sophisticated' in our approach to security

All of us recognize that Communism is an even greater threat today than it was in the past and we are just as much concerned about Communist affiliations today as we were in 1955. ²

Nonetheless, a former high-ranking official of the AEC who says that he has maintained "close contact" with his former colleagues, informs us that the security program in the AEC, as well as in other government agencies, has undergone drastic changes in the last few years.

"Security has become unpopular throughout government," he says. "And men who practice it assiduously have found that this is a good way to lose their jobs. . . . The argument is that we do not need a security program any more."

He added that it has been reported to him that in the AEC "certain lines of research have been dropped just when they looked the most promising." The alleged relaxation in security is, he believes, responsible.

Another source -- a former ranking military intelligence officer -- told us flatly that: "There is no security program in Government today. It has ceased to exist in any meaningful way." He attributes this to the prevailing climate of accommodation.

If the government has indeed let down its security guard, the ramifications in private industry are obvious. Of the some 150,000 individuals whom Admiral Waters estimates are "currently involved in classified activities" for the AEC alone, more than 140,000 are employed by companies and universities operating AEC facilities under federal contract or by other private contractors. Many times that many are, of course, employed by industry on classified work for the Department of Defense and other agencies.

Traditionally, industry has relied heavily on government security officers. Access to secret or top-secret data cannot be granted unless the government first provides clearance. But since 1951 industry has controlled all "confidential" clearances. Yet even then if derogatory information is turned up on an applicant or employee the case must be turned over to the government. Still, much of the day-to-day implementation of security measures falls to industry and under DOD regulations the private contractor is held responsible "for safeguarding all classified information under his control."

However, Congressman Edwin E. Willis, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, notes "a highly dangerous trend in some segments of industry . . . (to) let down in security efforts, programs, and personnel." (Are businessmen merely following what they perceive to be government's lead?)

This trend, Mr. Willis told a recent meeting of the Washington-Baltimore Chapter of the American Society for Industrial Security, "is due primarily to a combination of two factors: acceptance of the false belief that the Communist Party is washed up, no longer a real menace, and the old natural desire to cut costs. It is difficult for me to think of any more foolish economy. . . ."

Obviously, in the field of internal security the government should set both the standards and the pace. But today, according to one top-notch security executive with a major aero-space firm, "it is particularly difficult to get a clearance denied, or once granted, to get it revoked."

It may well be that in the Age of Accommodation, industry must now begin to demonstrate a far greater degree of self-reliance in security matters if it wishes to preserve not only the private enterprise system, but the nation under which that system has scored its greatest achievements.



WILLIAM GILL
National Editor

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor Dr. James D. Atkinson
Intelligence Editor Major General Garrison B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)
Economics Editor Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Foreign Editor Frank J. Johnson
Internal Security Editor Lee R. Pennington
International Law &
Space Editor Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
National Editor William Gill
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Research Director William K. Lambie, Jr.
Chief, Washington Bureau Lee R. Pennington

OFFICERS

President John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President John G. Sevcik
Vice President Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published four times monthly by the American Security Council. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Special subscription rates available to educators, students, clergy and members. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Loyd Wright
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond,
USA (Ret.)
General Mark Clark
Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren
Anthony Harrigan
Dr. Anthony Kubek
Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

Clifford F. Hood
Wayne A. Johnston
William H. Kendall
Ernest J. Loebbecke
Hughston M. McBain
A. B. McKee, Jr.
General Robert E. Wood
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Howard I. Young

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. BELMONT _____
MR. MOHR _____
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN *9* _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DELAACH *9* _____
MR. EVANS _____
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN *9* _____
MR. SULLIVAN *9* _____
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

encl

file

Jack Gordon

Horace

Shiggy

Bob

Rotato

Walt

John

Bob

Phil

Bill

Blair

Ken

Ken

8

REC- 99

REC- 99 100-425828-84

NOT RECORDED

31 AUG 17 1964

EX 109

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/16/88 BY SP-100

56 AUG 14 1964



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY SPINACHIC

Washington, July 20, 1964

WR 64-27

THE BITTER HARVEST

One of the most abused and least understood subjects of controversy to arise in the United States in recent years is now open to rational public discussion - that of Communist infiltration into the civil rights movement. It was given its first real airing in April when J. Edgar Hoover and columnist Joseph Alsop each called public attention to what Alsop called "the unhappy secret" that the Communist Party was having some success in its efforts to infiltrate the movement.

The Negro has been a prime target for the Communist Party in the United States through the entire 45 years of the Party's existence. He has also been a most elusive one. The older Negro organizations, The Urban League and The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, were well aware of the early threats to infiltrate their ranks and were able to oust the Communists and dissuade others in their groups who thought they could "work with" the Communists. Largely through the efforts of these organizations, Communist Party recruiting was never very successful among Negroes, even in large urban areas.

Now, with the rise of new, more militant civil rights groups, with their younger, less experienced leaders, the Communist Party has found new targets and is seeking to exploit them for its own ends. It is worth noting at the very outset that the goals of the civil rights leaders and those of the Communist Party are totally opposed to one another.

The following are samples of Communist activities within the past year.

Chicago

In September, 1963, after weeks of investigation, reporter Sam Blair of Chicago's American wrote a story setting out Communist efforts to infiltrate the local CORE organization. In observing picket line demonstrations at the Board of Education and at the site of temporary classroom construction, several local Communists were identified. One of the most active was Charles McCord, identified at one time as head of 42nd Ward Communist Club and a long time associate of CP vice chairman, Claude Lightfoot. Another was Eugene Feldman, a writer and one time Daily Worker editor. Lightfoot, himself, later took part in a demonstration "for food and jobs" on January 31, 1964 at the offices of the Illinois Public Aid Commission in Chicago. His presence produced a miniature midwestern version of Sino-Soviet world politics when he and Theresa Ehrlich, described by The Worker as a "Stalinist" and supporter of "the line purveyed by the Peking Review" engaged in a shoving and name calling exchange. Mrs. Ehrlich was back again trying to lead a "hunger-march" on Governor Otto Kerner's Chicago office on May 14th.

100-425828-89

Cleveland

In Cleveland, racial tensions have centered around schools. Tension reached a peak in February when a white minister was accidentally killed during a demonstration at a school construction site. In April, Cleveland's Mayor Locker furnished the U. S. Department of Justice a report listing the names of 31 individuals who had been active in civil rights demonstrations and who, according to the Cleveland police, had also been active in organizations cited as subversive. According to a Cleveland Press story on April 25, one name on the list was that of Eric J. Reinthaler. The article identified Reinthaler as a co-chairman of CORE's Cleveland finance committee and the police say he played a "major role" in demonstrations at the School Board.

Local CORE officials cannot claim that Reinthaler was a "sleeper". On July 19, 1962 he was released from the Federal Prison at Milan, Michigan where he had served 15 months for violation of the non-communist affidavit section of the Taft-Hartley Act. He had previously served as Ohio Valley Secretary of the Communist Party. According to the Press article, both Reinthaler and present Communist Party officers in Cleveland claim he is no longer a member of the Party, having been "expelled".

St. Louis

In the St. Louis area, civil rights demonstrators have engaged in sit-ins directed against several downtown banks, claiming racially biased hiring practices. The demonstrations have been conducted by CORE but a non-member of CORE, William S. Massingale, attracted the attention of Denny Walsh, a St. Louis Globe-Democrat staff writer. Massingale was active in sit-ins at the St. Louis City Hall and at one of the banks. Massingale, who is 63 years old, has been around St. Louis for a long time. He was Communist candidate for Alderman in 1943 and, according to the Globe-Democrat, once was vice-chairman of the Communist Party of Missouri. When contacted by the paper he denied membership in both CORE and the Communist Party.

New York

In New York City, while threatened "stall-ins" on roads leading to the World's Fair grabbed most of the headlines before they fizzled, rent strikes in Harlem and Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant section have been causing very real problems for a good many months. A rent strike consists simply of withholding rent from the landlord of the building until he has complied with tenants' demands for improvements. The rents are paid by tenants to whatever group is sponsoring the strike and placed in escrow for the landlord until the strike is settled.

The rent strikes have been organized by the Community Council for Housing, a local group headed by Jesse Gray. On February 3, 1960 Jesse Gray was called to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Before he was called, Albert Gaillard had identified Gray as the Harlem organizer for the Communist Party and the person to whom he had paid Communist Party dues for more than two years. Gaillard testified that Gray had told him that morning to "take the fifth" at the hearing or he would "be in pretty bad shape in the Harlem community". Gray, when asked if he were then a member of the Communist Party replied, "no", but when questioned as to whether he had been a member of the Party the year before or up until 10:00 A.M. that very morning, Gray sought the refuge of the fifth amendment. Later in the hearing, Gray took the fifth when asked if he had been "the executive officer or representative" of the Communist Party in Harlem.

and again when asked "Are you now that representative?" Gray was arrested on June 30, 1964 by police in Chicago during a demonstration of ACT, a new militant group.

San Francisco

The most spectacular demonstration of Communist efforts to infiltrate the civil rights movement has occurred in one of the world's most spectacular cities, San Francisco. Here the Communist Party has relied successfully on its second generation. On March 7, 1964, 127 people were arrested in connection with demonstrations at the Sheraton Palace Hotel; on March 14, 1964, 58 were arrested during demonstrations at a Cadillac showroom and on April 11, 1964, 226 were arrested in the Van Ness Avenue "auto row" demonstrations. The number of arrests testify to the fact that the demonstrations were neither peaceful nor law abiding.

The Sheraton Palace demonstration was led by Tracy Sims, an 18 year old militant Negro girl who shares an apartment with Rosanne Forest, the daughter of Jim Forest, one-time Communist Party leader in St. Louis and with Linda Carlson, who is a daughter of Frank Carlson, long active in the Party in Los Angeles. Rosanne Forest was among the people arrested on March 11 at the Cadillac showroom demonstration. A number of others identified with Communist causes themselves or having relatives in the Communist Party were arrested in one or more of the San Francisco demonstrations. These included Mark Comfort, son-in-law of Robert Black, an Oakland, California printer identified in 1953 testimony as a CP member; Carl Granich, son or Worker columnist, Mike Gold; Nora Lapin, daughter of the late Adam Lapin, once a Daily Worker correspondent; and Bettina Aptheker, daughter of Political Affairs editor Herbert Aptheker. Also arrested were Terrence, Conn and Mathew Hallinan, sons of San Francisco attorney Vincent Hallinan, the 1952 Progressive Party presidential candidate.

Communist tactics have been overt in San Francisco. The founding convention of the new Communist youth group (See WR64-21) was hastily transferred there from Chicago and its sponsors announced that the keynote speaker was to be Rev. Milton Galaninson of Brooklyn who was a leading figure in the New York school boycotts. Among those who issued the call to the convention were Tracy Sims and Michael Myerson of the "Ad Hoc Committee to End Discrimination", the group which organized the San Francisco racial demonstrations. Also listed in the youth group's press release were Robert Baum, identified as a charter member of CORE in Minneapolis, Edward Campbell, listed as vice-chairman of the Bridgeport CORE chapter, Edward Reftwich, a "CORE activist" in Bridgeport and Michael Sheidrick, a "CORE activist" from Paterson, New Jersey. The youthful organizers culminated their meetings by naming themselves the "Du Bois Clubs of America". This, in itself, was an obvious appeal to racism since the group was named for the late W. E. B. Du Bois who, years before he embraced Communism, had been one of the founders of the N. A. A. C. P.

Yellow Springs, Ohio

The quiet village of Yellow Springs, just east of Dayton is fairly typical of the small Midwestern college town. It is the site of Antioch College, an institution which has frequently become embroiled in controversy.

On March 14, 1964 several hundred students from Antioch and other nearby colleges engaged in a mass picketing protest aimed at a local barber who had refused to cut Negroes' hair. The students rocked and nearly overturned the car of a doctor trying to get through.

The crowd, already in violation of an injunction against mass picketing, defied police requests to disperse and fire hoses proved ineffective. Finally, after repeated warnings, the local police, reinforced by sheriff's deputies and officers from neighboring towns, had to resort to tear gas. Red-eyed but still defiant, the crowd returned and finally had to be moved by a police skirmish line with nightsticks held at chest level. More than 100 students were arrested and placed in jail. On the following Monday, most of the students were released to the Deans of their respective colleges but several ringleaders were required to post bond.

One of those placed under \$500 bond was young Joni Rabinowitz of New York. Her father, Victor Rabinowitz had come from New York to offer himself as attorney for the students just as he had done when Joni was tried for perjury in Albany, Georgia in November, 1963. Victor Rabinowitz has been identified in testimony before a Senate Committee as a member of the Communist Party and has sought the refuge of the fifth amendment when questioned on the subject.

What it Means

Some civil rights leaders have adopted the attitude that any mention of Communists in the movement is no more than a device to discredit all civil rights efforts. At the same time, some opponents of the civil rights movement have denounced it with the sweeping charge that it is all a Communist plot. Both attitudes are equi-distant from reality and represent a refusal to face up squarely to difficult problems. Both attitudes serve the Communist cause by (1) inhibiting reasonable discussion of the entire question, (2) permitting the Communists to continue their present efforts and (3) intensifying emotional attitudes capable of producing the bitter harvest most desired by the Communists - disorder, lawlessness and violence.



WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
RESEARCH DIRECTOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor Dr. James D. Atkinson
Intelligence Editor Major General Garrison B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)
Economics Editor Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Foreign Editor Frank J. Johnson
Internal Security Editor Lee R. Pennington
International Law &
Space Editor Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
National Editor William Gill
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Research Director William K. Lambie, Jr.
Chief, Washington Bureau Lee R. Pennington

OFFICERS

President John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President John G. Sevcik
Vice President Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published four times monthly by the American Security Council. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Special subscription rates available to educators, students, clergy and members. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Loyd Wright
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond,
USA (Ret.)
General Mark Clark
Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren
Anthony Harrigan
Dr. Anthony Kubek
Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

Clifford F. Hood
Wayne A. Johnston
William H. Kendall
Ernest J. Loebbecke
Hughston M. McBain
A. B. McKee, Jr.
General Robert E. Wood
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Howard I. Young

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Washington Bureau: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036
Western Office: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606

WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

WESTERN OFFICE: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
Stewart-Warner Corporation
LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
Security-First National Bank
CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Chairman of the Board
Belden Manufacturing Company
ROBERT DONNER, Chairman
Donner Foundation
HENRY DUQUE, Partner
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
Alexander & Company
PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
Eversharp, Inc.
ROBERT W. GALVIN, President
Motorola, Inc.
FRED M. GILLIES
Retired Chairman of the Board
Acme Steel Company
CLIFFORD F. HOOD
Former President
United States Steel Corporation
WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
Illinois Central Railroad
WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
ERNEST J. LOEBBECKE, President
Title Insurance and Trust Company
HUGHSTON M. McBAIN
Retired Chairman of the Board
Marshall Field & Company
A. B. MCKEE, JR., President
Forest Lumber Company
Imperial Valley Lumber Company
GENERAL ROBERT E. WOOD
Retired Chairman of the Board
Sears, Roebuck & Company
MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
Retired President
American Library of Information
HOWARD I. YOUNG, President
American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
JOHN M. FISHER
American Security Council
Senior Vice President
KENNETH M. PIPER
Motorola, Inc.
Vice President
STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
U.S. Steel Corporation
Vice President
JOHN G. SEVICK
Burton-Dixie Corporation
Vice President
RUSSELL E. WHITE
General Electric Company
Secretary-Treasurer
CYRIL W. HOOPER
Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
JOHN M. FISHER
Research Director
WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
Field Director
MAJOR GENERAL G. B. COVERDALE, USA (Ret.)
Chief, Washington Bureau
LEE R. PENNINGTON
International Politics Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
FRANK J. JOHNSON
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. STEFAN T. POSSONI
International Law and Space Editor
ASC Washington Report
REAR ADMIRAL CHESTER C. WARD, USN (Ret.)

August 5, 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/wb

Honorable Alan H. Belmont
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Belmont

Publication
I've enclosed for your consideration an advance copy of our National Strategy Committee's most recent study, "Guidelines for Cold War Victory".

This study was prepared by our top-level National Strategy Committee in cooperation with 128 representative universities and colleges and 102 major organizations representing millions of Americans.

This has been prepared on a non-partisan basis. The National Strategy Committee devoted its main attention to developing affirmative recommendations for the consideration of government and of our members.

The American Security Council is organized as the means through which its member companies and institutions work together and cooperate with the government. Thus, since this study will be a prime reference point in our next studies, we are most interested in any suggestions you may have for improvement of this study.

Also, if you'd like, we'd be pleased to send you a working draft of our next study "The Role of Business in the Cold War" when it is ready for review and criticism.

100-425828-90
Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
AUG 13 1964

John M. Fisher
President

John M. Fisher

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : R. W. Smith

SUBJECT: ~~BOOK REVIEWS "GUIDELINES FOR COLD WAR VICTORY"~~
~~BY NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN~~
~~SECURITY COUNCIL~~
~~CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER~~

DATE: August 12, 1964

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS:

Captioned book forwarded Assistant to the Director Belmont 8/5/64 by John M. Fisher, President, American Security Council (ASC). Letter acknowledged by Director 8/12/64. Book referred Central Research for review. Book is criticism and analysis of American approach to cold war conflict. Sets out guidelines for strategy bringing together liberal, moderate, and conservative thinking. Recommends that we use tougher approach in dealing with communists; that U.S. wage counterwar, measure for measure, and change our "defensive" position; that we work to effect internal transformation within Soviet State, that we demonstrate will to win, mount psychological and economic offensive, improve relations with NATO nations, reappraise neutralism, adopt new Latin American policy to defeat communism, and maintain superior military posture. Study also recommends updating internal security programs in accordance with recommendations in 1957 of Commission on Government Security established by Congress. Book prepared by National Strategy Committee of ASC. Participants in study include former U.S. ambassadors; prominent educators, scientists, and military men; top business executives; and organizations such as American Legion and International Association of Chiefs of Police. 6/8/62 Fisher requested Director participate in study. Request declined. Fisher former agent. Services satisfactory. Now on Special Correspondents' List. ASC financed and operated by private industry as national research and information center on subversive activities. In 1959 allegation made that ASC planning to develop informants in Communist Party. No further information developed. ASC indicates readiness to identify its members publicly as formerly with Bureau. All references to Director and FBI favorable. 100-425828-91

RECOMMENDATION:

AUG 24 1964 For information.

62-46855

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner

BOOK REVIEWS 1964
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/12/88 BY SP79mac/LL

REC. 51

AUG 21 1964

b6
b7C

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

CONTINUED - OVER

RESEARCH-SATELLITE
1 - Research-Satellite
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

100-46855-62

Memo: Smith to Sullivan

Re: BOOK REVIEW: "GUIDELINES FOR COLD WAR VICTORY"
BY NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN
SECURITY COUNCIL
CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER

DETAILS:

Captioned book was forwarded to Assistant to the Director Belmont on 8/5/64 by John M. Fisher, President, American Security Council. Fisher's letter was acknowledged 8/12/64 by the Director. The book was referred to Central Research Unit for review. *srw90*

Summary of Book

This study, the first in a series, is a criticism and analysis of the American approach to the cold war conflict with communism and is a guideline for corrective strategy. Its purpose is to bring together the best thinking (liberal, moderate, and conservative) that will enable this country to win the cold war.

According to the book, our strategy is working to our own detriment. In encouraging Soviet moderation and eventual change of heart, we adopt a fallacious policy of moderation and conciliation. The study indicates our foreign policy frees no one and actually results in less rather than more freedom throughout the world.

Moving from the premise that permanent coexistence with a communist dictatorship is impossible, the study recommends that we adopt a tougher approach in our dealings with communist countries; that - measure for measure - we wage counterwar against the communists and do everything short of nuclear war to effect internal transformation within the Soviet State, emphasizing the latent discontent of the people.

In the meantime, we must demonstrate the will to win and mount psychological and economic offensives. It is essential we improve our relations with the NATO nations; reappraise neutralism, which is incompatible with victory; formulate a new policy which will defeat communism in Latin America; and, maintain a superior military posture.

The study also recommends an updating and tightening of the internal security programs with special consideration being given by the legislative and executive branches of the Government to the recommendations made in June, 1957, by the Commission on Government Security, established by Congress to make an objective, nonpolitical study of the internal security program.

Memo Smith to Sullivan

Re: BOOK REVIEW: "GUIDELINES FOR COLD WAR VICTORY"
BY NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN
SECURITY COUNCIL

Participants in Study

This study was prepared by the National Strategy Committee of the ASC. Participating were such prominent individuals as General Mark Clark, Dr. Stefan Possony, Admiral Felix B. Stump (Ret.) and Dr. Edward Teller; top business executives of the 3,500 company members of ASC; 128 universities and colleges; 102 organizations such as the American Legion and the International Association of Chiefs of Police; and, former U.S. ambassadors and college presidents.

On 6/8/62 John M. Fisher, President of ASC, wrote to the Director and requested he participate in this study. The request was declined. Fisher is a former agent who resigned 2/13/53. His services were satisfactory and he is on the Special Correspondents' List.

American Security Council

The files disclose ASC is an organization financed and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for its members. ASC sponsors Fidelifax, Inc., a nationwide personnel investigating organization with offices in 32 cities, each of which is allegedly headed by a former Bureau agent.

In 1959, information was received that ASC was possibly planning to develop informants in the Communist Party which raised the possibility of intrusion in our field of primary responsibility. Files do not indicate further information has been developed in this regard.

Past inquiries have indicated that some people believe ASC is closely related to the Bureau. This is probably attributable to the organization's readiness to identify its members as being formerly associated with the Bureau. For instance, in the extensive lists of participants in this study, among the "experts" on the Strategy Staff are four former agents of the Bureau and one former Assistant Director. This alludes to former Assistant Director Stanley J. Tracy.

References to Director and FBI

All references to the Director and the FBI are favorable.

There are two references to the Director. The study begins with a quotation from Mr. Hoover's address to the Brotherhood of the Washington Hebrew Congregation on 12/4/63. On pages 115-116, a portion of the Director's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee 1/29/64 dealing with Soviet espionage is quoted. The book states that Mr. Hoover's testimony emphasizes the continuing importance of communist espionage operations.



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois

WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

WESTERN OFFICE: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232

August 5, 1964

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Casper
 Mr. Callahan
 Mr. Conrad
 Mr. McHugh
 Mr. Evans
 Mr. Gale
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Sullivan
 Mr. Tavel
 Mr. Trotter
 Tele. Room
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
 Stewart-Warner Corporation
 LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
 Security-First National Bank
 CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Chairman of the Board
 Belden Manufacturing Company
 ROBERT DONNER, Chairman
 Donner Foundation
 HENRY DUQUE, Partner
 Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
 WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
 Alexander & Company
 PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
 Eversharp, Inc.
 ROBERT W. GALVIN, President
 Motorola, Inc.
 FRED M. GILLIES
 Retired Chairman of the Board
 Acme Steel Company
 CLIFFORD F. HOOD
 Former President
 United States Steel Corporation
 WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
 Illinois Central Railroad
 WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
 ERNEST J. LOEBBECKE, President
 Title Insurance and Trust Company
 HUGHSTON M. McBAIN
 Retired Chairman of the Board
 Marshall Field & Company
 A. B. McKEE, JR., President
 Forest Lumber Company
 Imperial Valley Lumber Company
 GENERAL ROBERT E. WOOD
 Retired Chairman of the Board
 Sears, Roebuck & Company
 MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
 Retired President
 American Library of Information
 HOWARD I. YOUNG, President
 American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
 JOHN M. FISHER
 American Security Council
 Senior Vice President
 KENNETH M. PIPER
 Motorola, Inc.
 Vice President
 STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
 U.S. Steel Corporation
 Vice President
 JOHN G. SEVCIK
 Burton-Dixie Corporation
 Vice President
 RUSSELL E. WHITE
 General Electric Company
 Secretary-Treasurer
 CYRIL W. HOOPER
 Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
 JOHN M. FISHER
 Research Director
 WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
 Field Director
 MAJOR GENERAL G. B. COVERDALE, USA (Ret.)
 Chief, Washington Bureau
 LEE R. PENNINGTON
 International Politics Editor
 ASC Washington Report
 DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
 Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
 DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
 Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
 FRANK J. JOHNSON
 Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
 ASC Washington Report
 DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY
 International Law and Space Editor
 ASC Washington Report
 REAR ADMIRAL CHESTER G. WARD, USN (Ret.)

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
 Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 9th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue
 Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I've enclosed for your consideration an advance copy of our National Strategy Committee's most recent study, "Guidelines for Cold War Victory".

This study was prepared by our top-level National Strategy Committee in cooperation with 128 representative universities and colleges and 102 major organizations representing millions of Americans.

This has been prepared on a non-partisan basis. The National Strategy Committee devoted its main attention to developing affirmative recommendations for the consideration of government and of our members.

The American Security Council is organized as the means through which its member companies and institutions work together and cooperate with the government. Thus, since this study will be a prime reference point in our next studies, we are most-interested in any suggestions you may have for improvement of this study.

Also, if you'd like, we'd be pleased to send you a working draft of our next study "The Role of Business in the Cold War" when it is ready for review and criticism. *100-425828-93*

ENCLOSURE
2-
ENCLOSURE

REC-42

Sincerely, *John M. Fisher* 18 AUG 28 1964

EX-108

John M. Fisher
President

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/2/88 BY SP/ma/b/c

JMF/jr
Enc.

AUG 31 1964
69 SEP 3 1964 144

UNREGISTERED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/08 BY SP1mac/HC

100-42582 8-93
ENCLOSURE

THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
123 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois

Washington Bureau
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Contact: Robert W. Galvin - Chicago - NA 5-6000
John M. Fisher - Chicago - AN 3-2784

FOR RELEASE: Wednesday, A.M., August 12, 1964

TOP-LEVEL CIVILIAN COMMITTEE URGES ADOPTION
OF STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN THE COLD WAR

CHICAGO -- The top-level civilian National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council today recommended the adoption of a victory strategy in the Cold War.

The recommendation was made in a 128 page non-partisan study Guidelines for Cold War Victory released today.

John M. Fisher, President of the American Security Council, described the study as "a synthesis of the best liberal, moderate and conservative thinking on how we can win the Cold War without nuclear war."

"Guidelines" was two years in preparation. It was drafted by the 28 national figures on the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council in cooperation with representative colleges, universities and organizations. The chairman of the Committee is Robert Galvin, Chairman of the Board of Motorola, Inc., and the co-chairman is Loyd Wright, former president of the American Bar Association who headed the Commission on Govern-

- more -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/llc

ment Security established by Congress in 1955.

Mr. Fisher said the scope of participation in the study was "without precedent in American history". Never before have so many opinion-making groups participated in the development of national strategy recommendations. In addition to the top executives of the ASC's 3500 member companies and institutions whose advice was sought at the outset, the participants included 128 cooperating universities and colleges, 102 co-operating organizations representing millions of Americans, and the ASC's Cold War Advisory Committee comprised of prominent citizens and world figures.

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman of the ASC's National Strategy Committee, said that the central conclusion of the study was that, "Unless the United States adopts an affirmative Cold War policy, it will continue to lose the Cold War in the same way a football team would lose if it were prohibited from crossing the 50-yard line."

Mr. Galvin said, "The total power of any nation is the product of its military strength times its economic strength times its moral fibre or will. If any one of the elements of this formula equals zero, the total power of a nation equals zero."

"Thus, if we don't have the will, our superior military and economic power will be valueless and the credibility of our positions seriously doubted."

"Guidelines" points out that the late President John F. Kennedy set forth a basic goal for America in 1962 when he said that the U.S. seeks "a peaceful world community of free and independent states -- free to choose their own future and their own system, so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others".

The National Strategy Committee finds this national goal "utterly irreconcilable" with the Communist goal of total victory through the overthrow of all non-Communist societies and institutions.

"Against the Communist strategy of aggression," the study said, "there can and must be a strategy not merely to deter aggression but to transform aggressors into peaceful governments. In place of the present policies which encourage the Communists in their drive for world rule, the United States must develop a strategy of victory which will provide real inducements to the Communists to call off the Cold War.

"We do not advocate a conquest by the United States of the peoples of the Communist Bloc. Rather, we aim at a true reconciliation and peace between free peoples."

The study said that the present U.S. policies of containment and accommodation leading to "convergence" of the democratic and Communist systems "immeasurably increase the danger of precipitating nuclear war".

It said that these policies "totally ignore the empirical fact that every act of moderation or compromise, every retreat or concession on our part, has led not to reciprocity on the part of the Communists, but to new pres-

sure; not to a relaxation of tension, but to a new crisis; not toward peace, but toward war".

"Guidelines for Cold War Victory" calls for a "viable U.S. foreign policy" aimed concurrently at: (1) halting further Communist expansion; (2) promoting the national independence or at least the neutrality of the Communist satellite states; (3) working toward the establishment of governments (new or transformed) in Russia and Red China which will confine their foreign policy to the legitimate, patriotic, national interests of their peoples, showing equal respect for the patriotic, national interests of all their neighbors.

"If these aims were to be accomplished," said Mr. Galvin, "we would interpret their realization as victory in the Cold War".

To achieve these goals, "Guidelines" makes such recommendations as:

1. Affirmative action on Cuba.

Our national power should be applied peacefully and effectively by utilizing the centuries-old principle of declaration of contraband. It is recommended that the President apply this principle by declaring the entire Western Hemisphere to be a peace zone, with all Communist war material, including fuel, declared to be contraband. A quarantine should be instituted to keep more contraband from being moved into or between the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Simultaneously, a free Cuban Government should be established to serve as the agent of control for the second stage in the liberation of Cuba -- a massive, carefully planned, logically supported (by the U.S.) guerrilla warfare campaign against Castro -- a genuine "war of national liberation".

2. A new strategy for Southeast Asia.

It must be made clear to the Asian Communists that the U.S. will not allow them to limit so-called "wars of liberation" to our side of the line. We must be willing, and give concrete evidence of our willingness, to extend our own war of liberation into the enemy camp.

The cheapest and quickest way to win the war in South Vietnam is to begin with one or more of the privileged sanctuaries like North Vietnam and Communist-held parts of Laos. If these countries were cut off as a base of supply and sanctuary for the Viet Cong, both the military situation and the all-important psychological atmosphere in South Vietnam would be transformed.

3. Mount a comprehensive psychological offensive against world Communism.

We have no offensive psychological action policy to match that of the Communists. They war against us continuously;

we do not war against them. A psychological offensive offers us the best chance to win the Cold War without nuclear conflict.

Those who live under the miseries of Communism, who know it first hand, are the most fertile target for psychological warfare. A massive effort directed at these people is the best way to bring maximum internal pressure on the Communist regimes.

This effort should embody a full-scale ideological offensive to open the closed Soviet society, a program to place major stress on Soviet imperio-colonialism, and a special program to rally democratic forces in Eastern Europe into an effective opposition against their Soviet rulers. The latter program should not, however, incite these people to outright revolt unless and until there is solid basis to believe that such revolts would succeed.

(Note to editors: Other major recommendations appear in the enclosed summary of "Guidelines".)

Mr. Galvin stressed that "the individuals, organizations and institutions who officially cooperated in this study do not necessarily agree with all specific recommendations ". He emphasized that the recommendations were the sole responsibility of the National Strategy Committee. However, he said that "the central thrust of this study fairly represents the consensus viewpoint of these participants ".

The 28-member National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council is made up of 18 present or former heads of ASC member companies and 10 men who have played important roles in the nation's history. The latter 10 men include the Chief U.S. strategist in World War II, a former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, a former Chief of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur, the "father of the 'H' bomb", the Commander of the World War II allied invasion of Italy, and a past president of the American Bar Association who served as chairman of the Commission on Government Security.

The National Strategy Committee members are:

Chairman

Robert W. Galvin Chairman of the Board, Motorola, Inc.

Co-Chairman

Loyd Wright. Past President, American Bar Association

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret) . . . Former Chief of Staff to Gen. Douglas MacArthur
Bennett Archambault. Chairman of the Board, Stewart-Warner Corporation
Lloyd L. Austin. Chairman of the Board, Security First National Bank
General Mark W. Clark. President, The Citadel
Charles S. Craigmire Chairman of the Board, Belden Manufacturing Co.
Robert Donner. Chairman, Donner Foundation
Henry Duque. Partner, Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
Wade Fetzer, Jr. Chairman, Alexander & Company
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr. Chairman of the Board, Eversharp, Inc. and
Technicolor, Inc.
Fred Gillies Ret. Chairman of the Board, Acme Steel Co.
Clifford Hood. Former President, United States Steel Corp.
Wayne A. Johnston. President, Illinois Central Railroad
William H. Kendall President, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
Ernest J. Loebbecke. President, Title Insurance & Trust Company
Hughston M. McBain Ret. Chairman of the Board, Marshall Field & Co.
A. B. McKee, Jr. President, Forest Lumber Company
Imperial Valley Lumber Company
Admiral Ben Moreell. Former Chairman of the Board,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Company
Dr. Robert Morris. Former President, University of Dallas

Dr. Stefan Possony Director of International Studies
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret) . . . Former Commander in Chief, Pacific
Dr. Edward Teller. Nuclear Scientist
Rear Admiral Chester C. Ward, USN (Ret). Former Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.) . . Chief U.S. Strategist, World War II
Gen. Robert E. Wood. Ret. Chairman of the Board, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Maj. Gen. W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret) . . . Ret. President, American Library of Information
Howard I. Young. President, American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co.

The 128 representative universities and colleges cooperating in the study included Auburn University, the University of Notre Dame, Southern Methodist, Texas A & M, Loyola of Chicago, Xavier of Cincinnati, De Paul University, and a number of state universities such as Arizona State, University of Kentucky, University of Maine, University of Massachusetts, New Mexico State, and the University of North Carolina.

The 102 cooperating organizations represent a wide range of interests. They include the American Legion, American Farm Bureau Federation, American Society for Industrial Security, International House, Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Association of American Railroads, Association of Industrial Advertisers, International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, many other national organizations and a number of local and regional civic and business groups.

Among those serving on the ASC's Cold War Advisory Committee were Dr. Charles Malik, former president of the U.N. General Assembly; Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, former U.S. Ambassador to Italy; Charles Edison, former Governor of New Jersey; Henry Hazlitt, contributing editor of Newsweek; former U.S. Senator William F. Knowland of California; author

Russell Kirk; Benjamin Gitlow, former member of the Praesidium of the Communist International; Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, former director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs; and Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, former chairman of the U.N. Security Council.

The ASC's Strategy Staff also played an important role in the study. This staff, headed by Mr. Fisher, includes Major General G. B. Coverdale, former chief of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps and now administrative director of the ASC; Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, author of the famed Captive Nations Week resolution; Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Pulitzer Prize winning columnist; Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer of the University of Notre Dame's Political Science Department; and Stanley J. Tracy, former Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Fisher stated that the American Security Council is a non-profit, non-partisan association operated by 3500 businesses and private institutions to meet their Cold War responsibilities.

SUMMARY

GUIDELINES FOR COLD WAR VICTORY

Prepared By The National Strategy Committee
American Security Council
123 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606

Publication Date: August 12, 1964

The Free World and the Communist Bloc are locked in a final war to determine whether the world will live under dictatorship or under freedom. If we lose this war the lights of freedom will go out all over the world, possibly not to be relighted for centuries.

The National Governors' Conference said in a resolution unanimously adopted by all governors representing all wings of both major political parties on July 24, 1963:

"The only real obstacle standing today between Communism and world dictatorship is a strong United States, determined to use its strength in freedom's cause... The Cold War is a real and deadly struggle from which only one side will emerge victorious."

The late President John F. Kennedy set forth the basic goal of America in 1962 when he said that we seek "a peaceful world com-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/02 BY SP/ma/llc

SUMMARY -- 2

munity of free and independent states--free to choose their own future and their own system, so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others".

Standing between America and its goal is the Communist empire's drive for world dominion. The Communist goal, restated again and again, is the overthrow of all non-Communist societies and institutions. The Communist goal is total victory for World Communism.

The two goals are utterly irreconcilable.

Yet, although the Communists have clearly declared war on us, America has failed to decide that it, too, seeks victory in the present conflict. Instead, for nearly two decades the United States has patiently pursued the policy of containment. The failure of this policy is now clear. Nonetheless, the United States is today softening its policy of containment and shifting to the far more conciliatory strategy of interdependence.

The basic assumption in the strategy of interdependence is that by helping the Soviet Union overcome its economic difficulties, by seeking areas of common action, and by working toward a "convergence" of values and purposes, we can gradually bring about the fundamental alteration of Soviet purpose which containment alone failed to do.

The idea of convergence is based on the belief that as the United States becomes more socialistic and the Soviet Union adopts more Western methods, there will soon be no differences between the two systems and, therefore, no reason for conflict.

SUMMARY -- 3

We believe that these strategies are utterly wrong. They totally ignore the fact that every act of moderation or compromise, every retreat or concession on our part, has led not to reciprocity on the part of the Communists, but to new pressure; not to a relaxation of tension, but to a new crisis; not toward peace, but toward war.

The new strategy of interdependence has already been the basis for the no-inspection Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the credit sale of wheat to Russia, the recent moves to develop even more trade with Communist nations, and the "unilateral-interlocking arms control" reduction of enriched uranium and plutonium production.

The net effect of a policy of conciliation and accommodation is to affirm the Soviet leadership in its view that world Communism and its own hegemony are practical goals which do not involve undue risk, goals that they can now hope to achieve through increased aggression and subversion. Thus, instead of preserving peace, our present strategies immeasurably increase the danger of nuclear war.

A policy of conciliation and accommodation can never be effective in dealing with a dictator-aggressor. History shows that this can be no more effective in dealing with Khrushchev than it was in dealing with Hitler.

Thus, the Communists have been winning the Cold War because United States policy:

1. Is a defensive policy, with all this implies strategically and psychologically. It abandons the initiative to the Communists and

SUMMARY -- 4

allows them to choose the field of battle. It compels us to react rather than act. It abandons our anti-Communist allies within the Communist Empire. It weakens the belief of "fence-sitters" in our ultimate victory and dismays some of our most loyal friends. It saps our will to make sacrifices, raises false hopes and encourages national complacency.

2. Provides no real inducement to the Communists to stop the Cold War. The belief that the United States will never take the offensive assures the Reds that they can pursue their objective without risk to themselves. They have the world to win and nothing to lose by continuing to wage the Cold War against us, their passive adversary.

3. Fails to make use of our national power while we still have it. The United States is still the strongest nation in the world. Our military, economic, industrial and technological capabilities exceed those of any country on the face of the globe. At present, victory can be won without nuclear war. While the United States has the military capacity to win a hot war, no aggressor will dare start a hot war. Thus, it is urgent that we win the Cold War before the Communists achieve a technological breakthrough which may reverse this balance of power.

Unless the United States adopts an affirmative Cold War policy, it will continue to lose the Cold War in the same way that a football team would lose if it were prohibited from crossing the 50-yard line.

SUMMARY -- 5

Against the Communist strategy of aggression, there can and must be a strategy not merely to deter aggression but to transform aggressors into peaceful governments. In place of the present policies which encourage the Soviets in their drive for world rule, the United States must develop a strategy of victory which will provide real inducements to the Communists to call off the Cold War.

We do not advocate a conquest by the United States of the peoples of the Communist Bloc. Rather, we aim at a true reconciliation and peace between free peoples. Such a reconciliation will not be possible until there is a basic change in the nature of their government--until their government stops trying to conquer the rest of the world.

A viable U. S. foreign policy to accomplish our national goal of a "peaceful world community of free and independent states", must aim at three things concurrently: first, halt further Communist expansion; second, promote the national independence or at least the neutrality of the Communist satellite states; and third, work for the establishment of governments in Russia and Red China which will confine their foreign policy to the legitimate, patriotic, national interests of their peoples, showing equal respect for the patriotic, national interest of all their neighbors.

The total power of any nation is the product of its military strength times its economic strength times its moral fiber or will. If any one of the elements of this formula equals zero, the total power of a nation equals zero. Thus, if we don't have the will, our superior military and

SUMMARY -- 6

economic power will be valueless and the credibility of our positions will be seriously doubted.

Once a national objective of victory is adopted, it is imperative that we demonstrate that we have the national will to accomplish this objective. The following are recommended as Cold War priorities which the United States could move on immediately to prove conclusively that our goal is victory:

1. Affirmative action on Cuba.

Our national power should be applied peacefully and effectively by utilizing the centuries-old principle of declaration of contraband. It is recommended that the President apply this principle by declaring the entire Western Hemisphere to be a peace zone, with all Communist war material, including fuel, declared to be contraband. A quarantine should be instituted to keep more contraband from being moved into or between the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Simultaneously, a free Cuban Government should be established to serve as the agent of control for the second stage in the liberation of Cuba--a massive, carefully planned, logically supported (by the U. S.) guerrilla warfare campaign against Castro--a genuine "war of national liberation".

2. A new strategy for Southeast Asia.

It must be made clear to the Asian Communists that the U. S. will not allow them to limit so-called "wars of liberation"

SUMMARY -- 7

to our side of the line. We must be willing, and give concrete evidence of our willingness, to extend our own war of liberation into the enemy camp.

The cheapest and quickest way to win the war in South Vietnam is to begin with one or more of the privileged sanctuaries like North Vietnam and Communist-held parts of Laos. If these countries were cut off as a base of supply and sanctuary for the Viet Cong, both the military situation and the all-important psychological atmosphere in South Vietnam would be transformed.

3. Mount a comprehensive psychological offensive against world Communism.

We have no offensive psychological action policy to match that of the Communists. They war against us continuously; we do not war against them. A psychological offensive offers us the best chance to win the Cold War without nuclear conflict.

Those who live under the miseries of Communism, who know it first hand, are the most fertile target for psychological warfare. A massive effort directed at these people is the best way to bring maximum internal pressure on the Communist regimes.

This effort should embody a full-scale ideological offensive to open the closed Soviet society, a program to place major stress on Soviet imperio-colonialism, and a special program to rally democratic forces in Eastern Europe into an effective opposition

SUMMARY -- 8

against their Soviet rulers. The latter program should not, however, incite these people to outright revolt unless and until there is solid basis to believe that such revolts would succeed.

4. An effective economic offensive.

In place of trade deals which strengthen the economies of Communist countries, we recommend a limited trade embargo against them. This does not mean that all trade with the Soviet Bloc should necessarily be stopped. But it should be severely curtailed in those products which the Communists need most to continue the Cold War. This would include not only military equipment, but all articles which increase the industrial potential of the Soviet Union.

5. A more realistic foreign aid program.

Economic aid programs must be coordinated with America's objective of victory in the Cold War. Priority should be given to deserving allies and nations making a sensible effort to build freedom, but we must cut off aid to all countries which are hostile or are aiding or abetting Communist expansion.

The U. S. should gradually terminate economic aid as we have practiced it since the end of World War II and restore the mechanics of international investment, including the confidence factors that are necessary to increase the investment flow.

6. Improve relations with NATO nations.

To restore the confidence of our NATO allies and build a

SUMMARY -- 9

permanent and satisfactory unity in the Western alliance, the combined European NATO nations should be treated as a full partner rather than as a satellite. The combined European NATO nations should be granted possession and control of nuclear weapons for joint defense against air, missile and ground attack, and for deterrent and retaliatory purposes.

If it is clear to the Soviets that any attack on the key European front would automatically run into nuclear defenses, their strategy would have to be revised and war, as an instrument of world revolution, would have to be written off. It is precisely this change in strategy which must be considered the first step toward a constructive evolution of the Soviet regime.

7. A new policy for Latin America.

The Alliance for Progress, of itself, is not enough to combat the spread of Communism in Latin America. We are not opposed to an intelligent economic aid program for our neighbors to the south. But the U. S. must recognize that the real cause of Communism is Communists--not poverty per se.

America must do all it can to encourage and strengthen its friends among the intellectual, political and military groups in Latin America. It must also support the various private anti-Communist organizations in these countries who have struggled alone against the public ignorance and apathy on which Communist cadres count to make their objective possible.

SUMMARY -- 10

8. The U. S. must make maximum use of the United Nations as an effective Cold War forum. At the same time, we must face up to the reality that the UN itself is not capable of blocking Communist ambitions.

The UN can serve admirably as a world forum in which the U. S. and other nations can properly present their case. But we must learn to make better use of the UN to expand the cause of freedom--and not permit it to restrict American actions aimed at halting the continuing threats to freedom.

The U. S. should never subcontract to the UN its decision-making responsibilities--as it has done so often in the past. The result of this subcontracting has been the loss of the initiative in world affairs to America's enemies who never permit the UN to act as an inhibiting factor in their policy.

9. Maintenance of a superior military posture.

The avoidance of war requires that the United States maintain over-all military superiority, rather than the acceptance of any kind of "parity" which can only be ephemeral and inherently unstable.

No aggressor will dare start a "hot" war against the United States so long as the United States has the capability of winning any hot war.

To maintain military supremacy, the U. S. must undertake four major tasks: first, planned and rapid technological progress and modernization; second, build a supreme strategic force more

SUMMARY -- 11

flexible, discriminating and effective than any we have yet possessed; third, modernize U. S. and NATO ground forces equipped with nuclear tactical weapons for "invasion-proofing"; fourth, develop adequate defenses against attack, including anti-missile missiles and construction of a vast network of community fallout shelters, which combined would serve as a strong additional deterrent against nuclear war.

In addition, the U. S. must promptly develop a military capacity in space and a follow-on manned bomber to preserve the Strategic Air Command as a mixed bomber-missile force.

10. The U. S. must recognize the dangers inherent in disarmament.

So long as the Communists continue to seek world domination, disarmament is unthinkable. The Communists attempt to equate disarmament with peace, but they actually see it as a short cut to total Communist victory.

Until we appreciate the fact that disarmament is impossible unless the Communists give up their design for world conquest, mankind's most fervent hope will remain the grand illusion. Worse yet, disarmament will not lead to peace, but only to the ultimate disaster of a choice between surrender and war.

In conclusion, "Guidelines for Cold War Victory" emphasizes that "It is up to us, as free American citizens, to decide whether our civilization shall perish or whether it will renew itself and lead the way toward a better world for all mankind".

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WC*FROM : Mr. R. W. Smith *fwse*

o/p.
 SUBJECT: JOHN M. FISHER
 AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
 INFORMATION CONCERNING
 CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER

DATE: 8-11-64

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. Garner
- 1 - Mr. Keating

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 McLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan *100-425828-94*
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

R.W. Smith

By attached letter, Mr. John M. Fisher, President, American Security Council (ASC), sent to Assistant to the Director Belmont an advance copy of a study entitled "Guidelines for Cold War Victory," which was prepared by the National Strategy Committee of ASC. Fisher asked for suggestions for improving this study, which is currently being reviewed by the Domestic Intelligence Division. The review will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

The ASC is an organization operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities. It has announced publicly that there are several former Special Agents in the organization. In 1959, information was received that ASC was possibly planning to develop informants in the Communist Party which raised the possibility of intrusion in our field of primary responsibility. Files do not indicate further information has been developed in this regard.

Mr. Fisher is a former Special Agent who EOD 8-4-47, and resigned 2-13-53, in GS-12. His services were satisfactory, and he is on the Special Correspondents' List. Our relations have been cordial with him, however, we do not want to give ASC any basis for claiming that it is receiving suggestions or advice from the Bureau. Therefore, the attached acknowledgment over the Director's signature has been purposely made brief.

RECOMMENDATION:

REG-42

That the attached letter be sent to Fisher.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-5828-94

Enc. *sent 8-13-64*JEK:pc:mjh *mr.*

(6)

XEROX

AUG 31 1964

64 SEP 3 1964

EX-108
 08 AUG 28 1964
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/2/88 BY SP77144/HC

SEE ADDENDUM OVER

guy
ADDENDUM: DCM/mlk, 8-12-64

Mr. Fisher also sent copies of this book to the Director and to Mr. Tolson. Accordingly, it is felt that Mr. Fisher should receive one letter of acknowledgement over the Director's signature incorporating the receipt of the 3 books. A proposed letter is attached.

Keay *guy*
John

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

FROM : W. S. Tavel *ST*

SUBJECT: *DeWITT COPP* -
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: September 23, 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ~~7/12/1987~~ BY *SP170/act/ee*
~~8/8/073~~

I have just learned from Mr. DeWitt Copp that he has been hired as manager of the Washington office of the American Security Council. Copp is an individual with whom I was acquainted in high school and who, until recently, has taught history in a private school in Connecticut and done free-lance writing on the side. The Bureau assisted him in a book which he has written on communist activities at the United Nations by supplying him with certain public source data. Copp states he expects the book to be published early in 1965. The American Security Council is an anticommunist organization subscribed to by numerous industrial firms and which maintains a central reference library of information on communism and communists in Chicago.

Copp stated that his primary job to begin with is organizing and writing scripts for a radio program to be sponsored by the American Security Council consisting of 5-minute taped interviews with prominent individuals concerning topics dealing primarily with communism. He states that 500 radio stations across the country have accepted this service, which is being furnished as a public service feature and paid for by the Schick Razor Company. The editor is a Dr. Walter H. Judd and the coeditor is Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.). Copp stated that Senator Dodd would conduct a few of the interviews but that most of them would be handled by Judd. The program is expected to be on 5 days a week. Copp stated that the initial program is to appear on September 28 and he gave me a copy of a recording of the first program. I am sending this to the Domestic Intelligence Division separately.

Copp also furnished me a copy of a book entitled "Peace and Freedom Through Cold War Victory" with the subtitle "Guidelines for Cold War Victory" published by the American Security Council Press. I am also furnishing this separately to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Copp mentioned incidentally that Lee Pennington, formerly an Inspector in the FBI, has been doing some research work for the American Security Council in Washington and is working with Copp at present.

RECOMMENDATION: Submitted for information.

1. Mr. DeLoach

2. Mr. Sullivan (Encs. - 2) 167 SEP 30 1964

3. Personnel file of Lee R. Pennington (out of service)

100-425828-
NOT RECORDED

SEP 29 1964

2014 100-425828-9/23

INT. SEC. -
ERG

64 OCT 5 1964

94-59483-
ST
ORIGINAL FILED

Memo Smith to Sullivan

RE: REVIEW OF "THE WASHINGTON REPORT"
AUDITION RECORDING, PRESENTED BY THE

DETAILS:

ReBumemo Tavel to Mohr 9/23/64. The above-captioned recording which was personally handed to Mr. Tavel by Mr. DeWitt Copp, manager of the Washington office of the American Security Council, was received in the Domestic Intelligence Division on 10/19/64 and reviewed by the Central Research Unit. The American Security Council paperback "Guidelines for Cold War Victory: Peace and Freedom Through Cold War Victory," also presented by Mr. Copp, was previously reviewed by the Central Research Unit in a memorandum from Smith to Sullivan dated 8/12/64.

Background

This is the pilot program of a "prestige radio news program" produced by the American Security Council and provided free to 1,000 key stations under a public service grant from the Schick Safety Razor Company. The editors of the program are Dr. Walter H. Judd and Senator Thomas J. Dodd. Dr. Judd, a physician and member of the 78th to 87th Congresses, was nominated for President at the 1964 Republican National Convention. The first of frequent guests to appear in this series is former President Eisenhower. It is a five-day-a-week, 3 1/4 minute program designed to fit into a five minute time segment with local commercials.

Review

The enclosed record, which includes three programs, begins with an introduction by Dr. Judd who states that the purpose of the series is to give listeners a better understanding of complex current events and provide background essential to such an understanding. Dr. Judd says the venture is intended to be nonpartisan and will include leaders and experts in all important areas of international affairs.

On the first program former President Eisenhower's statesmanlike remarks concern the contrast between freedom and communism. He points out how communists use deceitful tactics and states that to defeat communism we must use truth and rely on our spiritual values. He wishes the venture success and remarks that it will help keep the "lights of freedom burning brightly."

In the second program, Judd, commenting on the Cuban crisis, alludes to a report allegedly submitted to the Secretary of State. This report, based on data secured from Cuban refugee groups, alleges that the Soviets have never pulled out of Cuba. Instead they have instituted a rotation plan designed to fool us. They have concealed submarine bases and have built underground silos for missiles. The report supposedly describes in detail Soviet activities in the 12-mile-long cavern at
ENCLOSURE ON BULKY RAMP

Memo Smith to Sullivan

RE: REVIEW OF "THE WASHINGTON REPORT"
AUDITION RECORDING, PRESENTED BY THE

Santa Tomas. Judd states that, although the report is discounted in official circles, America must take a hard look at the situation in Cuba.

The third program consists of Senator Dodd's presentation of a plan to shorten the war in Vietnam. In order to cut off the communist supply line, he advocates hit and run raids on the northern coast of Vietnam; the destruction of bridges, dams, and generators; and, the severance of the supply route running from neighboring Laos to North Vietnam.

American Security Council

The files disclose the American Security Council is an organization financed and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for its members. It sponsors Fidelifax, Inc., a nationwide personnel investigating organization with offices in 32 cities, each of which is allegedly headed by a former Bureau agent.

In 1959, information was received that the American Security Council was possibly planning to develop informants in the Communist Party which raised the possibility of intrusion in our field of primary responsibility. Files do not indicate further information has been developed in this regard.

Past inquiries have indicated that some people believe the American Security Council is closely related to the Bureau. This is probably attributable to the organization's readiness to identify its members as being formerly associated with the Bureau.

Observation

Based on the pilot program, it would appear that this series will utilize politicians to advocate that the United States carry out a more aggressive international policy against communism.

References to Director or FBI

No reference was made in this recording to either the Director or the FBI. ENCLOSURE ON BULKY RAMP

677.5
December 21, 1964

100-425828-96

REC-1


C
Honorable Daniel Ken Inouye
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

My dear Senator:

The letter of December 17th from your Administrative Assistant has been received.

While I would like to be of assistance, the FBI being an investigative agency of the Federal Government neither makes evaluations nor draws conclusions as to the character or integrity of any organization, publication or individual. Information contained in the files of the FBI must be maintained as confidential in accordance with regulations of the Department of Justice.

In view of this, I am sure you will understand why I cannot answer your specific inquiry. I can advise you, however, that the American Security Council and the Institute for American Strategy have not been the subjects of investigations by this Bureau. This should not be construed as a clearance or non-clearance of these organizations by the FBI. Also, they have no connection whatsoever with the FBI nor do they have access to our information.



Sincerely yours, E. I. H. SEC'D RET'D

Edgar Hoover

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOTE. The American Security Council is an organization ~~financed~~ and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for use of its members. Information developed is made available for a fee to members of companies and other organizations or individuals deemed to be qualified by the ASC. High officials are former SAs of the FBI. The

WAM:med (4)

NOTE continued page 2.

for DEC 24 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/21/88 BY SP/macl

60 DEC 30 1964 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

REF ID: A34326
RECEIVED
17 DEC
B
T
FBI - WASH. D.C.

RECORDED TO 94-52925-1

Honorable Daniel Ken Inouye

Institute for American Strategy operates in a similar manner and is also controlled by a former Agent named John Fisher. We have had contacts and dealings with these organizations in the past but more recently we have been circumspect concerning requests for literature and speech requests. Senator Daniel Ken Inouye is a Senator from Hawaii and a person with whom we have had cordial relations in the past.

The Senator's wife and friends were taken on a special tour 91-64.

b6
b7C

DANIEL K. INOUYE
HAWAII

RALPH M. MIWA
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 17, 1964

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Within the applicable rules and regulations of your office, Senator Inouye would appreciate it very much if you could provide him with some objective background information on the following organizations:

The American Security Council
The Institute for American Strategy

It would be appreciated if the request can be expedited.

Sincerely,



RALPH M. MIWA
Administrative Assistant

RMM:sb

DEC 18 2 55 PM '64

DEC 24 1964
XEROX

lett Inouye
12-21-64
WAM/mud
12/20/64
mud

REC-2/00-425828-96
23
2 DEC 18 1964


CORRESPONDENCE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED 94-52975

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. BELMONT _____
MR. MOHR _____
MR. DULACHT *part* _____
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. FELT _____
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN *part* _____
MR. SULLIVAN _____
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

File
Molotov Gromyko
Geo. Shultz
Reagan
Csp

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
by [initials]

DATE 7/12/86 BY SP7mech/Hcc

100-425828-

NOT RECORDED

25 JAN 14 1965

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE AT 1A 201083630

56 JAN 1968

69 JAN 18 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/18 BY SP7mackie

100-425828-

EXPOSURE



①

WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/88 BY SP1mcc/

Washington, January 11, 1965

WR 65-2

WORLD PERSPECTIVES - 1965

The ending of the old year and the arrival of the new is always a time for stock-taking, particularly in international affairs. It is a fascinating age in which we live, because a titanic world struggle is in progress, the outcome of which will have a decisive effect on the destiny of mankind for perhaps many centuries to come. Since World War II, America has played the major single role, for good or ill, in determining the direction of world history. Washington is still the city on which all eyes are fixed. Every other nation, friend or foe, must give major weight to our probable reaction before shaping its own policies. America is the arbiter of the world; war or peace, closed or open societies, misery or prosperity - all depend in largest measure on the action, or lack of it, by the United States. The responsibility of the American people to others, to themselves, and to future generations, is an exceedingly heavy one.

The Crisis in Vietnam

Washington's gravest responsibility - and the one it has most tragically failed to meet -- is in Vietnam. 1964 has been a very bad year in this unhappy country. As coup has followed coup and Communist control has steadily enlarged, the judgment on the overthrow of President Diem has been given by events: it was a profound mistake for which Washington must take much of the blame. The war against the Viet Cong was going quite well in the Spring of 1963 until the Communist-infiltrated Buddhists moved against the Diem Government. The United States panicked and helped to destroy the kind of stable government for which it now so desperately pleads.

At the beginning of 1965, it may well be too late to avoid a total disaster. The substance of real democracy is presently impossible in Vietnam, but the United States has been stubbornly insisting on its facade at the cost of progressively alienating those elements in Vietnam who must, after all, do the actual fighting against the Communists. The danger of total dependence on United States support is again revealed; it is only against our friends and allies that we dare to employ pressure; never against our enemies. Disharmony between the U.S. and South Vietnamese is at a new peak.

As to the Chinese and North Vietnamese instigators and supporters of the Viet Cong rebellion, repeated United States warnings to "leave their neighbors alone" have had

100-4125828

no effect. In retaliation there have been some limited, clandestine operations against the North, and more may have been decided upon following General Taylor's November visit to Washington. But the United States is clearly unable to bring itself to put real teeth into its warnings. This is what the Chinese mean when they call us "paper tigers." We have the power but we dare not use it.

Why are we immobilized in Vietnam?

The analogy of "Munich" with current events is frequently inaccurate and almost always exaggerated. But the similarities to Vietnam are truly striking. Although they were as opposed to Naziism as the United States is to Communism, Britain and France declined to risk war with Germany in 1938 over Czechoslovakia for these reasons:

1) The principle of self-determination (like democracy) was highly respected and many people felt that the Sudeten Germans were genuinely oppressed by the Czechs and should be allowed to join Germany. (Actually Henlein, the Sudeten leader, worked secretly with Hitler and had strict orders to make no settlement with the Czechs no matter what concessions they granted). Similarly, many people today consider the South Vietnamese Government oppressive and so believe the Buddhists and/or Viet Cong have a legitimate grievance. 2) It was argued that going to war would not help Czechoslovakia which would be overrun by the Germans in any case. Today it is said that extending the war to North Vietnam probably would not help matters in South Vietnam. 3) There was great reluctance to risk the horror of war so long as there was any chance that Hitler could still be appeased. Today the danger of war is also stressed by those who argue that, on the other hand, China can surely be appeased by a "settlement" that will eliminate the hated U.S. military presence from mainland Asia. 4) Public opinion in Britain, the Dominions, and France would not support war in 1938 (the proof was the wild cheering of Chamberlain and Daladier when they returned from Munich). Today, evidently, American public opinion is also against a major confrontation with China in Asia.

It is only simple justice to Chamberlain and Daladier to say that these arguments against war in 1938 were highly persuasive. There was also another argument in favor of peace in 1938 that does not exist today. Britain and France were only then beginning their rearmament programs which had been fiercely opposed by the pacifists of the day. Some leaders felt, perhaps mistakenly, that time was essential in order to overcome German air superiority. Perhaps the year gained at Munich did, in fact, help in the Battle of Britain in 1940. This is debatable, but what is fact is that war did come and no argument can be made today that the military situation vis-a-vis China will be more favorable in the future than it is today. With its atomic bomb the Chinese dragon is growing, not shrinking.

Senior American policy makers, at least, do not seem to be infected by the false logic of such advocates of retreat as De Gaulle or Walter Lippmann; nor do they appear to share the illusions and naivete of the modern American pacifists. Most are grimly aware of the consequences of a "negotiated" settlement or of American withdrawal. Probably those who can be objective now recognize the mistake in destroying Diem. However, the modern counterparts of the arguments which lead to Munich are no less compelling, and the pressures on the President against acceptance of a confrontation in Asia are enormous. In particular, American foreign policy has gone much too far down the fatal road of obeisance to "world opinion" to flout it now. America would

be savagely denounced at home and abroad if it publicly attacked North Vietnam or China. Our European allies are opposed. The Communists know this well and are making the most of it.

President Johnson therefore finds himself unable to do much more than try a little bluffing while sitting tight with the present policy and hoping for a miracle. While possible, miracles seldom happen, so the outlook must be for the loss of Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam will have a profound effect on future war or peace because its outcome will have a very important influence on whether the international Communist movement as a whole adopts the Soviet or Chinese view of "peaceful coexistence". The apparent failure of Russia and China to even begin to compromise their differences after Khrushchev's ouster was due in part to Chou En-lai's totally uncompromising stand when he was in Moscow. This can only be ascribed to the complete confidence of the Chinese that time is on their side and that their policies will eventually prevail. No doubt they are counting heavily on a victory in Vietnam to prove their point that violence pays off. This will give a huge new impetus to revolutionary war throughout Africa, Asia, and perhaps again in Latin America. It may also influence the future make up of the Soviet Government.

This is one of the reasons why those sincere Americans and others who are bringing such heavy pressure on the Administration to abandon Vietnam because they believe this is the road to peace would do well to rethink their positions. The futility of the Munich settlement as the way to "peace in our time" needs no retelling. Similarly, defeat in Southeast Asia will encourage and strengthen Communist China - the most sinister force for war and evil now existing on the world stage. Even those who trust most in the genuineness of the "detente" with Soviet Russia should recognize that any Chinese triumph, anywhere, works against the permanency of that detente because it exposes Soviet "moderation" to ridicule. If the Soviets still hold to their basic world goals and aspire to world leadership, they are certainly driven to compete more aggressively with Red China in achieving successes for world revolution, however, cautious they might like to be.

Deterioration in Africa

We are now experiencing this in Africa where Russia is hastening to give increased aid to militant, anti-Western elements. The Congo war is an immediate result but can only be a forerunner of worse to come. Egyptian President Nasser's violent verbal attack on the United States of December 23, during which he openly boasted of giving aid to the Congo rebels, shows how little we have achieved in ten years of trying to buy his friendship. Like small dogs who bark and nip at a big dog because they are convinced he will not bite back, Nasser, Ben Bella, and others are taking their cue from the success of China to pursue their own imperialistic intrigues. They dominate the U. N.; it cannot oppose them. The United States is still the only effective world policeman, but it recoils at the thought of laying its night stick across the skulls of the world's lesser offenders. Our political philosophers have lead us into a labyrinth of moral confusion, the effect of which is to strip us as naked as the antelope before the tigers of the world. And the tigers are multiplying.

Some Successes

The recent year has seen notable Communist defeats in Brazil, the Chilean elections, and most recently in British Guiana where Cheddi Jagan has been forced to step down from power. But it would be wishful thinking to regard these gains as anything more than temporary. Castro remains in power in Cuba and if defeat is not somehow still avoided in Vietnam, this shattering event will reverberate no less in Latin America than elsewhere in the world. Every life saved today by United States timidity may cost 100 in the wars of tomorrow.

The Need for Honesty

Unfortunately, emotional factors introduced into the recent United States Presidential election and the need for Administration self-justification precluded a serious discussion of American foreign policy by either side. Vietnam, for example, was hardly touched upon. President Kennedy, when he assumed office in 1961, did not mince words in describing the dangers that faced us in that period - perhaps because he did not then have to take responsibility for the policies of the past. The world situation is even more serious today.

If President Johnson made a similarly frank appraisal, he could shape American public opinion to support him in more affirmative action.



FRANK J. JOHNSON
FOREIGN EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor Dr. James D. Atkinson
Managing Editor DeWitt S. Copp
Intelligence Editor Major General G. B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)
Economics Editor Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
National Editor William Gill
Foreign Editor Frank J. Johnson
Research Director William K. Lambie, Jr.
News Editor Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President John G. Sevcik
Vice President Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond,
USA (Ret.)
Bennett Archambault
Lloyd L. Austin
General Mark Clark
Charles S. Craigmire
Henry Duque
Wade Fetzer, Jr.
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.
Fred M. Gillies
Clifford F. Hood
Wayne A. Johnston
William H. Kendall
Hughston M. McBain
A. B. McKee, Jr.
Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
General Robert E. Wood
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Howard I. Young

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren
Anthony Harrigan
Dr. Anthony Kubek
Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)

Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 2-10-65

FROM : M. W. Jones

SUBJECT: ~~ARTICLE ON SOVIET ESPIONAGE
BY DE WITT COPP
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL~~

BACKGROUND:

On 1-21-65, captioned individual came to your (Mr. DeLoach) office indicating that he was writing an article on Soviet espionage for his group's newsletter "Washington Report." He was given appropriate reprints on the subject of espionage.

The American Security Council is a group financed and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for use of its members. It has been friendly toward the Bureau.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

Copp has now furnished a copy of the manuscript of his article for review of those portions pertaining to the FBI. The article deals generally with the intensity of Soviet efforts to gain our secrets and points out that the United Nations has been a boon to these spying activities. Copp indicated that he has a short deadline, inasmuch as the article is to go to press on Thursday, 2-11-65.

REVIEW OF MANUSCRIPT:

The Crime Research Section and the Domestic Intelligence Division have checked the manuscript, and appropriate changes have been noted directly on the copy. (It is noted that the portions x-ed out in red reflect changes made by Copp's editors. Our changes are noted in blue pencil.) It is felt Copp should be told that we checked material only for accuracy and that this should not be construed as endorsement of his article.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-137

11 FEB 15 1965

That upon approval, this memo and the enclosed manuscript be returned to the Crime Research Section for appropriate, prompt referral to Copp.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Branigan

67 FEB 18 1965
JVA:mm (7)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Hill _____
Andy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/13/88 BY SP/ML/HC

94-594193-1
ENCODING COPY FILED

The new Kremlin leaders, Prime Minister Aleksi N. Kosygin and First Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev have been joined by President Lyndon Johnson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in proclaiming continued "peaceful coexistence" the order of 1965. Remaining U.S. and Western trade barriers, once considered so essential to the defeat of Communism, are expected to topple before the prevailing westerly winds of change to be replaced by trade bridges into the Communist camp. More, the President is seconded by Prime Minister Wilson in offering invitations to Brezhnev and Kosygin to come on over and have a friendly look around. Thus on the surface, reflected by both the words and deeds of the new administration, a genuine and continuing thaw can be expected in East-West relations.

But Cassandra-like, we maintain that Below the surface there are a number of barometers through whose ebb and flow the real meaning of "peaceful coexistence" must be judged if we are to keep an accurate and objective outlook on the cold war. One of these barometers measures the magnitude and scope of Soviet espionage directed against us.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7macb

January, 1965

For nearly a quarter of a century, the United States has been the number one target of Soviet intelligence efforts. Exposures over the years by the FBI of Soviet agents - foreign and American born - have given some indication of the degree of success these efforts have had. They are efforts that have gone on unabated and unaffected by diplomatic freezes and thaws. This is because the avowed purpose of the Communist movement is to destroy us. And

ENCLOSURE 100-425828-97

"peaceful coexistence" is not a change of heart in this intent but a change in technique. The purpose of Soviet Espionage is to serve the intent, regardless of the technique. During January, 1965, evidence of this fact was made known by three separate cases -- two here and one in England.

On January ~~7, 1965~~, Boris V. Karpovich, the Soviet Embassy's information Counselor in Washington, was ~~expelled from the U.S.A. on~~ ^{declared persona non grata by the U.S. government} for conduct incompatible with his diplomatic duties, and he departed the U.S. on grounds of "having been implicated in an indictment for espionage." ^{January 12, 1965.}

Arrested at the same time and arraigned on a three count charge alleging that he conspired over a period of years to pass military secrets to the Soviet Union was Air Force veteran Robert Glenn Thompson. The FBI maintained that Thompson had been recruited into Soviet intelligence operations in Berlin in 1957 and that he did its bidding until 1963. Karpovich, in dealing with Thompson, had worked in tandem with fellow Soviet agent Fedor Kudushkin. Both men had used the United Nations as cover. Karpovich was employed as a verbatim translator-stenographer in the Secretariat and Kudushkin as Second Secretary of the Soviet delegation. Later Kudushkin was shifted to the Secretariat, where he remained until 1963 when he returned to the Soviet Union.

The second case was made public a week later on January 15 in London. There it was announced that two Soviet diplomats had been asked to leave the country "for having attempted to subvert members of the British Defense establishment." One of the two was reputed to be the chief of Soviet espionage in Great Britain using as his cover the official position of First Secretary to the Soviet Embassy in London. ~~The British foreign office was reluctant to publicize the case for fear it would "interfere with improving Anglo-Soviet~~

relations and possibly upset the visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to London in the spring."

The third case, which became known three days later on January 18, concerned our expulsion of Kazimir Mizior, an employee in the Military Attaché's office of the Polish Embassy. The charge was couched in vague, undefinable terms -- for acts "incompatible with accepted norms of official conduct."

~~The move was said to be in retaliation for the Poles having accused and evicted Colonel George F. Carey, Jr., U.S. Air Attaché in Poland, for photographing Polish military installations, which our government denied. However, since Mizior was a minor employee and the Polish Government has three military attaches in Washington, any one of whom we could have asked to be recalled, speculation is that Mizior was involved in espionage.~~

These three cases, though fragmentary and isolated by time and distance, are nevertheless significant, particularly when taken in the aggregate and added to cases of a similar nature spanning the past two decades. ~~What they become are the newest additions to the Soviets' vast espionage operations aimed against us and our allies.~~

Magnitude of the Operation

As of January 1, 1965, there were in the United States 852 official Soviet-bloc personnel (FBI term for Soviet and Soviet bloc). They were accompanied by 1145 dependents. On this subject, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated before the House sub-Committee on Appropriations: "It is well established that a top-heavy percentage of Soviet-bloc official personnel assigned to this country actually have intelligence assignments of one type or another." (This also

includes some of their dependents) "The number of these representatives has steadily increased over the years and the Soviet Bloc works diligently to send more such representatives."

This last is borne out by the fact that the total number of Soviet-bloc personnel and their dependents has increased from 1843 to 1997 -- or by 154 -- in one year's time.

There are four primary sources of cover for the activities of Soviet-bloc espionage agents in the United States --- their embassies, the United Nations, commercial enterprises in the Amtorg Trading Corporation, and cultural exchange groups such as the Moiseyev Folk Dancers.

~~The problems posed by Chinese Communist espionage in this country differ from those posed by Soviet-bloc espionage~~

~~Communist espionage is because of the very fact that we do not have~~

~~diplomatic relations with Red China and it is not a member of the United Nations. However, evidence of a Chicom espionage apparatus which has been operating for over a year in the Mexican border town of Mexicali indicates that the Red Chinese are intent in trying to penetrate the US too.~~

Soviet Intelligence naturally uses its four sources of cover according to the particular assignment, and so it cannot be said that more agents are congregated in any one agency than the other.

However, there is little doubt that the United Nations has been a boon to Soviet-bloc spying activities. Since 1950, ⁽²²⁾ ~~U.N. personnel~~

~~Soviet-bloc officials and dependents~~ serving their delegations or

employed as international civil servants in the Secretariat, have ~~been declared "persona non grata" for reasons of espionage -- their intelligence activities~~ ^{informally requested to leave, expelled from the U.S., dismissed or had their accreditation to the U.N. terminated}

9 ~~of that number since, 1960. This last figure can again be used in measuring in value the present era of "peaceful coexistence."~~

The July, 1963 case of Ivan Egorov, U.N. Personnel Director in the Secretariat Office of Political and Security Council Affairs,

~~X~~ is illustrative of Soviet U.N. usage ~~for two reasons~~. Egerov was arrested by the FBI with his wife Alexandra. They were charged with "conspiring to gather information on U.S. military and Naval installations, troop movements, shipping and military water front facilities." This bears out the Soviet use of dependents for espionage. Secondly, Egerov had just received a promotion at the U.N. after having been only a year in grade. He received it over the head of others in the department far better qualified for promotion and who had served far longer in grade. Under Secretary for the Department was a fellow countryman, Vladimir P. Suslov. And so, while engaged covertly in espionage, Egerov was rewarded by being promoted in his official job.

There is an ironic note to be added. Since October, 1962, it could be said that indirectly the United States Government has been contributing to the enlargement of U.N.-based Soviet agents. At that time, Secretary General U Thant contracted to establish a training school in Moscow for prospective Soviet translators and interpreters in the Secretariat. The cost to be contributed by the U.N. for two years of operation was \$200,000. Of this total, we contributed \$64,000. The school is called the Moscow Pedagogical Institute for Foreign Languages, and to date it has graduated 31 translators and 10 interpreters. The U.N. budget estimates for 1965 call for the continuance of the school at the same price.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, in commenting on the plan in 1962, said: "As matters now stand, we are committed to pay one third the cost for prospective Soviet U.N. employees -- or to be more exact, we are being called upon to foot the bill for the training of future espionage agents who will shortly come to our country cloaked in diplomatic immunity."

Another source of cover for espionage is the Amtorg Trading Corporation. It has the distinction of being the Soviets' oldest official cover in the U.S., having been set up in 1924. On the night of October 29, 1963, FBI agents arrested John W. Butenko, an American engineer, and Ivan A. Ivanov, a chauffeur for Amtorg. Arrested with them were three Soviet U.N. personnel. On December 8, 1964, both Butenko and Ivanov were found guilty by a Federal Court of conspiring to spy for the Soviet Union. Ivanov of course held a much higher rank than a chauffeur in Soviet Intelligence.

The use of cultural exchange as a Soviet espionage cover was recently illustrated when a former Soviet Intelligence officer attended a performance of the Moiseyev Folk Dancers in New York and recognized in the group ~~and~~^{an} old comrade in arms. He was Lt. Colonel Aleksander A. Kudyartsev, who had formerly served as Soviet agent in Western Europe. In this regard, it is recognized by the FBI that at least one, and possibly two, Soviet agents accompany all visiting groups from Russia.

Aside from the afore-mentioned four sources of official cover, Soviet Intelligence has made a growing use of the so-called deep cover espionage agent. These are highly skilled professionals usually operating under assumed names and using false identity documents. Colonel Rudolph Abel is a good example of such an agent, having conducted espionage operations under several aliases until he was apprehended in 1957.

Swedish Colonel Stig Wennerstrom could also be considered in this same category. In his 15 year career as a spy, five of which he spent in the U.S., Wennerstrom cloaked his damaging activities behind his official capacity as a Swedish Air Attaché.

There is no doubt that at this time there are in this country a goodly number of expert deep cover Soviet agents secretly plying their trade.

Scope of the Operation

All Soviet Intelligence efforts against the United States and the West are directed through two operating arms. They are the KGB (Committee of State ~~State~~ Security), whose youthful Chairman is presently V.Y. Semichastny, and the GRU (Military Intelligence), ~~headed by Ivan Serov~~. Both arms are under the control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and are responsible to Prime Minister Kosygin. But neither of these arms, utilizing the cover available to them in the United States, could fulfill their missions with any real degree of success if they could not find Americans willing to work for them. Here too the public record indicates how well they have succeeded.

Over the years, U.S. citizens from all walks of life and for a multitude of reasons -- ranging from ideology to fear of blackmail -- have been the major contributing factors in carrying out the objectives of Soviet espionage. These objectives are virtually unlimited and could be said to include anything about anything, concerning everything in the United States. Because we are a free society, an enormous amount of material is available to the Soviets for the asking. But the basic clandestine targets are focused on the acquiring of military secrets and the penetration of the U.S. government. In the latter regard, top priority is given to the development of sources within key agencies such as the Department of State.

Today, those who are criticising security procedures to guard

against such penetration would do well to bear in mind that Soviet Intelligence has made good use of the sexual deviates who are considered by the FBI to be security risks. That such individuals gravitate toward employment in sensitive government jobs is illustrated by the fact that between 1960 and 1963, 85 permanently assigned employees in the Department of State were dismissed for reasons of "sexual perversion" and the majority were serving in Foreign Service assignments.

During 1965, while diplomatic efforts go forward to make "peaceful coexistence" the fair-weather symbol of international relations, the barometer of Soviet espionage can be expected to remain unchanging. The FBI will quietly mark its minor fluctuations and act accordingly in the very big and professional business of espionage.

It can be said that we in turn in 1965 will spy against the Communists with the same degree of professional application and scope. But we spy to guard against surprise attack, while the Soviets spy working toward the day they will mount the attack.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

February 17, 1965

The attached copy of "Washington Report" was sent to the Director from the American Security Council, 123 North Wacker, Chicago, Illinois.

Reference is made to the Director and the FBI throughout the publication.

nm

MR. FOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR
MR. REED
MR. CASPER
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. CONRAD
MR. FELT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. TAVEL
MR. TROTTER
MR. JONES
TELE. ROOM
MISS HOLMES
MRS. METCALF
MISS GANDY



100-425828
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

123 North Wacker, Chicago, Illinois 60606

NOT RECORDED

4 FEB 24 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/08 BY SP1mac/tic

36 FEB 25 1965



WASHINGTON REPORT

Washington, February 15, 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/c/fhc

WR 65-7

SOVIET ESPIONAGE - 1965

The new Kremlin leaders, Prime Minister Aleksi N. Kosygin and Communist Party First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, have, so far, followed their predecessor in proclaiming continued "peaceful co-existence" as the order for 1965. More of the Free World's trade barriers, once considered essential to the defeat of Communism, are expected to topple before the prevailing westerly winds of change to be replaced by trade "bridges" into the Communist camp. Thus, on the surface, reflected by both the words and deeds of the West, a genuine and continuing thaw can be expected on the Western side of the Cold War.

But there are a number of barometers and through their readings the real meaning of "peaceful co-existence" must be judged. One of these barometers measures the magnitude and scope of Soviet espionage directed against us.

For nearly a quarter of a century the United States has been the number one target of Soviet intelligence efforts. Arrests of Soviet agents over the years by the FBI have given some indication of the intensity of Soviet efforts despite changes in the East-West political climate. "Peaceful co-existence" is not a change of heart in the avowed purpose of Communism to rule the entire world; it is merely a change in-technique. The purpose of Soviet intelligence is to serve the intent regardless of the technique. During January, 1965, evidence of this fact was made known by three separate cases -- two here and one in England.

On January 7, Boris V. Karpovich, the Soviet embassy's information counselor in Washington was declared "persona non grata" and deported on grounds of "having been implicated in an indictment for espionage".

On January 15, in London, it was announced that two Soviet diplomats had been asked to leave the country "for having attempted to subvert members of the British defense establishment". One of the two was reportedly the chief of Soviet espionage in Great Britain, using the official position of First Secretary in the Soviet embassy in London as his cover.

On January 18, the U.S. announced the expulsion of Kazimir Mizior, an employee of the military attache's office in the Polish embassy. The charge was that he had

100-425828-

ENCLOSURE

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

engaged in acts "incompatible with accepted norms of official conduct", a move said to be in retaliation for the Poles having accused and expelled Colonel George F. Carey, Jr., U.S. Air attache in Warsaw.

These three cases, though fragmentary and isolated by time and distance, are significant when taken in the aggregate and added to similar cases spanning the past two decades.

As of January 1, 1965, there were in the United States 852 official Soviet-bloc personnel (the term "Soviet bloc" includes the Soviet Union and its satellites). They were accompanied by 1145 dependents making a total of 1997. Regarding these people, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated before the House sub-Committee on Appropriations: "It is well established that a top-heavy percentage of Soviet-bloc official personnel assigned to this country actually have intelligence assignments of one type or another." (This also includes some of their dependents.) "The number of these representatives has steadily increased over the years and the Soviet bloc works diligently to send more such representatives".

This last is borne out by the fact that the total number of Soviet bloc personnel and their dependents has increased by 154 -- in one year's time.

There are four primary sources of cover for the activities of Soviet bloc espionage agents in the United States -- their embassies, the United Nations, commercial enterprises such as the Amtorg Trading Corporation, and cultural and other exchange groups such as the Moiseyev Folk Dancers.

The problems presented by Chinese Communist espionage in this country differ from those posed by Soviet bloc espionage because of the very fact that we do not have diplomatic relations with Red China, and it is not a member of the United Nations. However, evidence of a Chicom espionage apparatus, which has been operating for over a year in the Mexican bordertown of Mexicali, indicates that the Red Chinese are intent on trying to penetrate the U.S., too.

Soviet Intelligence naturally uses its four sources of cover according to the particular assignment, and so it cannot be said that more agents are congregated in any one agency than the other. However, there is little doubt that the Soviets have used the United Nations to bolster their spying activities. Since 1950, 30 U.N. Soviet bloc officials and dependents, serving their delegations or employed as international civil servants in the Secretariat, have been declared "persona non grata", expelled from the U.S., dismissed or had their accreditation to the U.N. terminated for reasons of their intelligence activities. Fourteen of that number have departed since 1960.

Since October, 1962, it could be said that indirectly the United States Government has been contributing to the enlargement of U.N.-based Soviet agents. At that time, Secretary General U Thant contracted to establish a training school in Moscow for prospective Soviet translators and interpreters in the Secretariat. The cost to be contributed by the U.N. for two years of operation was \$200,000. Of this total, we

contributed \$64,000. The school is called the Moscow Pedagogical Institute for Foreign Languages, and to date it has graduated 31 translators and 10 interpreters. The U.N. budget estimates for 1965 call for the continuance of the school at the same price.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, in commenting on the plan in 1962, said: "As matters now stand, we are committed to pay one third the cost for prospective Soviet U.N. employees -- or to be more exact, we are being called upon to foot the bill for the training of future espionage agents who will shortly come to our country cloaked in diplomatic immunity".

Another source of cover for espionage is the Amtorg Trading Corporation. It has the distinction of being the Soviets' oldest official cover in the U.S., having been set up in 1924. On the night of October 29, 1963, FBI agents arrested John W. Butenko, an American engineer, and Ivan A. Ivanov, a chauffeur for Amtorg. Arrested with them were three Soviet U.N. personnel. On December 2, 1964, both Butenko and Ivanov were found guilty by a Federal Court of conspiring to spy for the Soviet Union. Ivanov, of course, held a much higher rank than a chauffeur in Soviet Intelligence.

The use of cultural exchange as a Soviet espionage cover was recently illustrated when a former Soviet Intelligence officer attended a performance of the Moiseyev Folk Dancers in New York and recognized in the group an old comrade in arms. He was Lt. Colonel Aleksander A. Kudyartsev, who had formerly served as a Soviet agent in Western Europe. In this regard, it is recognized that at least one, and possibly two, Soviet agents accompany all visiting cultural groups from Russia.

Aside from the aforementioned four sources of official cover, Soviet Intelligence has made continued and growing use of the so-called deep cover espionage agent. These are highly skilled professionals usually operating under assumed names and using false identity documents. Colonel Rudolph Abel is a good example of such an agent, having conducted espionage operations under several aliases until he was apprehended in 1957. Swedish Colonel Stig Wennerstrom could also be considered in this same category. In his 15 year career as a spy, five of which he spent in the U.S., Wennerstrom cloaked his damaging activities behind his official capacity as a Swedish Air Attaché.

All Soviet Intelligence efforts against the United States and the West are directed through two operating arms. They are the KGB (Committee of State Security) whose Chairman is presently youthful V. Y. Semichastny, and the GRU (Military Intelligence). Both arms are under the control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and are responsible to Prime Minister Kosygin. But neither of these arms, utilizing the cover available to them in the United States, could fulfill their missions with any real degree of success if they could not find Americans willing to work for them. Here, too, the public record indicates how well they have succeeded.

Over the years, U.S. citizens from all walks of life and for a multitude of reasons -- ranging from ideology to fear of blackmail -- have been the major contributing factors in carrying out the objectives of Soviet espionage. These objectives are virtually unlimited and could be said to include everything about anything in the United States. Because we are a free society, an enormous amount of material is available to the Soviets for the asking. But the basic clandestine targets are military secrets and the penetration of the U.S. government. In the latter regard, top priority is given to the development of sources within key agencies such as the Department of State or the National Security Agency.

During 1965, while diplomatic efforts go forward to make "peaceful co-existence" the fair-weather symbol of international relations, the barometer of Soviet espionage can be expected to remain unchanging. The FBI will quietly mark its minor fluctuations and act accordingly in the very big and professional business of espionage.

It can be said that, in turn in 1965, our Intelligence Agencies will spy against the Communists with the same degree of professional application but with a far smaller budget. But we spy to guard against surprise attack, while the Soviets spy toward the day they will mount the attack.

DeWitt S. Copp

DeWITT COPP
MANAGING EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor Dr. James D. Atkinson
Managing Editor DeWitt S. Copp
Intelligence Editor Major General G. B. Coverdale, USA (Ret.)
Economics Editor Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
National Editor William Gill
Foreign Editor Frank J. Johnson
Research Director William K. Lambie, Jr.
News Editor Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President John G. Sevcik
Vice President Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond,
USA (Ret.)
Bennett Archambault
Lloyd L. Austin
General Mark Clark
Charles S. Craigmire
Henry Duque
Wade Fetzer, Jr.
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.
Fred M. Gillies
Clifford F. Hood
Wayne A. Johnston

William H. Kendall
Hughston M. McBain
A. B. McKee, Jr.
Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
General Robert E. Wood
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Howard I. Young

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag
Bryton Barron
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren
Anthony Harrigan
Dr. Anthony Kubek

Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1964 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Washington Bureau: 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036
Western Office: 5931 West Slauson Avenue, Culver City, California 90232

10 Anniversary American Security Council

April 28, 1965

Black tie dinner Awards to be made of 5" pillar of
lucite - black base

11 awards - Outstanding business citizen - Patrick J. Frawley

Others to ten outstanding citizen - one for each year
of ASC. In future only one annually

The ten cited are:

J. Edgar Hoover
Senator Dodd

Former Representative Judd

Loyd Wright Past President The American Bar Assn.
Robert Galvin
General Haffner
General Wood Houston McBain

No photographers - No press Chicago Club does not permit

Dinner at 7 PM Cocktails at 6 PM

To be held at the Chicago Club

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/08 BY pinnacle

100-425828-98

ENCLOSURE

end #1



EDITOR



Dr. Walter H. Judd
REPUBLICAN

CO-EDITOR



Sen. Thomas J. Dodd
DEMOCRAT

THE
BI-PARTISAN
WORLD
AFFAIRS
PROGRAM

THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON REPORT

Largest Daily Radio Program in the U. S.

Serving more different markets (900) than all major networks combined.

After the **WASHINGTON REPORT** was on eight weeks, queries were sent to station managers. Below are some typical comments:

“Couldn’t be better. Doing a wonderful job here. We have had many requests from people to use the records in various organization’s meeting.” J. Christopher KXJK

“A most informative program and worthwhile.” Jim Biber KSTR

“Programs are well produced and subject matter *excellent* and handled nicely.” Program Manager KICS

“It’s a *very good* program and we hope to continue it for a long time.” Frank Moffett WGAW

“The calibre for these interviews is of such stature that we proudly air the program.” Charles Esposito WNVL

“Just keep up the good work and keep the programs coming.” Bob Sass WCQS

“*Excellent*, we need more programs like this which give the true facts.” Bernie Smith WNCC

The WASHINGTON REPORT is carried by top stations in choice time periods. For example:

WBRC Birmingham, Ala. 6:20 pm	KVOD Albuquerque, N. M. 7:30 am
KFRB Fairbanks, Alaska 6:55 pm	WSNY Schenectady, N. Y. 6:50 pm
KCUB Tucson, Ariz. 6:10 pm	WLW Cincinnati, Ohio 8:05 pm
KFI Los Angeles, Calif. 6:55 pm	WIBG Philadelphia, Pa. 11:25 pm
WGBS Miami, Fla. 12:30 pm	WIS Columbia, S. C. 6:15 pm
WIIN Atlanta, Ga. 1:31 pm	WMUU Greenville, S. C. 6:05 pm
KGU Honolulu, Hawaii 12:50 & 6:20 pm	WAPO Chattanooga, Tenn. 6:15 pm
WWL New Orleans, La. 6:10 pm	KVET Austin, Tex. 5:20 pm
WEZE Boston, Mass. 8:30 am	KXYZ Houston, Tex. 8:30 pm
WLOL St. Paul, Minn. 5:30 pm	WSLS Roanoke, Va. 7:40 am
KVEG Las Vegas, Nev. 8:30 am	KVI Seattle, Wash. 7:05 pm
WBUD Trenton, N. J. 6:25 pm	WCHS Charlotte, W. Va. 5:10 pm

All kinds of advertisers sponsor the WASHINGTON REPORT.

For example:

WGBS First Federal Savings and Loan
WGAW Stanley's Jewelers
WLOL Twin Cities Federal Savings and Loan Assn.
KVOD Albuquerque Gravel Products
WREO Cobble Dick Buick, Oldsmobile Dealer and Independent Insurance Agents
KVET Watson Florist
WFNC Dairy, Savings & Loan and Drug Store
WTKM American Legion
KACE Bourns, Inc.
KICO Valley Auto
WHLN Star Furniture Co.
WSNY Martine Packing
WXIV Franklin Insurance Co.
WCHS Elk Refining Co.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY sp1mac/bs

100-425828-98

ENCLOSURE

Produced and distributed free to radio stations under a public service grant from the Schick Safety Razor Company.

Ind. 2

April 12, 1965

Mr. Lee R. Pennington
3808 Taylor Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/c/c

Dear Lee:

Assistant Director DeLoach has advised me of the gracious invitation which you have extended to me, on behalf of the American Security Council, to accept an award at the 10th Anniversary Dinner of that organization in Chicago on April 28th.

While I am indeed honored to be considered for this award and would like very much to attend the Dinner, prior commitments prevent me from being in the Chicago area on that date. I regret it is not possible to accept the invitation but know you will understand.

~~ENCLOSURE ATTACHED~~

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

EX-110

APR 12 1965
77 B I REC'D-READING
10 AM


REC-24/00-42588-98
12 APR 15 1965

3
ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Tolson - Sent with cover memo
1 - Mr. DeLoach - Sent with cover memo
1 - Miss Holmes - Sent with cover memo
1 - Miss Gandy - Sent with cover memo

for
Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOTE: See ~~M~~ A. Jones to DeLoach memo dated 4-9-65, captioned, "Tenth Anniversary, American Security Council Dinner, Chicago, Illinois, Request For Director to Accept Outstanding Citizen's Award."



ELR:kjb (8)

69 APR 29 1965

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/hi

100 - 425828 - 98

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 4-9-65

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: TENTH ANNIVERSARY, AMERICAN SECURITY
COUNCIL DINNER, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR TO ACCEPT OUTSTANDING
CITIZEN'S AWARD

Mr. Lee R. Pennington, former Bureau Inspector, has contacted your office to advise that the American Security Council (ASC) will hold its Tenth Anniversary Dinner at Chicago on 4-28-65, and the organization wishes to give an outstanding citizen's award to Mr. Hoover for his service to the Nation.

Pennington said this is the first year these awards have been given and at the dinner one will be presented to a distinguished citizen for each of the ten years the Council has been in existence. In addition, one award will be given this year to an outstanding business citizen. In the future, only one award will be made annually. He described the award as a five inch pillar of lucite with a black base. The dinner, which is black tie, will be held at 7 p.m., April 28th, in the Chicago Club, and no photographers or press will be present.

Pennington said the outstanding business award for this year will be given to Mr. Patrick J. Frawley, Chairman, Schick Razor Company. He furnished the names of seven other award recipients as follows: Senator Thomas J. Dodd; Dr. Walter H. Judd; Mr. Lloyd Wright; Robert W. Galvin; General Charles C. Haffner, Jr.; Hughston M. McBain; and General Robert E. Wood. Mr. Pennington, a Consultant for ASC, indicated that the Council would be honored to have the Director attend this function and accept the award.

INFORMATION IN BUFILE:

ASC was formed by business leaders in 1955 as a national research information center on subversive activities. Information developed is made available for a fee to member companies and other organizations qualified to receive this information. The following is a brief resume of information concerning above award winners with the exception of Senator Thomas Dodd, who is well known to the Director.

REC-114

100-425828-99

PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, head of Schick and Chairman of the Technicolor Corporation, Culver City, California, has sponsored the professional ~~Anticommunist~~ ^{April 16, 1965}, Fred Schwarz, in his activities, and has also served as Chairman of the California School of Anticommunism. He is a young, aggressive businessman who made a name for himself

Enclosure ~~part~~ 4-13-65

CRIME RICHARD

1- Mr. Tolson - Enclosure 1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure 1 - Miss Gandy - Enclosure

1- Miss Holmes - Enclosure

ELR:kjb (8)

Em

Continued . . .

M. A. Jones to DeLoach Memo

RE: TENTH ANNIVERSARY, AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL DINNER

in merchandising after World War II. The Director thanked Frawley, in letter of 4-11-62, for the Technicolor filming of the Director's Valley Forge speech. Files contain no unfavorable information regarding Frawley. The Director saw him on 1-13-65.

ROBERT W. GALVIN, Chairman of Motorola, Inc., Chicago, is an admirer of the Director. We have had limited cordial correspondence with him, the latest in March, 1964, when he complimented the Director on an article which appeared in the "Harvard Business Review." Galvin, with his family, toured the Bureau in 1959.

GENERAL CHARLES C. HAFFNER, JR., Chairman of the Board, R. R. Donnelley and Sons, Chicago, is a 70-year-old industrialist who was an Army Major General in World War II. Files contain no information of pertinence relating to him.

DR. WALTER H. JUDD, former Congressman from Minnesota, who was defeated in his bid for re-election in 1962, was critical of the FBI in November, 1964, in connection with our handling of the Walter Jenkins investigation. He criticized the Director for sending flowers to Walter Jenkins and indicated the FBI had been compromised by perverts in its own ranks. He also questioned our impartiality in this investigation. Prior to these slanderous statements by Judd, we had enjoyed cordial relations with him. It should be noted that there is an indication that Judd will be in Germany at the time of the ASC Award Dinner and will not be able to attend.

HUGHSTON M. MCBAIN, 63-year-old retired Chairman of Marshall Field and Company, Chicago, met the Director briefly in April, 1953, and in 1958 the Director personally autographed a copy of "Masters of Deceit" to him. Files contain no unfavorable information regarding McBain.

GENERAL ROBERT E. WOOD, 85-year-old Director, Sears Roebuck, Chicago, headed the American First Committee in 1941 and was an outspoken critic of U.S. foreign policy. During World War II, the War Department reportedly had information indicating a remote connection between Wood and several alleged Nazi sympathizers. In 1958, Wood wrote the Director criticizing "Masters of Deceit," because it complimented Jewish organizations in the fight against communism, a stand with which he did not agree. This letter was not acknowledged.

LOYD WRIGHT, well-known Los Angeles lawyer, who is former President of the American Bar Association, has been friendly to the Bureau and we have had cordial relations with him. Wright served as Chairman of the Commission for Government Security and he has had contact with the Director in the past.

OBSERVATION:

It is believed the Director would not desire to take time from his busy schedule to attend the ASC Dinner for the acceptance of this award.

See Recommendation next page

M. A. Jones to DeLoach Memo

RE: TENTH ANNIVERSARY, AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL DINNER

RECOMMENDATION:


That the attached letter be sent to Mr. Pennington advising that prior commitments preclude the Director from attending this affair.

MM 80

GRC

✓

GL
J





AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1101 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

April 20, 1965

Mr. Tolson	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Belmont	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Mohr	<i>✓</i>
Mr. DeLoach	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Casper	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Callahan	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Conrad	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Felt	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Gale	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Rosen	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Sullivan	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Tavel	<i>✓</i>
Mr. Trotter	<i>✓</i>
Tele. Room	<i>✓</i>
Miss Holmes	<i>✓</i>
Miss Gandy	<i>✓</i>

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
Stewart-Warner Corporation
LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
Security-First National Bank
CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Chairman of the Board
Belden Manufacturing Company
HENRY DUQUE, Partner
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
Alexander & Company
PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
Eversharp, Inc.
ROBERT W. GALVIN, Chairman of the Board
Motorola, Inc.
FRED M. GILLIES
Retired Chairman of the Board
Acme Steel Company
CLIFFORD F. HOOD
Former President
United States Steel Corporation
WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
Illinois Central Railroad
WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
A. B. MCKEE, JR., President
Forest Lumber Company
Imperial Valley Lumber Company
MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
Retired President
American Library of Information
HOWARD I. YOUNG, Hon. Chairman
American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
JOHN M. FISHER
American Security Council
Senior Vice President
KENNETH M. PIPER
Motorola, Inc.
Vice President
STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
U.S. Steel Corporation
Vice President
JOHN G. SEVICK
Burton-Dixie Corporation
Vice President
RUSSELL E. WHITE
General Electric Company
Secretary-Treasurer
CYRIL W. HOOPER
Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
JOHN M. FISHER
Administrative Director
WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
Assistant to the President
MICHAEL J. WARD
Chief, Washington Bureau
LEE R. PENNINGTON
International Political Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
Managing Editor, ASC Washington Report
DEWITT COPP
Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
National Editor, ASC Washington Report
WILLIAM GILL
Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
FRANK J. JOHNSON
Special Editor, ASC Washington Report
JOHN F. LEWIS
News Editor, ASC Washington Report
EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. STEPHAN T. POSSONRY
International Law and Space Editor
ASC Washington Report
REAR ADMIRAL (CHESTER W. WARD) USN (Ret.)
Radio Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. WALTER H. JUDD
Radio Co-Editor, ASC Washington Report
SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1/mach/c

Lee Pennington has forwarded your April 12, 1965 letter to me.

We deeply regret that prior commitments prevent your attending our April 28 awards dinner in Chicago. Eight or nine of the other award winners will be present with other national figures as their guests.

The seven former special agents among our staff and officers are especially proud that the Special Awards Committee named you for a 1964 "Outstanding Citizen Award".

We will ship your award to you on April 29, 1965.

Respectfully,

John M. Fisher
John M. Fisher
President

EX 105

REC-19

APR 22 1965

EX-PROC

12 APR 28 1965

RECORDED CORRESPONDENCE

PERS. REC. UNIT

159

May 12, 1965

EX-100

REC-9 100-425828-101

610-
Honorable John M. Fisher
President
American Security Council
123 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/02 BY SP7mac/bsi

Dear Mr. Fisher:

*Stamps
in
photo attached*
I am profoundly grateful for the Outstanding
Citizen Award presented me by the American Security
Council, and it is a privilege to accept it on behalf of my
associates in the FBI whose efforts made possible this
recognition.

The generous comments in your letter
concerning my career with the FBI are very reassuring
and, through you, I wish to express my sincere appreciation
to the members of your organization for selecting me for
this honor. The Award is handsomely executed, and I can
assure you it will be given a place of honor in my office.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 10
MAY 12 1965
COMM-FBI

NOTE: The American Security Council had asked the Director to attend its
10th anniversary dinner in Chicago on 4/28/65 to accept this award; however,
it was necessary for the Director to decline in view of prior commitment.
Mr. Fisher is on the Special Correspondents' List. The award itself is a
5-inch pillar of plexiglass enclosing a gold globe surmounted by an eagle.
The plexiglass is mounted on a black base which carries an inscription "In
Recognition of Outstanding Leadership-In Cold War Education."

Copy
Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - M. A. Jones
1 - B. M. Suttler

1 MAY 1965 CHPLcamr (7) amr

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

REC'D. REC'D.

1 AMR

HFM



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1101 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

May 5, 1965

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/c/f/c

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
Stewart-Warner Corporation
LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
Security-First National Bank
CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Chairman of the Board
Belden Manufacturing Company
HENRY DUQUE, Partner
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
Alexander & Company
PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
Eversharp, Inc.
ROBERT W. GALVIN, Chairman of the Board
Motorola, Inc.
FRED M. GILLIES
Retired Chairman of the Board
Acme Steel Company
CLIFFORD F. HOOD
Former President
United States Steel Corporation
WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
Illinois Central Railroad
WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
A. B. MCKEE, JR., President
Forest Lumber Company
Imperial Valley Lumber Company
MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
Retired President
American Library of Information
HOWARD I. YOUNG, Hon. Chairman
American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
JOHN M. FISHER
American Security Council
Senior Vice President
KENNETH M. PIPER
Motorola, Inc.
Vice President
STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
U.S. Steel Corporation
Vice President
JOHN G. SEVICK
Burton-Dixie Corporation
Vice President
RUSSELL E. WHITE
General Electric Company
Secretary-Treasurer
CYRIL W. HOOPER
Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
JOHN M. FISHER
Administrative Director
WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
Assistant to the President
MICHAEL J. WARD
Chief, Washington Bureau
LEE R. PENNINGTON
International Politics Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
Managing Editor, ASC Washington Report
DEWITT COPP
Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
National Editor, ASC Washington Report
WILLIAM GILL
Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
FRANK J. JOHNSON
Special Editor, ASC Washington Report
JOHN F. LEWIS
News Editor, ASC Washington Report
EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. STEFAN T. POSSOMY
International Law and Space Editor
ASC Washington Report
REAR ADMIRAL CHESTER C. WARD, USN (Ret.)
Radio Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. WALTER H. JUDD
Radio Co-Editor, ASC Washington Report
SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

As I promised in my letter of April 20, I am forwarding herewith your award as one of the men selected by our Special Awards Committee as an "Outstanding Citizen". Your splendid career in the service of our country is deserving of the fullest respect and gratitude of all Americans and we, in this small way, want to express the sincere appreciation of all those connected with the American Security Council.

Respectfully,

John M. Fisher
President

JMF/pc

EX-100

REC-9

award received.

100-425828-101

8 MAY 19 1965

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Let to Fisher
5-12-65
SP/ma/c/f/c

ENCLOSURE

SP/ma/c/f/c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/tbc

185



100-425828-101

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/88 BY SP7mac/HC

100-425228-101



THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
THEIR RELATIONSHIP
IN EAST ASIAN INSTITUTIONS

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR
MR. DELOACH
MR. CASPER
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. CONRAD
MR. FELT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. TAVEL
MR. TROTTER
MR. JONES
TELE. ROOM
MISS HOLMES
MRS. METCALF
MISS GANDY

Reference is made to the Director
and the FBI on page 2 of the attached
report.

cb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/12 BY SP7mac/HC



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/SC

Washington, May 17, 1965

WR 65-20

CASTRO'S SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES

British historian and philosopher, Arnold Toynbee, before giving a lecture at the State Department on April 16, 1965, was quoted as saying: "It's hard to understand why you make such a fuss about Castro." And then comparing the U.S. and Cuba to an elephant and its fear of a mouse, he quipped, "It's great fun for the mouse."

Just a week prior to these comments, a CIA report on Cuban subversion was submitted to the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, (Selden Committee). The report stated in part that "the Castro regime has in operation (since 1961) a highly professional espionage and subversion agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). The DGI is advised by at least five Soviet intelligence specialists. Moreover, one of the purposes of the highly secret meetings of Latin American leaders in Havana last November was to give added impetus to more militant Communist activity in the hemisphere" (WR 65-9) (underlining added).

Castro's DGI is divided into three units, the largest of which masterminds the training, financing and promoting of subversion, and guerrilla warfare in Central and South American countries. Though the CIA report spelled out in detail the degree of the DGI's activities in these areas, it made no mention of its efforts in the United States. Our own investigation attempts in some measure to fill the gap.

100-425828

NOT RECORDED

18 MAY 25 1965

Methods of Infiltration

There are two known major points of entry by which covert Castro agents infiltrate the United States. One is by fishing boat to Puerto Rico, and then by illegally entering the U.S. with falsified documents. Congressman William Cramer, Republican of Florida, in testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security as far back as two years ago said that ".....in excess of one thousand people have come through this route into the United States as Puerto Rican citizens with falsified passports."

The other method of infiltration is by boat or plane to Mexico. There the Mexican Communist Party supplies the proper papers and the agent crosses the border at Laredo, Juarez or Tijuana. Infiltrators from Cuba who enter the U.S. using either one of these routes, or via Canada, masking their identities by whatever manner, are trained agents whose assignments cover the Marxian spectrum of subversive activities.

260
Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two part series.

00 MAY 27 1965

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

65-63997-201
65-80187-
EMERGED COPY FILED IN

Indication of Activities

On the night of November 16, 1962, the FBI raided a workshop on West 27th Street in New York City. There they seized a secret cache of weapons and explosives which included delayed action incendiary bombs. They also arrested three Castro agents and Roberto Santiesteban Casanova, a newly arrived attache with the Cuban Mission at the U.N. Two other members of the Cuban Mission, Jose Gomez Abad and his wife, Elsa, were named as fellow conspirators.

The purpose of the weapons and the explosives was "for the sabotaging of defense installations and the demoralization of the civilian population." Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, said the plan was "aimed at the heart of the internal security of the United States of America."

Four days later, immigration officers in Brownsville, Texas, reported that Mexican authorities had prevented the blowing up of the International Bridge between Brownsville and Matamoros, Mexico. In doing so, they also nipped in the bud a sabotage plan to destroy major buildings in Matamoros. Two of those apprehended were Castro agents.

Since 1962, there have been several allied cases, one taking place in October, 1964, in which a bomb was exploded in the Everglades Hotel in Miami injuring a number of Cuban exiles attending a meeting.

Some months later, a Cuban-terrorist threat to bomb the Roney Plaza Hotel in Miami intimidated the management into cancelling a meeting of this same exile organization.

This threat came on the same day the bomb plot to blow up the Washington Monument, the Statue of Liberty and the Liberty Bell was discovered.

On the surface, this latter episode appeared to be the wild act of a quartet of misguided idiots. But there is sound reason to believe that wild as the attempt was, the four would-be saboteurs were acting under DGI instructions. Leader of the bomb plot, Robert S. Collier, had traveled illegally to Cuba in the summer of 1964. Upon his return, he formed with a number of fellow Cuban travelers a pro-Castro, pro-Peking group which called itself the Black Liberation Front. In December, 1964, a United Nations party was given by the Cuban delegation in honor of its visiting guerrilla expert, Ernesto Che Guevara. At this party, Collier was introduced to Michelle Duclos, a member of an extremist separatist organization in Quebec. Later, the plotters bought the dynamite in Canada, and it was Miss Duclos who transported the explosives to New York in her car.

These five incidents fall under the heading of terror tactics. That only one of them met with any real degree of success speaks well for the FBI and our law enforcement agencies. However, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, pointed out in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations last year that the efforts of the Castro regime to infiltrate intelligence agents into the United States "show that we (FBI) must maintain a broad coverage in this area of our operations."

How broad a coverage can be glimpsed by these additional incidents. In early 1963, a Castro agent was apprehended in a New York City apartment possessing a suitcase filled with visa applications and other documents which would aid fellow agents to gain illegal entry into the United States.

From Caracas, Venezuela in February of this year came news of another type of smuggling operation which again pointed toward the activities of U.S.-based Castro agents. By accident, on board the U.S. ship Santa Rosa were found 1,000 mail pouches filled with pro-Castro literature. The literature had been printed in and shipped from Miami, Florida.

Just as Puerto Rico has served as an important way-station for Castro agents to enter the U.S., it has also served as a transit point for still another sort of smuggling-- that of narcotic drugs.

In December, 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport -- one of them a Cuban, Mario Carabeo Nerey. Treasury officials in Puerto Rico said Carabeo Nerey was engaged in drug traffic. How large the traffic is can be measured by the fact that between January and November, 1964, narcotics agents seized 697 pounds of drugs being smuggled into the U.S. from Cuba. This was an increase of over 450 pounds seized during the previous year. Included in this amount was heroin, shipped to Cuba from Red China.

In January, 1965, a New York police inspector, Ira Bluth, was quoted as saying: "Marihuana used to come to New York almost entirely from Mexico, but recently large amounts of the drug have been discovered coming from Cuba."

On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinez were taken into custody in a New York motel with 3 million dollars worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinez is believed to be a Castro agent.

Aside from the obvious harmful effects addiction to these drugs creates, the major purpose behind the smuggling of narcotics into the U.S. by Castro agents is to raise money to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico.

Castro's DGI is working in concert with Puerto Rican Communists and militant splinter factions of the Puerto Rican independence movement, accelerating their attacks against the social and governmental structure of the island. Since 1961, a number of Castro-supplied arms caches have been uncovered. Gun battles have been fought between the police and insurrectionists. Castro agents have infiltrated both exile and student groups, their purpose being to stimulate the kind of rioting which would require armed intervention. Should this happen, the cry for independence, which 97 percent of the Puerto Rican electorate rejected in the November, 1964 elections, would take on a more critical meaning. This is so because the strategy of the movement is tied directly to the November 20, 1964 vote of the United Nations Committee on anti-Colonialism. The Committee voted 17-6, in direct violation of a 1953 General Assembly ruling, to place the demand for Puerto Rican independence on the U.N. agenda. (WR 65-4)

This act played directly into the hands of Castro's DGI and Puerto Rican extremists -- two of whom are presently members of the Cuban U.N. mission.

When the General Assembly convenes again, there is little doubt that agitation and propaganda will be stepped up in New York and San Juan, with the possibility of more violent actions erupting in Puerto Rico.

Scope of the Effort

Recently, the Puerto Rican newspaper "El Mundo" estimated that since 1960, 12,000 Americans and Puerto Ricans have received subversive training in Cuba.

We cannot attest to the accuracy of the figures nor can we say how many of that number are under the orders of the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence. Although we do not have Castro-trained guerrillas operating in our country as a number of the Latin American countries presently do, we can say that intelligence and law enforcement agencies here and in Puerto Rico take the efforts of the DGI most seriously.

Of course, the publicly-known cases outlined in this report can only give an indication of what is afoot. Hoary historians such as Toynbee may look down upon the world and view it from the vantage point of centuries. Unfortunately, we who have to live in the world from day to day and face its reality cannot afford cute analogies of mice and elephants with regard to Castro and ourselves.

In Part II of Castro's Subversion in the United States we will show how Castro's American supporters, using the techniques of agitation and propaganda; by forming front groups; by infiltrating the Civil Rights movement, and by attacking our foreign policy are winning important victories in what can best be termed the psychological hot war.

DeWitt Copp
DeWITT COPP
MANAGING EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Managing Editor	DeWitt S. Copp
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
National Editor	William Gill
Foreign Editor	Frank J. Johnson
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
News Editor	Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor	Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman	William H. Kendall
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman	Hughston M. McBain
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	A. B. McKee, Jr.
Bennett Archambault	Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Lloyd L. Austin	Dr. Robert Morris
General Mark Clark	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Charles S. Craigmile	Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Henry Duque	Dr. Edward Teller
Wade Fetzer, Jr.	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.	General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Fred M. Gillies	General Robert E. Wood
Clifford F. Hood	Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Wayne A. Johnston	Howard I. Young

STRATEGY STAFF

Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1965 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: May 26, 1965

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages A2634-A2635. Congressman Hosmer, (R) California, extended his remarks and stated "the American Security Council is one of the Nation's most respected private organizations dedicated to the preservation of the Nation and of freedom everywhere. Its weekly Washington Report invariably deals authoritatively with national and international developments affecting the

Nation's security. The May 17 and 24 issues of this report detailed the pattern of Castro's subversion in the United States as written by DeWitt S. Copp, its able and authoritative managing editor." Mr. Hosmer placed in the Record Part One of this two-part series. This article commented on the activities of certain Cuban agents in the United States and stated "These five incidents fall under the heading of terror tactics. That only one of them met with any real degree of success speaks well for the FBI and our law-enforcement agencies. However, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, pointed out in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations last year that the efforts of the Castro regime to infiltrate intelligence agents into the United States 'show that we (FBI) must maintain a broad coverage in this area of our operations.'"

66-1731-2702
Original filed in

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/MS/HC
100-425828-
NOT RECORDED
27 JUN 8 1965

XEROX
JUN 8 1965

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 5-25-65 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

66 JUN 11 1965

DO-6
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 28, 1965

The attached publication was sent to
the Director by the American Security
Council, 123 North Wacker Drive,
Chicago, Illinois.

Reference is made to the Director
on page 2.

MR. HOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR
MR. TELFER
MR. CASPER
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. CONRAD
MR. FELT
MR. GALE
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. TAVEL
MR. TROTTER
MR. JONES
TELE. ROOM
MISS HOLMES
MRS. METCALF
MISS GARDNER

crt

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/2/88 BY *Opmanatic*

REC-70
EX-70

100-425828-102
NOT RECORDED

4 JUL 8 1965

P 36
51 JUL 19 1965



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/fhc

Washington, June 28, 1965

WR 65-26

THE ANARCHO-COMMUNIST COALITION

Looking beyond its psychological warfare aimed at destroying the American will to win in Southeast Asia, international Communism is attempting to build a power base inside the United States itself. The objective is to establish such a base on college campuses and to build a bridge that will link the left wing intelligentsia found there with the revolutionary groups now organizing in some urban areas of the nation.

This poses a new threat to the United States. Communist boring from within has been a familiar conspiratorial tactic from the foundation of the Soviet state, but something new has been added in the 1960's: exploitation of the domestic anarchism which has recently sprung to life in this country. The decision to build from within colleges and universities arises from the fact that some educational institutions have become a privileged sanctuary for those who condemn the values of our society - even the values of education itself.

Because the virtue of tolerance in recent years has been assigned a value above and beyond almost every other public virtue, some college and university administrations have all but lost control of the student body privileged to attend courses. Revolutionary elements, taking note of the loss of effective administrative control, have invaded certain campuses and, in effect, seized power from the educational authorities.

The now classic case of this is the Berkeley campus of the University of California which was paralyzed by student and non-student anarchists on a number of occasions during the last academic year. Those who tried out their revolutionary tactics at Berkeley are hopeful of using the same methods at other educational institutions. They aim at nothing less than a strong and, if possible, a controlling voice in the administration of colleges and universities. In short, if the campus anarchists have their way, college administrators will have to share power with militant student groups. This means that the U.S. would have a situation analogous in some respects with Latin universities which are traditional centers of political strife and revolutionary activity.

100-425828-102

Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two part series.

ENCLOSURE

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

Can the campus anarchists achieve their goal? The answer depends upon whether the U.S. public is informed and aroused regarding what is taking place. Disturbing evidence exists that indicates the weakness of universities when faced by revolutionaries on the campus. For example, a mere 200 "peaceniks" were successful in late May in forcing Columbia University in New York to cancel its annual awards ceremony for the Naval Reserve Officers Training Unit. Demonstrators from Communist-aligned groups, including Youth Against War and Fascism, the Progressive Labor Movement and the May 2 Movement, locked arms, fought with police, and harried university officials who finally cancelled the ceremony, saying: "We don't want another Berkeley."

The fears of the Columbia officials are understandable. But appeasement of rioters, nihilists and anarcho-Communists on the campus is no more successful than appeasement of Communists overseas. If the revolutionaries are not defeated on the campuses, they will control the nation's colleges and universities within a few years.

The word "anarchist" is used because by no means all of the demonstrators are Communist Party members. Some of the revolutionary leaders are CP members, to be sure, as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover has reported. However, in the 1960's the international Communist movement does not fully depend on Marxist-Leninists. Communism today is operating on a "front" basis, taking advantage of a loose coalition of groups opposed to capitalist society. In the Eastern Congo, for instance, the rebel units that sought to topple the Tshombe government were far from being models of classic Communism. Some were influenced by Moscow, others by Peking, and still others by the Algerian regime. Nevertheless, they worked side-by-side in an effort to shatter a government friendly to the West. The methods used in the Congo also are being used in the United States. The factions that blocked the NROTC ceremony at Columbia did the same job that a single, monolithic Communist organization might have accomplished.

Today, the anarcho-Communist coalition is far more candid than the Communist movement was in the 1930's. The student revolt leaders are openly peddling their anarchist and defeatist philosophy.

In recent talks at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, Steve Weissman, one of the leaders of the Berkeley revolt, urged risings on other campuses. In a statement of his basic attitude, he said: "I am not responsible morally in observing a law in the making of which I had no decision." On the basis of this theory, he would not have to respect laws against assault or even murder. Obviously, a country is in danger when militant groups believe that they are above the law.

If anarchism is to be nullified, its influence will have to be eliminated at the college and university level. This means that administrators will have to insist that the one kind of freedom which properly belongs to an educational institution is the freedom to learn. No one in a college or university has a writ for revolution. The process of education can be carried on only under the rule of law and an understanding of this is the only possible basis for campus peace and order.

The anarcho-Communist alliance intends to move out from those campuses where it is free to operate. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which directed the anti-Viet Nam protest in Washington this April, has indicated the next target: manufacturing plants which produce military material. A spokesman for SDS declared that letters have been sent to each chapter, urging sit-ins at such factories. Specific targets include plants which produce helicopters, jets and non-lethal gas.

In dealing with this new breed of nihilist, the U.S. government should enforce applicable laws. For example, the Committee for Non-Violent Action has issued a "declaration of conscience" which states: "We encourage those who can conscientiously do so to refuse to serve in the armed forces." The committee also stated: "We shall encourage the development of other non-violent acts, including acts which involve civil disobedience, in order to stop the flow of American soldiers and munitions to Viet Nam." It would seem that such statements constitute violations of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which prohibits advising persons facing the draft from refusing to serve their country. Prosecutions under this act are rare, but the time is at hand when the Department of Justice should take action.

It would be a mistake for Americans to dismiss the campus anarchists as a new species of crank. Anyone familiar with Russian history knows that the Communists reap what the nihilists and anarchists sow. These latter had prepared the ground in Russia by destroying public values and introducing lawlessness, agitation and terror. It was on this foundation that the disciplined Bolsheviks were able to build their regime of totalitarian control. The rioters of the 1960's cannot be dismissed as being in the same class as the goldfish swallowers or other pranksters of the 1920's and 1930's.

The underlying philosophy of the anarcho-Communist coalition bears a resemblance to the philosophy enunciated by the Chinese Communists. Many of the campus strategists of the revolutionary coalition in this country have a hard-line outlook and, like the ChiComs, they seek the psychological stimulation of various key groups to more militant action.

In this connection, one of their prime objectives seems to be to build an axis from campus centers to the depressed areas of our great urban complexes. This summer undoubtedly will find many of the campus revolutionaries at work in extreme leftist groups in the nation's big cities. A number of organizations already have been created for giving support to those who take part in riots. In New York, the Progressive Labor Movement, which follows the Peking line, has a sub-organization in the Committee to Defend Resistance to Ghetto Life (CERGE). The chairman of this committee has been convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to testify before the grand jury investigating the Harlem riots.

In South Viet Nam, the Communist Viet Cong specialize in development of what they call "combat hamlets" -- local centers of resistance to regular govern-

ment administration. The same pattern seems to be emerging in the United States: an attempt is being made to form combat hamlets, as it were, in the depressed areas of big cities. The aim is to neutralize the local police and to force them to abandon attempts to maintain lawful authority in an urban area. Indeed the plan in the U.S. seems to be to create in the big cities a network of interlocking political action groups staffed by revolutionaries trained on our college campuses. The end in view is the substitution of a new, synthetic, anarcho-Communist political authority for the legitimate authority of city and state. Observers with vision and understanding of Communist methods in other countries grasp the overall trend of this development -- the step-by-step establishment of a Communist state within a state inside this nation. It is to this end that the revolutionaries seek initial power bases on the campuses and from these to build a bridge to the urban centers.

Anthony Harrigan
ANTHONY HARRIGAN
STRATEGY STAFF

James D. Atkinson
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS EDITOR

Anthony J. Bouscaren
DR. ANTHONY BOUSCAREN
STRATEGY STAFF

Myron T. Possony
DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY
STRATEGY & MILITARY AFFAIRS
EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Managing Editor	DeWitt S. Copp
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
National Editor	William Gill
Foreign Editor	Frank J. Johnson
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
News Editor	Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor	Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman	William H. Kendall
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman	Hughston M. McBain
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	A. B. McKee, Jr.
Bennett Archambault	Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Lloyd L. Austin	Dr. Robert Morris
General Mark Clark	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Charles S. Craigmire	Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Henry Duque	Dr. Edward Teller
Wade Fetzer, Jr.	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.	General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Fred M. Gillies	General Robert E. Wood
Clifford F. Hood	Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Wayne A. Johnston	Howard I. Young

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag	Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Bryton Barron	Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren	Dr. T. L. Shen
Anthony Harrigan	Duane Thorin
Dr. Anthony Kubek	Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1965 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606

WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1101 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/88 BY SP7mac/HeC

August 23, 1965

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Casper	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. Felt	✓
Mr. Gale	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
Stewart-Warner Corporation

LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
Security-First National Bank

CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Hon. Chairman of the Board
Belden Manufacturing Company

HENRY DUQUE, Partner
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine

WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
Alexander & Company

PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
Eversharp, Inc.

ROBERT W. GALVIN, Chairman of the Board
Motorola, Inc.

FRED M. GILLIES
Retired Chairman of the Board
Acme Steel Company

CLIFFORD F. HOOD
Former President
United States Steel Corporation

WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
Illinois Central Railroad

WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company

A. B. MCKEE, JR., President
Forest Lumber Company

MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
Retired President
American Library of Information

HOWARD I. YOUNG, Hon. Chairman
American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
JOHN M. FISHER
American Security Council

Senior Vice President
KENNETH M. PIPER
Motorola, Inc.

Vice President
STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
U.S. Steel Corporation

Vice President
JOHN G. SEYCIK
Burton-Dixie Corporation

Vice President
RUSSELL E. WHITE
General Electric Company

Secretary-Treasurer
CYRIL W. HOOPER
Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
JOHN M. FISHER

Administrative Director
WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.

Assistant to the President
MICHAEL J. WARD

Chief, Washington Bureau
LEE R. PENNINGTON

International Politics Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON

Managing Editor, ASC Washington Report
DEWITT COPP

Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

National Editor, ASC Washington Report
WILLIAM GILL

Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
FRANK J. JOHNSON

Special Editor, ASC Washington Report
JOHN F. LEWIS

News Editor, ASC Washington Report
EDGAR ANSEL MOWER

Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY

International Law and Space Editor
ASC Washington Report
REAR ADMIRAL CHESTER C. WARD, USN (Ret.)

Radio Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. WALTER H. JUDD

Radio Co-Editor, ASC Washington Report
SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

The Honorable Clyde A. Tolson
Associate Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Constitution Avenue and Tenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tolson:

As General Eisenhower points out in the enclosed brochure, Communism "seeks to bury us by . . . dividing us against ourselves in our own house."

For this reason, responsible Americans must put aside domestic political considerations and cooperate on national security matters.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd and Dr. Walter H. Judd are providing an outstanding example of such bi-partisan cooperation by serving as co-editors of the "American Security Council Washington Report" radio program.

As one prerequisite for this kind of cooperation, neither the program nor the American Security Council has ever reported on or taken positions on domestic political issues.

You may hear their program on WMAL, the Washington Evening Star station, at 8:00 PM Monday through Friday.

I am sure that both Senator Dodd and Dr. Judd would be most grateful for your comments and suggestions on their program. We, too, would appreciate your comments.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Fisher

John M. Fisher
President

REC 45 100-425828-103
8 SEP 8 1965

3 SEP 2 1965

66 SEP 7 1965

Seal/SP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/HC


ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

100-425828-103



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON REPORT



Co-editor Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat

Editor Dr. Walter H. Judd, Republican

A FREE unique news service specializing in
exclusive reporting of all aspects of the Cold War.

THE BI-PARTISAN WORLD AFFAIRS NEWS PROGRAM

Largest Daily Radio Program in the United States

First Class


The Honorable Clyde A. Tolson
Associate Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Constitution Avenue and Tenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20530

5744

100-425824-103



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON REPORT



Co-editor Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat

Editor Dr. Walter H. Judd, Republican

A FREE unique news service specializing in
exclusive reporting of all aspects of the Cold War.

THE BI-PARTISAN WORLD AFFAIRS NEWS PROGRAM

Largest Daily Radio Program in the United States

"The great majority of our citizens, I believe, want to understand the form and fashion of the challenge posed for us by Communism. They seek sound information on which they can rely and from which they can draw their own conclusions and make their own decisions as to the rightness or wrongness of the paths we pursue in the search for a peace which preserves our freedoms."

President Lyndon B. Johnson

December 11, 1964 message to National Governors' Conference School on Cold War Education



General Dwight D. Eisenhower identified the need and set the standards for the *American Security Council Washington Report* in his message to the American people on the inaugural broadcast of the program. His statement has become the official policy guide for this news series.

"WE MUST FIRST"

I believe there is an overpowering need for a regular and sustained study of this subject through a series of programs such as this. It is vital that the American people understand the nature of this struggle—that they grasp the magnitude of the threat posed by Communism to our free society—that they come to know their adversary in all his many and devious guises.

Of course, America is resolved to remain so strong morally, economically, and militarily as to overwhelm any Communist threat or any attempt to use force against us. But there is one point I must emphasize again: to further their persistently announced purpose of dominating the world the Communists resort to any strategem and artifice, no matter how evil its nature. They use blandishment as well as threat, bribery as well as force. In their doctrine, anything is right if it helps to gain their ends. As a common practice they resort to deceit, lies, false accusations and character assassination.

To defeat these efforts, America cannot use Communist methods. As a free world leader, our nation cannot act like criminal Communists. Instead, to combat their insidious and dangerous tactics, we must first be alert and informed, and then we must use truth incessantly and vigorously as our mightiest weapon to defeat them.

AMERICA'S SECRET WEAPON

Beyond this, I feel we have a secret weapon in America which no scientific technology in any totali-

BE ALERT AND INFORMED."

by General Dwight D. Eisenhower

tarian country could ever hope to produce. I am speaking now of our spiritual values; of our deep and abiding faith in the individual created free and equal with all others, and in his ability to rise to any recognized challenge that may confront us.

The difficulty is that today we are faced with an adversary who obscures that challenge — an enemy who seeks to bury us by confusing Americans, by tempting us to lose faith in ourselves, by dividing us against ourselves in our own house, as well as by creating dissension between us and our allies.

I think the difficulties we are faced with in this protracted conflict spring largely from the fact that many Americans have never fully understood the tragic harvest of human suffering Communism has reaped around the world, and the methods it uses to undermine and weaken our free society.

No nation has ever been more merciful than America toward its enemies, or more generous to the poor and downtrodden of the world. Nowhere in history has there been anything to compare with the generosity and compassion the American people have for decades shown to friend and foe alike. No nation has ever sought less for itself. All we ask is a world in which all nations can live together in peace. We are not out to conquer any country or take over anyone else's country.

STRENGTH—AND WEAKNESS

I think this is one of our great strengths. But in the fight against Communism it can at times prove to

be a weakness. Americans assume that all other people will be just as fair and honest in their dealings with us as we are with them. Usually this is true. But the Communists have a completely different set of values—they respect nothing but strength. They are forever seeking to corrupt new nations.

I know that on these Washington Report programs you and your guest experts will accurately explain these processes to the American public. You will keep them abreast of Communism's efforts to spread itself day-by-day over the whole earth. You will help our people understand what they are faced with in this most fateful of all wars. And I know that to support the growth and strength of freedom you will make sound proposals based on solid fact, not on wishful thinking.

The only real obstacle standing today between Communism and world dictatorship is a strong United States, determined to use its strength in freedom's cause.

If we should lose this struggle, the lights of freedom will go out all over the world, to be relighted no one knows when. Every American has a responsibility to see that this doesn't happen, and I welcome every responsible effort, like these broadcasts, that can help our citizens better to understand their responsibilities in this vital matter.

I want to wish you (Walter H. Judd) and the American Security Council every success. Your work will help keep the lights of freedom burning brightly.



WASHINGTON REPOR

The *Washington Report* is a daily news program devoted exclusively to Cold War developments. This specialized reporting is particularly needed now when the Communist Bloc has stepped-up its *psychological* offensive on a number of fronts. The program provides in-depth reporting in a factual, moderate, easy-to-understand style.

This five-minute news feature is broadcast five days a week. It is available free on an exclusive basis to one station in each market.

CO-EDITORS

Sharing the microphone as co-editors and commentators are Dr. Walter Judd, one of the foremost leaders in the Republican Party and a veteran of 20 years' service in the House of Representatives, and Thomas J. Dodd, Democratic Senator from Connecticut most often identified with the liberal wing of his party. Despite differences in domestic political philosophy, these two outstanding men are united as implacable foes of Communism. Drawing on their wide experience and knowledge, they cover briefly, but in depth, the meaning behind current Cold War events.

STAFF

Dr. Judd and Senator Dodd are backed by an outstanding research and editorial staff both in Washington and at the American Security Council's research center in Chicago which has the largest private library on national security and Communism in this country. Several of the senior staff members are shown on the inside back cover.

STATION SUPPORT FOR WASHINGTON REPORT

Since its beginning in September 1964, the *American Security Council Washington Report of the Air* has received the highest of recognition from the broadcasting industry. It is now beamed into millions of American homes five days a week from more than 900 participating stations coast-to-coast and in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico. Radio Free Europe utilizes the program and International Radio Station WRUL beams it to 106 countries around the world. The *Washington Report* is also broadcast throughout the world by the Armed Forces Radio Service.

The majority of the participating stations are ABC, CBS, NBC or independent stations. It is also a regularly scheduled Mutual Broadcasting System program available to all Mutual stations except in markets where another station has prior exclusivity.

As the most widely aired daily radio program in the United States, it serves more different markets than all three major networks combined.

The *Washington Report* is carried in prime time by top stations.

GUESTS

The *Washington Report* often features interviews with top representatives of other nations, key figures in the news, and broadcasts made at the front lines of the Cold War. For example, a recent guest was Juanita Castro, the sister of Cuba's dictator, who fled that island to join exile groups working to overturn the tyranny of Communism. First-hand reactions to the fighting in Viet Nam were recorded by Senator Dodd during a recent fact-finding mission to the Far East.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first guest on the program. Other guests have been such news-makers as top Democratic and Republican senators and congressmen, the Dalai Lama, and Dato Ong, Ambassador from Malaysia.

DISTRIBUTION

The programs are distributed to stations on records (five programs per record) in advance of each week's schedule. The program content is 3 1/4 minutes long so that it may be locally sponsored as a five-minute program. Or, it may be inserted within longer news programs for added dimension and showmanship.

The *Washington Report* radio series is made possible by a special public service grant from the Schick Stainless Steel Blade Division of the Schick Safety Razor Company. Under this grant, the American Security Council Press plans to make the programs available until at least September 1966.

SETS NEW RECORD

For example:

KFI (NBC)	Los Angeles	6:55 PM
WWL (CBS)	New Orleans	6:00 PM
KGU (NBC)	Honolulu	12:50 and 6:20 PM
KVI	Seattle	7:05 PM
WMAL (ABC)	Washington, D.C.	8:00 PM
WEZE (NBC)	Boston	8:30 AM
WLOL	Minneapolis	5:30 PM

While the majority of the stations carry the *Washington Report* as a sustaining program, it is locally sponsored in many markets. For example: First Federal Savings and Loan, WGBS (Mutual), Miami; Elk Refining Company, WCHS (CBS), Charleston, West Virginia; Twin Cities Federal Savings and Loan Association, WLOL, Minneapolis; Stanley's Jewelers, WGAW (Mutual), Gardner, Massachusetts; Bourns, Inc., KACE, Riverside, California.



WHAT THE STATIONS SAY ABOUT THE *WASHINGTON REPORT*

"The *Washington Report of the Air* is one of the better ways to help assure fairness in our news and information programming. It contributes ably to our variety of viewpoints and does it fairly and intelligently."

*Harold Green, Program Manager
WMAL (ABC), Washington, D.C.*

"This program is the most authoritative and yet the most interesting and informative program of this nature that KFML has ever carried. It will occupy a position of prime time in our daily schedule as long as it is available."

*Arthur L. Robertson, General Manager
KFML & KFML-FM, Denver, Colorado*

"*Washington Report* has proven to be a most interesting and provocative program. We have aired the program at 5:10 PM daily for the past 26 weeks and our current sponsor has given us blanket approval for a 52 week renewal. This program fills a void that I am certain exists at most radio stations."

*Morton J. Victorson, Sales Manager
WCHS (CBS), Charleston, West Virginia*

"The *Washington Report* was immediately sold out and, since we broadcast the program 4 times daily at 4 different newscasts, we reaped abundantly. The response has been in the form of letters and telephone calls. It is said that the Report as news behind the news is priceless, that its variety makes it always interesting and that its factual approach is a credit to sound and rational thought."

*Michael G. Davis, Manager
KBGN-AM & FM, Caldwell, Idaho*

"*Washington Report* is a stimulating program which every news conscious American interested in our Country as well as current World problems should hear. We are proud to be able to carry it on Radio-Station KFQD, and will continue to do so as long as there is a program to broadcast to our listeners."

*Jay Perry, General Manager
KFQD (CBS), Anchorage, Alaska*

"The program has been well received in Louisiana and we are happy to learn it will be continued. Its importance lies in the fact that it points up the dangers of Communist influences in our own country and abroad which are too often glossed over or ignored by a large section of the nation's news media."

*Fred Hammond, News Director
WWL (CBS), New Orleans, Louisiana*

"The *American Security Council Washington Report* has been an audience builder for Radio Miami, WGBS. It is a stimulating, thought-provoking, well-produced series. I'm happy to hear the series will be continued for another year."

*Spencer E. Danes, Program Manager
WGBS (Mutual), Miami, Florida*

WASHINGTON REPORT STAFF

Assisting co-editors Dr. Judd and Senator Dodd



JOHN M. FISHER Editor-in-Chief
Mr. Fisher is President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Security Council. He is also President of the Institute for American Strategy and President of the American Research Foundation. He has served as the consultant to the Chairman of the Committee on Cold War Education of the National Governors Conference, member of the Civil Defense Advisory Council for Illinois; a World War II combat pilot; a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His research experience includes organizing and heading a national research organization with 32 branch offices.



DeWITT S. COPP Managing Editor
Author and historian DeWitt Copp has written numerous books and articles on Communism and international affairs, including: *Betrayal at the U.N., Communist-Nazi Relations in World War Two, and Communist Exiles—Marx to Present Day*. As a prize-winning radio and television writer, he has also written over 1,000 radio programs and has 40 film and TV credits for dramatic shows, including documentaries for the U.S. Air Force and Army. He is a frequent contributor to the *ASC Washington Report* and serves as its Managing Editor.



WILLIAM J. GILL National Editor
Award-winning free-lance journalist William Gill has over 18 years' experience in news reporting, including assignments for Time, Life, Fortune, National Geographic and The Saturday Evening Post. A graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism and a former UPI correspondent, his by-line has appeared in articles ranging from economics and education to civil defense and foreign affairs. He is National Editor of the *ASC Washington Report* and a recognized expert in the fields of international security and disarmament.



JOHN F. LEWIS Associate Editor
Washington Producer
John Lewis began his career as a newsman 22 years ago with the Associated Press covering government and politics. Subsequently an editor and publisher of several weekly newspapers, he later entered broadcasting as an analyst of political and economic affairs. He became Radio-TV News Director for one of the nation's leading stations and also served as communications media consultant to the American Farm Bureau Federation. For many years he was an independent producer of educational and public affairs programs for both radio and television.



LEE R. PENNINGTON Internal Security Editor
Mr. Pennington is Chief of the Washington Bureau of the American Security Council. He is a retired inspector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has also served as Director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion. With his extensive background in national security matters and his long service in Washington, Mr. Pennington plays a key role in gathering facts for the *ASC's Washington Report*.

DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON International Politics Editor

Dr. Atkinson is Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He was Director of the Psychological Warfare course conducted for the armed forces by the Georgetown Graduate School. He is President of the American Military Institute. He is the author of *The Edge of War* and numerous published articles. He has been a consultant to the Psychological Strategy Board, the Operations Research Office, the Department of the Navy and other government agencies.



DR. LEV R. DOBRIANSKY Economics Editor

Dr. Dobriansky is Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee; lecturer at Naval War College, National War College, Armed Services Staff College and other universities; author or editor of five books; author of over 200 published articles on the Soviet Union; author of congressional resolutions on Captive Nations Week and Shevchenko Monument. He has received tribute in Congress, the Freedoms Foundation award and many other honors.



WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR. Research Director

Mr. Lambie heads the American Security Council's Library and Research Center. He is a graduate of the Vanderbilt University of Law and a member of the Tennessee bar. Mr. Lambie is a former special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He served in the U. S. Navy during World War II. In the four years he has been Research Director, the American Security Council's research staff has handled more than 60,000 research requests from ASC member companies, the press and government agencies plus conducting research for the *ASC Washington Report* and other ASC publications.



EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER Senior News Editor

Mr. Mowrer is a nationally syndicated columnist and appears in papers like the New York Daily News. A Pulitzer Prize winner Mr. Mowrer was the Chicago Daily News chief foreign correspondent for twenty years. He predicted in 1922 that Mussolini meant war; in 1933 that Hitler meant war and in 1936 that the Japanese meant war. He watched the first skirmishes of the Spanish Civil War and covered Europe, China, North Africa and the Middle East. He has written ten books in the field of political science, the most recent of which is *An End to Make Believe*.




DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY Military Affairs Editor

A leading political and military scientist, Dr. Possony is a member of the ASC's National Strategy Committee. He is Director of International Studies Program, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Dr. Possony's broad background includes services as a psychological warfare specialist for the French Foreign Office and later for the Office of Naval Intelligence; as a special advisor to the U. S. Air Force; and Professor of International Politics, Georgetown University. He lectures widely on international affairs, strategy and Communism. He has published many books and articles.





The **WASHINGTON REPORT** is broadcast by over 900 radio stations in the United States and is heard in 106 other countries.



Produced by: **AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESS**
Executive Offices: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Washington Bureau: 1101-17th Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Distributed by: Broadcast Services Syndicate, 230 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60601

Produced and distributed free to radio stations under a public service grant from the
Schick Safety Razor Company. Offered exclusively to one station in each market.

August 31, 1965

REC 45 100-425828-104

Mr. John M. Fisher
President
American Security Council
123 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mech/HC

Dear Mr. Fisher:

Associate Director Clyde A. Tolson and I have received your letters of August 23rd, with enclosures, and want to thank you for bringing this material to our attention.

While I indeed would like to be of service to you, as you may know, it is contrary to my long-standing policy to comment on literature or programs not prepared by personnel of this Bureau. Therefore, I am certain you will understand why we cannot comment as you have suggested.

I have, however, been emphasizing to those citizens who communicate with me that the problems facing many of our communities are those which should be met by legally constituted authorities with the steadfast cooperation of every loyal citizen. This is not the time for vigilante action or for inaction. We must unite as a people, we must understand our basic American heritage under law, and we must face the issues confronting us with deliberation, quiet courage, and knowledge.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 30
AUG 1 1965
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Ritter _____
Rosen _____

1 - Chicago - Enclosure

NOTE: Mr. Fisher is a former Special Agent who is on the Special Correspondents' List. Dr. Walter H. Judd, former Congressman, corresponded favorably with the Bureau in the past; however, he has been critical of the Director and our relations are estranged with him. Only a copy of Mr. Hoover's letter is being sent to Chicago inasmuch as they are identical.

6 SEP 7 1965

MAILED

TELETYPE UNIT

DTP:rsp (4) *rsp*



AMERICAN SECURITY COU

EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND RESEARCH CENTER: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
WASHINGTON BUREAU: 1101 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SPINACHIC

August 23, 1965

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

SENIOR ADVISORY BOARD

BENNETT ARCHAMBAULT, Chairman of the Board
Stewart-Warner Corporation
LLOYD L. AUSTIN, Chairman of the Board
Security-First National Bank
CHARLES S. CRAIGMILE, Hon. Chairman of the Board
Belden Manufacturing Company
HENRY DUQUE, Partner
Adams, Duque & Hazelton
WADE FETZER, JR., Chairman
Alexander & Company
PATRICK J. FRAWLEY, JR., Chairman of the Board
Eversharp, Inc.
ROBERT W. GALVIN, Chairman of the Board
Motorola, Inc.
FRED M. GILLIES
Retired Chairman of the Board
Acme Steel Company
CLIFFORD F. HOOD
Former President
United States Steel Corporation
WAYNE A. JOHNSTON, President
Illinois Central Railroad
WILLIAM H. KENDALL, President
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
A. B. MCKEE, JR., President
Forest Lumber Company
Imperial Valley Lumber Company
MAJOR GENERAL W. A. WORTON, USMC (Ret.)
Retired President
American Library of Information
HOWARD I. YOUNG, Hon. Chairman
American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company

OFFICERS

President
JOHN M. FISHER
American Security Council
Senior Vice President
KENNETH M. PIPER
Motorola, Inc.
Vice President
STEPHEN L. DONCHESS
U.S. Steel Corporation
Vice President
JOHN G. SEVCIK
Burton-Dixie Corporation
Vice President
RUSSELL E. WHITE
General Electric Company
Secretary-Treasurer
CYRIL W. HOOPER
Stewart-Warner Corporation

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Chief Executive Officer
JOHN M. FISHER
Administrative Director
WILLIAM K. LAMBIE, JR.
Assistant to the President
MICHAEL J. WARD
Chief, Washington Bureau
LEE R. PENNINGTON
International Politics Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. JAMES D. ATKINSON
Managing Editor, ASC Washington Report
DEWITT COPP
Economics Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. LEV E. DOBRANSKY
National Editor, ASC Washington Report
WILLIAM GILL
Foreign Editor, ASC Washington Report
FRANK J. JOHNSON
Special Editor, ASC Washington Report
JOHN F. LEWIS
News Editor, ASC Washington Report
EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor
ASC Washington Report
DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY
International Law and Space Editor
ASC Washington Report
REAR ADMIRAL CHESTER C. WARD, USN (Ret.)
Radio Editor, ASC Washington Report
DR. WALTER H. JUDD
Radio Co-Editor, ASC Washington Report
SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Constitution Avenue and Tenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Hoover:

As General Eisenhower points out in the enclosed brochure, Communism "seeks to bury us by . . . dividing us against ourselves in our own house."

For this reason, responsible Americans must put aside domestic political considerations and cooperate on national security matters.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd and Dr. Walter H. Judd are providing an outstanding example of such bi-partisan cooperation by serving as co-editors of the "American Security Council Washington Report" radio program.

As one prerequisite for this kind of cooperation, neither the program nor the American Security Council has ever reported on or taken positions on domestic political issues.

You may hear their program on WMAL, the Washington Evening Star station, at 8:00 PM Monday through Friday.

I am sure that both Senator Dodd and Dr. Judd would be most grateful for your comments and suggestions on their program. We, too, would appreciate your comments.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Fisher

John M. Fisher
President

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

JMF/jr

REC 45

100-425828-104

3 SEP 2 1965

8-107

EXP. PROC.

AUG 27 1965

33

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7mac/4c

6916

100-42582 8-104

ENCLOSURE

REC 1 100 - 425828 - 105

December 16, 1965

Mr. Herbert J. Frank
President
The Aerasonic Corporation
Post Office Box 569
Clearwater, Florida 33517

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/87 BY SP7m/AGH/c

Dear Mr. Frank:

Your letter of December 9th has been received.

In response to your inquiry, this Bureau has
never investigated the American Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JRP
JRC

1 - Tampa - Enclosure

NOTE: Bufiles reflect the American Security Council is an organization financed and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for the use of its members. Data developed is furnished to individuals and organizations deemed appropriate to receive such information for a fee. Former Special Agents of the FBI are high officials of this Council. Correspondent communicated with the Director to inquire if the age of a letter written in pencil could be scientifically determined. Our reply of 8-7-62 was

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Alt _____

JRP:ncr (4)

6 DECEMBER 1965

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

(next page)

✓ Williams 4724

Mr. Herbert J. Frank

written on black letterhead stationery. During 1958 Frank spoke before the Grandview Terrace Association in Clearwater, Florida. The substance of his remarks was furnished the Bureau by one [redacted] of that city, and the Bureau is aware of comments made by Frank ridiculing the Government and the Bureau. In view of this, the above reply on black letterhead stationery appears appropriate, and correspondent is not being addressed as honorable.

b6
b7C



SCHICK SAFETY RAZOR COMPANY

DIVISION OF EVERSHARP, INC.

5933 W. SLAUSON AVE. ■ CULVER CITY, CALIF. 90232 ■ 391-6721 870-7081

P. J. FRAWLEY, JR.
PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN BOARD OF DIRECTORS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY *Spimac/He*

January 10, 1966

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Wick
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Mr. F. E. Carnie, Sr.

Partner

Fred E. Carnie and Son Company
2012 K Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Fred E. Carnie & Son
2012 K Street
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Carnie:

As businessmen, we have both supported different organizations fighting Communism. These fine organizations have tried hard, but the Communists are not deterred by the efforts of these small groups.

We need at least one anti-Communist organization big enough to get results. This can be done easily if we all support the same association -- one which has already demonstrated its vitality.

On this basis we ask you to join us in the American Security Council. It was organized by business as the reasonable and responsible way to fill this need. With over 3500 member companies it is already the largest organization of its type. Its radio program -- featuring top Republican Walter H. Judd and top Democratic Senator Thomas J. Dodd -- is already the largest daily radio program in the country. It has met the market test.

The enclosed new brochure describes the American Security Council. Membership dues are nominal and should not dislocate your budget.

Please complete the enclosed membership form now and return it to me.

EX-102 REC-35 ✓ 100-425828-106
Sincerely,

15 JAN 17 1966

ENCLOSURE

PJF:mm
Encl. 2

P. J. Frawley

Patrick J. Frawley
Chairman of the Board


Attention J. Edgar Hoover. CORRESPONDENCE
This sounds like another John
Schick Society. What is your opinion?
+ OMB - 1000
Regards, Fred Carnie, Pres.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Attention J. Edgar Hoover. DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7macthc

This sounds like another John Birch
Society. What is your opinion?

Regards F. E. Carnie, Pres.



21
add 1/20/88
W.P. Pres

REC-35

100-425828-106 January 21, 1966

EX-102

Honorable F. E. Carnie
President
Fred E. Carnie and Son
2012 K Street
Sacramento, California 95814

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/88 BY SP/ma/c/Hcc

Dear Mr. Carnie:

Fred E.

On January 18th I received the letter of January 10th addressed to you by Honorable Patrick J. Frawley which you sent along with the material concerning the American Security Council.

With respect to your inquiry, the FBI has never investigated this group. I thought you might like to know, however, that we have enjoyed favorable relations with it.

Enclosed is the literature you forwarded.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 19

JAN 21 1966

COMM-FBI

Enclosures (2)

Re: 106
1 - San Francisco - Enclosure

NOTE: Mr. Carnie is not identifiable in Bufiles. Mr. Frawley is on the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin mailing list. He met the Director on 1-3-65 and discussed various points of interest about communism. Mr. Frawley is known personally to Assistant to the Director DeLoach. The American Security Council has not been investigated by the Bureau. It is self-described as an organization financed and operated by private industry as a National Research and Information Center on subversive activities. They have publicly announced that there are several former Special Agents of the FBI within their organization. In view of this data, it is felt the above reply is appropriate.

DTP:rss (4) *mas*

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

100-425828-106
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT
100-425828-106

PLM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: March 14, 1966

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. DeLoach

SUBJECT: SENATOR TOM DODD

1 - Mr. Rosen

ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES
APPEARING IN THE PEARSON COLUMN

1 - Mr. Malley

1 - Mr. Walters

1 - Mr. Frankenfield

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac44c

Lee Pennington stopped by to advise the Bureau that Tom Dodd is a co-chairman of a daily radio broadcast over WMAL which he and former Congressman Judd, a former doctor-missionary, sponsor. This program is backed by the American Security Council as a public service educational program, which is financed by Schick Razor Company, dealing with current relations, primarily foreign relations.

The American Security Council is particularly concerned with this program in view of the recent articles which have appeared in the Washington Merry Go Round; namely, Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson's column.

Pennington states that he has learned that [redacted] and [redacted] both of whom formerly were employed by Tom Dodd, have been fired because of their relations with one another. It is alleged that Senator Dodd put locks on his doors after he fired Boyd. It appears that Dave Martin has furnished certain information to Dewitt (Pete) Copp concerning the alleged theft of material from Dodd's office. In this regard, one Michael O'Hare (phonetic), Jack Anderson, and [redacted] allegedly used Dodd's copying machine for the purpose of copying at least 1,000 sheets of Tom Dodd's records. It is alleged that Michael O'Hare was a former employee of Tom Dodd. He allegedly allowed Anderson and Boyd to enter Dodd's offices.

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 58-6157

Pete Copp is Managing Editor of the American Security Council Press and in this connection writes a good many of the MAR 21 1966 broadcasts which are subsequently transcribed and then disseminated through WMAL over various associated stations throughout the country.

AR:ige

(6)

51 MAR 29 1966 102 MAR 22 '66

100-425828

NOT RECORDED

CONTINUED - OVER

58-6157

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
SENATOR TOM DODD

It is because of this relationship that Dodd has with the radio program that the American Security Council is greatly concerned. They feel that this publicity will reflect unfavorably on the program.

The above information was furnished to the Bureau for the Director's information. Information we previously obtained indicates the records stolen from Dodd's office were copied in Irving Davidson's office by a female employee of Davidson's, who is supposed to be in Dallas, Texas. The balance of the material concerning Dodd is not new.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 3-28-66

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP70mc/HC

66-1731-251

al filed in:

Pages 635-639. Senator Byrd, (D) West Virginia, placed in the Record the March 14 edition of the Washington Report entitled "The Need for Political Warfare Education." The Washington Report is published by the American Security Council and reports on national and international developments affecting the Nation's security. This report comments on the legislation to establish a Freedom Academy and Freedom Commission and states "Whatever the outcome of the pending legislation, it becomes increasingly clear that the American people must begin to build a more adequate political defense structure for the free world. A substantial part of the foundation for such a structure can be provided by a 'freedom academy,' official or private."

RECEIVED

100-425828-107

NOT RECORDED
184 APR 8 1966

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 3-25-66 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

54 APR 21 1966 RJS

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____

MR. DELOACH *PD* _____

MR. MOHR *PD* _____

MR. WICK *PD* _____

MR. CASPER *PD* _____

MR. CALLAHAN _____

MR. CONRAD _____

MR. FELT _____

MR. GALE _____

MR. ROSEN *PD* _____

MR. SULLIVAN *PD* _____

MR. TAVEL _____

MR. TROTTER _____

MR. JONES _____

MR. FROOM _____

MISS HOLMES _____

MRS. METCALF _____

MISS GANDY _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/18 BY *Spineachke*



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7mac/HC

7/18 Washington, July 18, 1966

WB 66-27

FORGET THE CAPTIVE NATIONS?

"Especially disgusting is the villainous demagogic of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called Captive Nations Week, hypocritically pretending to be defenders of nations that have escaped from their yoke. These international gendarmes, stranglers of freedom and independence, would like again to enslave the free nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But this will never happen!"

These are the words of Mikhail Suslov in reference to the 1965 Captive Nations Week observance, uttered on July 17, 1965 in Lithuania with reference to all captive nations.

Who is Suslov? He is the secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and a member of its ruling Presidium. He has weathered all political storms in the Soviet Union and he has served in the highest echelon under Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev and now serves under Brezhnev and Kosygin. In short, Suslov has been the chief thinker and ideologist under successive totalitarian regimes in colonialist Moscow. He knows the psycho-political significance of Captive Nations Week, even if some of our leaders and many of our citizens have given it scant attention.

Suslov was not alone in his denunciation of the Week. He merely voiced again the fear and concern of Moscow, which Khrushchev first enunciated in 1959 on the occasion of Vice President Richard Nixon's trip to Russia. Mr. Nixon, in his book Six Crises, stated, "The Captive Nations Resolution was the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour."

As in every previous year, a whole chorus of Red denunciations rose in connection with last year's observance. Here are two selected ones which were generally overlooked outside the Soviet bloc.

100-425828-

NOT RECORDED

"They are beating the drums again across the sea, filling columns in newspapers and delivering long hypocritical speeches. For the umpteenth time the governing circles of the United States are holding the so-called 'Captive Nations Week'. And the machine of propaganda is deafening

Editor's Note: Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky is the man who conceived the idea of Captive Nations Week. He is a Professor of Economics at Georgetown University, Washington D. C. and is Economics Editor of the American Security Council Washington Report.

ANNUAL REPORT OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY
JULY 26, 1966
FEB 39

File

SOVIET INFORMATION SECTION

the citizens with the 'atrocious' inventions about the fate of nations who are 'suffering under the yoke of the Kremlin regime.'" (Radyanska Ukraina, July 25, 1965).

By contrast, in a Polish blast, the writer sought to downplay the observance.

"An annual, pitiful undertaking. One could treat it as a joke . . . if it were not for the fact that Captive Nations Week, an annual undertaking organized by men who have long since lost contact with their nations, is supported by the U. S. Congress and by a proclamation of the President of the U. S." (Trybuna Ludu, July 27, 1965).

Skilled in timing their propaganda, the Russians seized upon the 1965 Week as an occasion for sentencing Gerald Brooke, a 28 year old British teacher to five years of hard labor for propagating anti-Soviet literature. This was to be a warning to anti-Communist groups of what to expect.

Why the Sensitive Reaction?

Americans who are unfamiliar with these and similar accounts invariably ask, "Why the sensitive reaction?" The answer is simple. From the very start, Captive Nations Week has been a thorn in the side of Communist psycho-political strategy toward us and the industrial West. A cardinal objective of Moscow's deceptive policy of "peaceful coexistence" has been to establish our politico-moral acceptance of the Soviet Empire. The Soviet Russians and their collaborators insist that if we really want to coexist peacefully, we must forget about any captive nations. Moscow and its associated Communist regimes even demand that in order to achieve a real lessening of tensions - thus giving them a necessary breather for their consolidation efforts - we must show our good faith by forgetting the whole history of Soviet Russian imperialism and Communist conquests since 1918.

The Captive Nations Week resolution, passed by the U. S. Congress in 1959 and now Public Law 86-90, counteracts all this deception. By stressing the very essentials that Moscow and the Red Syndicate would have us forget, both the law and the annual Week stand as a major obstacle to the Red psycho-political design. Moreover, the two are a source of grave apprehension to the cold warriors of Moscow and other Communist capitals because they persistently point to one of the Soviets' most exposed areas of vulnerability.

The Captive Nations Week has great educational value. Its observance clearly outlines the perfidy, deception, and long-run dangers of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" strategy. This strategy has four dimensions: 1) to lull the West into a state of confusion, friction, and demoralization, 2) with this advantage of a breather, to consolidate the Communist empire through necessary economic changes, the elimination of all remaining resistance, the suppression of patriotic "bourgeois nationalism," and the strict maintenance of totalitarian power in the various Communist Parties within the Soviet orbit, 3) to pursue "wars of liberation" in the underdeveloped areas of the Free World, and 4) to strive to attain a scientific breakthrough in military and space technology that would facilitate a political blackmail of the West into surrender.

*7-6
ny*
The existence of U. S. nuclear arms does not deter a Kosygin, visiting Egypt, from harshly maligning Americans as "Hitlerites" and "imperialists"; nor does it

frighten a Brezhnev from greeting the Tri-Continental Havana Conference, held last January in these words: "Today, Havana attracts the attention of all fighters against the forces of imperialist aggression and colonialism and for the national and social liberation of peoples . . . The U. S. imperialists are challenging all progressive forces." Repeated often enough without adequate challenge, all these blatant untruths will doubtless poison the minds of millions. Yet there are many in our country, in high places and low, who resist speaking the truth openly about the captive nations, particularly those in the U.S.S.R. itself.

The Truths and the Growing Week

Fortunately, since 1959, the nation-wide observance of Captive Nations Week has steadily grown, and the basic truths about Soviet Russian imperialism, genocide and colonialist exploitation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the oppression of all the captive peoples by their totalitarian governments, are reaching more and more Americans. Although the White House unfortunately has played down the Week in recent years, our Governors, Mayors and citizens have broadened the annual observance.

By 1965, half of our States issued official proclamations, and practically every major city did likewise. Over one-third of the House of Representatives and close to one-third of the U. S. Senate have become members of the National Captive Nations Committee, which guides the annual observance. Local Captive Nations committees have sprung up in every section of the country. The Week is now observed overseas in the Republic of China, West Germany, Turkey, Sweden and Australia.

This year, the third week of July marks the eighth annual observance of Captive Nations Week. During this week Americans will again raise their voices to honor the enslaved half of the world. They will emphasize again the things that must be done if the long list of captive nations - from Cuba to Hungary to Ukraine to North Vietnam - is not to be extended and if our sins of omission today are not to result in unnecessary sacrifices of American life and treasure tomorrow.

Building Bridges of Understanding

One of the chief themes of the 1966 Week is the building of bridges of understanding with the captive nations - the people themselves, rather than with the illegitimate regimes that hold them in bondage and politico-economic slavery. The bridge of understanding can only be one link in the mutual struggle for freedom - their freedom regained and ours preserved. To believe that by arriving at "understandings" with the Communist rulers we shall be furthering the freedom of the captive nations is not only an illusion but also an affront to common political sense. In addition, our wishful thinking about the early end of the Cold War - in itself a striking achievement of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" policy - has blinded us to the realities of the Red Empire and has exposed us to further illusions about "mellowed Communists in Moscow and Warsaw", "independent Communists in Bucharest and Belgrade", and "the growing nationalism among satellite Communist regimes". On the contrary, a little exercise of logic itself would demonstrate that the power center of the Red Empire is the Soviet Union and all other parts, even including Red China, depend for their ultimate survival upon this center. Moreover, if more of our people took the trouble to read the U. S. Senate study on The Soviet Empire (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965) they would find these illusions shattered as the story of current

Russian genocide, colonialism, and basic Stalinism is unraveled for them.

The crucial fact is that our people are not being told the full truth about people of the captive nations and their plight in the totalitarian Red states. Unpardonable ignorance, a morally irresponsible indifference, and restraining fears are frequently the ingredients of omission that in the long run exact a disproportionate cost. On May 26, 1966, President Johnson unequivocally stated, "The United States cannot condone the perpetuation of racial or political injustice anywhere in the world." Nowhere in this world is such injustice greater and more ruinous than in the Red Empire of captive nations.

Those of us who have been active in Captive Nations Week have opposed measures which tend to perpetuate the control of Communist regimes over the Captive Nations. Such measures would include the liberalization of trade with Eastern Europe, the promulgation of the U. S. -U. S. S. R. Consular Treaty and proposals to admit Red China to the U. N. The 1966 Captive Nations Week is an appropriate time to stress our support of positive measures concentrating on the freedom of the captive nations. Among them, we might include the support of public and private "Freedom Academies", creation of a special Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations and the focusing of world attention on Sino-Soviet imperio-colonialism. We will further the cause of world freedom by never forgetting all the Captive Nations - those in the Soviet Union, in Central Europe, in Asia and Cuba.



LEV E. DOBRAINSKY
ECONOMICS EDITOR

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
Managing Editor	Frank J. Johnson
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobrainsky
National Editor	William Gill
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
Associate Editor, Radio Producer	John F. Lewis
News Editor	Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor	DeWitt S. Copp
Associate Editor	Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman	Clifford F. Hood
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman	Wayne A. Johnston
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	William H. Kendall
Bennett Archambault	A. B. McKee, Jr.
Lloyd L. Austin	Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
General Mark Clark	Dr. Robert Morris
Charles S. Craigmire	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Henry Duque	Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Wade Fetzer, Jr.	Dr. Edward Teller
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Fred M. Gillies	General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
	Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

STRATEGY STAFF

Karl Baarslag	Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren	Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Anthony Harrigan	Dr. T. L. Shen
Dr. Anthony Kubek	Duane Thorin
Rev. Daniel Lyons, S.J.	Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1966 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/98 BY SP7mactc

WR 66-230

Washington, August 8, 1966

SIMULTANEOUS WAR:

The Strategy of the Tricontinental Conference

We must give the Communists credit for one thing: they think big. Even though they had suffered a major defeat in Indonesia, and even though their chances for victory in Viet Nam were fading rapidly, the Communists nevertheless went ahead with the creation of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization - a permanent mechanism whose principal mission is to incite, support and coordinate simultaneous "wars of national liberation" on three continents. Furthermore, they established it in Havana, Cuba, directly under the nose of the United States.

This step was taken during the first two weeks of January of this year. More than 500 delegates from some 83 national Communist organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America assembled for the "First Tricontinental Conference."* However, in the seven months that have since elapsed, the Conference has been virtually forgotten by the American people. Headlines and public attention have shifted to other trouble spots. But the work of the permanent bodies established by the Conference goes on quietly and in deadly earnest.

Clearly, Latin America is going to be the testing ground for the new Communist strategy of "simultaneous war." The Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization, established by the Tricontinental Conference, set up in its turn a Permanent Executive Secretariat. Also located in Havana, the Secretariat is the full-time general headquarters for the control and coordination of violence and terror throughout the under-developed areas of three continents. It is composed of a Secretary General (Captain Osmany Cienfuegues, the present Cuban minister of Construction) and twelve secretaries, four from each continent.

100-425828-

The Secretariat is to supervise the Committee on Assistance and Aid to Movements for National Liberation and Struggle Against Colonialism and Neocolonialism, which has as its mission "to promote, increase, and coordinate effective solidarity with national liberation movements."

NOT RECORDED

According to the resolutions passed during the main Conference in January, Colombia,

18 AUG 16 1966

*Readers were alerted to the importance of this Communist-sponsored Conference in WR 66-2 of January 17, 1966.

54 AUG 22 1966 F-850

Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, Panama, and Ecuador appear to be in the forefront for Communist exploitation. The revolutionary movements of these countries (and others not specifically named) are instructed to "take prompt steps to make a joint study of this military situation . . . "

Latin America itself is covered by the establishment of the Latin American Solidarity Organization. This body is made up of 27 Latin American and Caribbean "delegations" to the Tricontinental Conference. It met immediately after the Conference to review the problems of "revolutionary tactics and strategy." It, too, selected Havana as its permanent headquarters.

As its first order of business, it appointed an Organizing Committee made up of nationals of nine Latin American countries: Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, Guyana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. This Committee has a twofold mission: to orient and guide national Communist organizations so that they may more effectively wage "simultaneous war" throughout the southern hemisphere; and also the immediate task of organizing the "First Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference," to be held sometime in 1967.

Comment of the Experts

The continuing threat posed by these developments has prompted two independent groups of technical experts on counter-intelligence and subversion to issue renewed warnings in the form of special reports.

One of these is the Latin American body known as the Special Consultative Committee on Security. It was established by the Organization of American States at the Puenta del Esta meeting in 1962, and is made up of "seven experts in the field of security who are nationals of member states of the OAS." Their report on the Tricontinental Conference was published on April 2, 1966, and was signed by representatives from Brazil, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the U.S. (The other two members were absent at the time.)

The second group was the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, appointed specifically "to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other security laws." It published a special "staff study" on the Tricontinental Conference on June 7, 1966, which quoted heavily from and fully endorsed the earlier Special Consultative Committee's report.

Warning that "while the democracies rest, the Communists work," the Latin American experts wrote:

"It is necessary to understand that at the present moment we are at war. But we are not engaged in a classical war of the historical kind: that is, a war in which the opposing forces struggle to take objectives that have a material form . . . The war we face today . . . takes as its direct objective man as an individual . . . If we do not convince ourselves that we are at war and that therefore we are combatants, we shall succumb."

The security experts of the Special Consultative Committee of the OAS also found

it necessary and appropriate to repeat some advice they had given the OAS in their report of May 7, 1965. This statement read as follows:

"It is essential that democratic men, particularly those who are responsible for the destinies of their peoples, become convinced that it is not 'anti-democratic' to adopt the measures that are required in order to defend their principles and achievements against the action of Communism. Furthermore, they should be convinced that one cannot be complacent toward Communism nor fail to make every possible effort to cope with the threat posed by its unceasing revolutionary war, inasmuch as only in this way will democracy truly defend itself.

"Much remains to be done in the Americas in order to solve the difficult economic, social and political problems, but it is the professional Communists who do not desire solutions to these problems. Therefore, as a basic measure of self defense, the Communist problem must be eradicated in order to carry out the reforms demanded by the peoples of the Americas."

Cuba - The Center of the Octopus

While the organizational structure is extremely important, representing as it does the brain and the nervous system which directs the Communists' "simultaneous war," it is the trained revolutionary cadre who constitute the fighting muscle. Here the geographic importance of Cuba, as the "secure base" or "rear area" from which subversive operations are launched into all parts of Latin America, assumes a special significance. Reiterating a conclusion published in its December 11, 1964 report, the OAS Special Consultative Committee states that "so long as the regime prevailing in Cuba persists, the immediate Communist threat to the Americas will continue."

As pointed out in the Senate Subcommittee's staff report, Cuba's role in the Communists' offensive into our southern hemisphere goes back to July, 1960, when Raul Castro and his wife hosted a "Preparatory Conference of Latin American Youth." This conference turned out to be merely a "cover" for the first mass effort to recruit teenagers from 17 South American countries for guerrilla training. Arriving in Cuba just prior to the meeting were two experienced Spanish Communist guerrilla experts, General Enrique Lister and Colonel Alberto Bayo. These two professionals established the first of the steadily growing complex of guerrilla training camps in Cuba.

Among the first of these was the one under the command of Colonel Bayo at the Boca Ciega School in the resort town of Tarara, not far to the east of Havana. There in mid-1960, the initial group of 19 young Latin American students began their rigorous training program. Meanwhile, General Lister was building an extensive network of guerrilla warfare schools in Minas del Frio, Oriente Province. By early 1963, the number of these camps had reached 10; by 1966, there was a total of 43, all actively engaged in turning out young, tough, thoroughly indoctrinated Communist cadre for "national liberation wars."

Communist Persistence

The Communists call on every revolutionary to make a revolution; to carry the


battle into its most violent forms, including armed conflict; and to wage the struggle unto the death.

These facts underline the steady growth of a permanent command and control structure for tricontinental armed uprisings, backed up by an expanding training base which is producing increasing numbers of professional Communist cadre to lead the announced campaign of "simultaneous wars."

Despite recent setbacks in the guerrilla uprisings in Peru, Venezuela and Colombia, and despite the vindication at the polls of the earlier U. S. military intervention and of the subsequent Inter-American Peace Force deployments in the Dominican Republic, the Soviet Union still considers its subversive base in Cuba worth the price of a subsidy of over a million dollars a day. (A new trade agreement signed in February, 1966, will increase the exchange of products between the U. S. S. R. and Cuba from \$747 to \$914 million, 22% more than last year.)

At the same time, the U. S. private investment in Latin America is nearing \$12 billion. President Johnson has stated that the U. S. intends to continue the Alliance for Progress economic assistance programs (which come to approximately \$1 billion annually) on into the next decade.

The magnitude of these commitments underlines the fact that both sides know that they are playing for high stakes and for keeps. The fight for freedom in Latin America is far from over. It is just beginning. President Johnson in his White House statement of May 2, 1965, made the U. S. position clear: "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."



EDWIN F. BLACK
BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

Editor's Note: General Black, who has served two tours in Vietnam, is presently serving as Director, Western Hemisphere Region, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
Managing Editor	Frank J. Johnson
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
National Editor	William Gill
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
Associate Editor, Radio Producer	John F. Lewis
News Editor	Edgar Arisel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor	DeWitt S. Copp
Associate Editor	Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman	Clifford F. Hood
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman	Wayne A. Johnston
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	William H. Kendall
Bennett Archambault	A. B. McKee, Jr.
Lloyd L. Austin	Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
General Mark Clark	Dr. Robert Morris
Charles S. Craigmire	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Henry Duque	Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Wade Fetzer, Jr.	Dr. Edward Teller
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Fred M. Gillies	General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
	Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

STRATEGY STAFF

Captain J. H. Morse, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
Dr. T. L. Shen
Duane Thorin
Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1966 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. DELOACH _____
MR. MOHR _____
MR. NICK _____
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. FELT _____
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN _____
MR. SULLIVAN _____
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/01 BY SP7mac/SC



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/12/88 BY sprinbach

Washington, May 15, 1967

WR 67-20

THE COST OF TOURISM TO THE SOVIET UNION

The Risk

In March of this year, the State Department issued a four-page warning to American citizens planning to visit the Soviet Union during the coming tourist season. The release was entitled "Travel to the Soviet Union" and following a list of Do's and Don'ts, it stated: "There is some basis for surmising that the Soviet authorities' treatment of Americans accused of violating their laws and regulations is harsher in periods of strained bilateral relations than would normally be the case. There have been indications of Soviet interest in exchanging imprisoned American tourists for Soviet citizens convicted of espionage in the United States. Also, the government-controlled press in the U.S.S.R., reflecting the Soviet desire to permit only controlled contacts between Soviet citizens and visiting Americans, has recently carried stories apparently designed to be public warnings that many tourists and other visitors from the United States are collecting intelligence information."

A year prior to this most recent warning, the State Department had issued a similar document built on the same three premises—strained relations, exchange of arrested citizens and espionage. All three were valid then and are now, and the only question might be—When in the past twenty years have relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. not been strained? Perhaps the answer is one of degree, but looking at the last five years starting with the Cuban missile crisis it is possible to examine a number of specific cases and thereby in one fashion measure the degree of "strained bilateral relations."

In 1963, Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn of Yale, taking part in the Cultural Exchange Program, was framed by the Soviets on espionage charges. In 1964, Peter Landerman, a tourist, was sentenced to three years in a labor camp following a traffic accident in which a Russian was killed. In 1965, there was the Newcomb Mott case (WR 65-50, 66-19) which ended in Mott's unexplained death while in Soviet hands. Similarly, in 1966, there was the case of Thomas C. Dawson, Peace Corps member, who inadvertently crossed the Iranian-Soviet frontier and was jailed. Shortly thereafter, ex-army Lieutenants Craddock M. Gilmour, Jr. and Buel Ray Wortham, Jr. were arrested at the Soviet-Finnish border. They were charged with exchanging money on the black market and stealing a souvenir while tourists in the Soviet Union. Wortham recently claimed he and his friend Gilmour had been framed by the KGB. The

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
100-3551505
162-1163821
65-379891

REC-24

100-425828-108

NOT RECORDED

3 MAY 31 1967

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY
64 JUN 8 1967

Soviet Committee on State Security, and, as in the Mott case, the purpose of the exercise was to exchange them for convicted Soviet spy Igor A. Ivanov. Since Ivanov's conviction in December, 1964, he has been free on \$100,000 bail pending the appeal of his 20-year sentence. He is the only Soviet citizen in the United States so charged and his KGB superiors are anxious to bring him home. Finally, in November, 1966, there was the Soviet-Czech kidnapping of American citizen Vladimir Kazan-Komarek.

In all of these cases, with the exception of Newcomb Mott, the arrested individuals came home again safely after having suffered varying degrees of economic blackmail, hardship and mental torture. Each case offers its own validity to the State Department's comprehensive warning and each received considerable attention in the U.S. press, as well as airing on radio and TV.

However, since 1964, when the Consular Convention was signed between the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., there have been approximately twenty other incidents in which American tourists have been detained by the KGB. They are unreported cases because those detained were held only briefly. In most instances the victim was totally innocent of any wrong doing or had mistakenly broken a Soviet regulation.

Last year, despite the State Department's warning, which came as a direct result of the vicious death of Newcomb Mott, it is estimated that at least 24,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union. This year, according to the Soviets, the number is expected to double.

One might argue that of all the American tourists who have visited the Soviet Union since 1963, only an infinitesimal number have run afoul of the KGB in either a minor or a major way and that recent Senate ratification of the Consular Treaty will offer a greater measure of protection to the traveler in the future. This may be true, but as the State Department has pointed out, *any* American tourist is vulnerable during periods of "strained bilateral relations." Such vulnerability has nothing to do with Soviet legality, nor does ratification of the Consular Treaty protect the victim from reaping any harsh effect of Kremlin policy.

Further, all Intourist guides who squire American tourists around Soviet cities are KGB-connected. Some are actual agents of the secret police. All are required to report to their superiors on the statements and behavior of their U.S. charges.

The Sponsors

One organization in the forefront of encouraging U.S. travel to the Soviet Union is the Citizen Exchange Corps. It was formerly known as Peace Hostage Exchange Foundation, Inc., the name and original idea being taken from the medieval practice of exchanging hostages between countries in order to insure peace. CEC is located just off Fifth Avenue at 10 West 46th Street in New York City. Last year, it arranged three summer tours to the Soviet Union for approximately 500 Americans. It hopes to do better this year on the same basis, each tour lasting three weeks.

CEC explains its "raison d'etre" in these words: "Founded in 1962 as a non-profit, non-political foundation, the Citizen Exchange Corps was organized to help ease international tensions in accordance with Public Law 87-256, the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act

(Sept. 21, 1961). The founders of CEC set as goals a vast expansion of citizen exchanges between Communist and non-Communist nations with first emphasis on the most critical areas legally open to American citizens. Thus, our first concentration on exchange with the U.S.S.R.

"CEC sends groups of Americans of all ages, backgrounds, and occupations on three week study exchange programs. CEC exchange participants visit Moscow, Leningrad and a third city. During the entire time—whether in the city or on the Volga—CECers spend three mornings per week participating in the CEC Field Institute Program featuring Soviet and American experts from leading universities with lectures on Soviet education, art, economics, history, music, city planning, etc."

A spokesman for the organization told this reporter that CEC is "non-profit and apolitical with no ties to any foreign government and no stand on any issues." Because of "private donations," CEC is able to offer its package tours at somewhat less than the normal price.

Again according to a CEC spokesman, since the idea is a reciprocal one, the organization played host to 150 Russians who visited the United States in 1966. However, according to U.S. Immigration authorities the total number of Soviet citizens who have visited the United States in the past five years, outside of those who came as performers under the Cultural Exchange program, was 1,509. Of this number, most were able to come because American dollars paid the way.

CEC also maintains it is the only such organization that has a joint American-Soviet faculty for its lectures, but there are other groups and organizations like it which offer similar visits to the U.S.S.R. For example, this summer American University in Washington, D.C. is sponsoring a six-week tour of four Soviet cities for a 25-member group. Those students who elect to go will receive six semester credits toward their undergraduate degree.

On the surface, the efforts of these organizations and their goals are worthwhile, being based on the belief that people-to-people meeting and exchange will help to eliminate misunderstanding and serve to better the chances for continued "peaceful coexistence." But beneath the surface, there is no misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet Central Committee and the Politburo. The Russian people obey Kremlin policy; they question it at their peril. All the fun and games of people-to-people meetings cannot change that single fact. As for "peaceful coexistence," it is the Kremlin policy of the day and while it may mean the road to detente to some in the United States, it is to the Communists a well defined tactic on the road to Marxian paradise.

Since the Soviet leadership is faced with the growing problem of internal public ferment which tourism East and West can only help to stimulate, the question arises—Why do the men in the Kremlin permit tourism?" A former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union put it to me this way: "The thing the Soviets want from us more than anything else today is 'valuta'—foreign exchange. One way they get it is through tourism."

The Real Cost

One reason the Soviet Union is anxious to stimulate tourism and thus "valuta" is because it is supplying, at the cost of nearly a billion dollars a year, about 80 percent of the weaponry now being used by the North Vietnamese. If an estimated 50,000 Americans do visit the Soviet Union this summer, it will bring the Soviet coffers roughly fifty million dollars.

Thus it can be said that American tourism to the U.S.S.R., whether sponsored by the CEC to strengthen cultural bonds or whatever else, will produce for Ho Chi Minh 25 MIG-21's, or 200 SAM missile sites, or 6,000 SAM missiles. Or, to put it in another context, this 50 million dollars spent by American citizens will purchase for the Viet Cong thousands of recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, and hundreds of thousands of submachine guns, hand grenades and rifles.

There are still other ways in which the Soviets can spend the dollars of American tourists to good Communist advantage. In a speech given scant press attention, Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado stated on the floor of the Senate, April 13, 1967: "I have learned that the Cuban merchant ship, Cerro Pelado, left the northern Cuban port of Mariel last December and carried Cuban troops, arms, and ammunition to North Vietnam. Now four SAM mobile units with Cuban crews are operating in North Vietnam. Also, in December a 10,000-ton Russian ship left that same port carrying mortars, light artillery, medium tanks, rifles, and ammunition to Hanoi. The fact is that Russia not only has turned Cuba into a potent base for subversion—with at least 43 guerrilla training camps turning out more than 10,000 guerrillas a year—but also into a vast ammunition depot by which its wars of national liberation are supplied . . . ninety miles from the United States."

What better way for the Soviets to utilize "valuta" offered by American citizens?

In short, American tourism to the Soviet Union, last year and this, bears an additional cost to the nation. It helps to pay the price to kill our servicemen fighting Communist aggression in Vietnam.

DeWitt Copp

DeWITT S. COPP
Associate Editor

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
Associate Editor and Secretary, National Strategy Committee	Anthony Harrigan
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Foreign Editor	Frank J. Johnson
National Editor	William Gill
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
Associate Editor, Radio Producer	John F. Lewis
News Editor	Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Associate Editor	DeWitt S. Copp
Associate Editor	Michael J. Ward

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevic
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman	Wayne A. Johnston
Loyd Wright, Co-Chairman	William H. Kendall
General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.)	General Curtis E. Le May, USAF (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	A. B. McKee, Jr.
Bennett Archambault	Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. James D. Atkinson	Dr. Robert Morris
Lloyd L. Austin	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
General Mark Clark	General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.)
Charles S. Craigmire	Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.)	General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.)
Henry Dueque	Major General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Wade Fetzer, Jr.	Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.	Dr. Edward Teller
Fred M. Gillies	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell, USN (Ret.)	General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Clifford F. Hood	Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Rev. Daniel Lyons, S.J.	Dr. T. L. Shen
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer	Duane Thorin
	Stanley J. Tracy

Copyright © 1967 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Washington Bureau: 1101 - 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W.S. Tave/ WST/kc

DATE: 7-21-67

FROM : L.E. Short LES/kc

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ~~American~~ Security Council
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/88 BY SP7mac/ki

The attached ~~American~~ Security Council document has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

EX-113 REC 48 100-425828-109

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure." NOT RECORDED

Enc. E
"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

The Charging Strategic

military Balance

U.S.A. vs. USSR,

pamphlet prepared by

Sub. group

14 JUL 21 1967

S. Oberholser

62 JUL 26 1967 95

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/21/88 BY SP7mac/HC

100-425828-109



COUNCIL NOTES

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Wick	✓
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

July 6, 1967

W. C. S.
DeMolay

Sp. Rep.

W. A. A.

To: ASC member company executives

Re: Megatonnage Gap

Please share this vitally important study and the enclosed news release with your local editor. He will be especially interested in the trend chart on page 31!

The release date is Wednesday, July 12, 1967. The House Armed Services Committee will make a concurrent release of their Committee print of this study.

May we count on you?

Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
John M. Fisher
President

5-
DeMolay

P. S. Member company executives may have additional copies for \$1.00, a 33-1/3% discount from the \$1.50 price for others.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/18 BY *SP1mac/tbc*

601-8685527-101



NEWS

FROM THE
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

123 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606 • Washington Bureau: 1101 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Contact: John M. Fisher, Chicago (312) 263-2784

FOR RELEASE: Wednesday, A.M., July 12, 1967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP/ma/cb

DEFENSE EXPERTS WARN OF MEGATONNAGE GAP:
Report Submitted to House Armed Services Committee

WASHINGTON. . . The American Security Council today released a study in which 18 of the nation's top experts on national defense assert that the Soviet Union is succeeding in its massive drive toward strategic military superiority.

Their report, "The Changing Strategic Military Balance -- U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.," was prepared with the assistance of the Library of Congress at the request of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.), recently retired Commander, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, is chairman of the special subcommittee of the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, which prepared the study.

The report, based on analysis of hundreds of unclassified sources and consultation with other experts, finds that "the United States has exchanged its goal of a war-winning strategic superiority for a strategy of mutual deterrence," whereas the Soviet Union "is driving hard toward a goal of overwhelming superiority in the decisive field of nuclear weaponry."

"For 1971," say the authors of the report, "it appears that a massive megatonnage gap will have developed. U.S. delivery capability is estimated to range between 6,000 megatons and 15,000 megatons, whereas the estimated high for the Soviet delivery capability is 50,000 megatons, and the projection of the established Soviet range-curve indicates a low figure for the Soviets of approximately 30,000 megatons."

The report contains a warning that in 1967 "the United States does not appear to have a superior position in deliverable strategic weapons." The signers note, however, that "there is still time to regain superiority, but time is on the side of the one which uses it."

A key feature of the report is a review of arguments pro and con deployment of an American anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).

The subcommittee, after exhaustive analysis of the arguments, voices a warning that by "placing our sole reliance for deterrence on ICBMs, POLARIS and POSEIDON missiles, and the remaining manned bomber force, the United States places itself in the dangerous position of having only one option left if it is faced with a Soviet ultimatum to surrender. It must either fire its offensive nuclear weapons or give up its sovereignty. An ABM would at least strengthen the hand of the President if he is confronted with such a fateful decision, and it might stay the hand of an enemy at a critical moment in history."

Members of the subcommittee include: Gen. Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command; Adm. Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAF (Ret.), former Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Professor Stefan T. Possony, Director of International Studies, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Gen. Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.), former Commander, Strategic Air Command, and Dr. Edward Teller, nuclear scientist.

ASC Defense Study - Add two

Other signers of the American Security Council report to Congress include:

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.), former Chief of Staff to Gen. Douglas MacArthur; Professor James D. Atkinson, Georgetown University; Vice Adm. E. W. Grenfell, USN (Ret.), former Commander, Atlantic Submarine Fleet; Adm. Ben Moreell, CEC, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Civil Engineers, U.S. Navy; Vice Adm. W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.), retired Chief of Naval Material; Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USA (Ret.), former member of planning staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.), former Commander in Chief, Pacific; Rear Adm. Chester C. Ward, USN (Ret.), retired Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy; Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.), Chief U.S. strategist, World War II, and Maj. Gen. W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.).

The American Security Council is a non-profit association engaged in national security research and education. It is the means through which its member companies, foundations, universities, colleges and other private institutions work together to meet their cold war citizenship responsibilities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/18 BY *spmeachec*

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE U.S.A. VS. U.S.S.R.

STUDY PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE BY THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN
SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE, 1967.



THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE

U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.

Prepared at the Request of the House Armed Services Committee
by a Special Subcommittee
of the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council

\$1.50

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center
123 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606

Washington Bureau
1101 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword	5
I. Soviet Union versus United States Strategic Objectives:	
Trends in the Strategic Military Balance	9
II. The Strategic Military Balance	47
A. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)	49
B. Intermediate/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM/MRBM)	59
C. Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM)	65
D. Submarine-Launched Missiles (SLM)	77
Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces (ASW)	80
E. Strategic Bombers	85
F. Space Weapons	93
Annex: Chronology of Weapons-Grade Requirements for Nuclear Materials	101

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Soviet Space Firsts	24
Strategic Balance Trend	31
ICBM Balance	49
IRBM/MRBM Balance	57
ABM Balance	63
SLM Balance	75
Strategic Bomber Balance	83
Space Weapons Balance	91
Nuclear Material Requirements	99

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Strategic Balance Trend	32
ICBM	50
IR/MRBM	58
ABM	64
SLM	76
Strategic Bombers	84
Space Weapons	92

FOREWORD

This study has been prepared for the House Armed Services Committee at the request of Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers. He asked that we prepare an assessment of the strategic military balance between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. based *on unclassified sources only*.

To insure availability of the full range of public source material, Chairman Rivers asked the Library of Congress to assist in this study. This assistance was provided by the Aerospace Technology Division of the Library of Congress. We gratefully acknowledge this help which included reviewing a great volume of material for pertinent references, compiling the results of this review, and providing office space and other facilities for American Security Council staff personnel.

It is fully realized that in using unclassified sources of information only, much of the data used could be inaccurate. However, the same can be said for the most carefully gathered secret intelligence. Opportunities for factual verification of intelligence information concerning the U.S.S.R. do not come very often. Informational "raw material" must be evaluated and interpreted before it becomes functionally meaningful. The element of human judgment is predominant in these processes and a wide range of fallibility inevitably results.

Some of the figures used so freely in classified quantifications fail to receive a unanimous vote by the principal intelligence officers involved, but a decision must be made and so the majority prevails. One must ever keep in mind that a belief by a majority that something is so does not make it a fact, and factual verification is often difficult, if not impossible.

Thus the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba came as a complete surprise to official Washington despite the massive preparations which had extended over several months. Similarly, there are current differences within the Department of Defense as to whether the primary purpose of the great Soviet TALLINN defense system is to defend against bombers or against missiles.

This study is based on analysis and evaluation of hundreds of unclassified sources published from January 1960 through April 1967. The types of sources used ranged from military, nuclear-strategic, and

scientific books, treatises, journals and limited-distribution studies, trade and technical journals and magazines, and publications of general and popular circulation, news magazines and newspapers.

Some of the more productive sources for strategic balance specifics included testimony before Congressional Committees by Secretary of Defense McNamara and other Department of Defense officials, *The Military Balance* by London's Institute for Strategic Studies, *Jane's All The World's Aircraft*, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *Technology Week*, *Air Force Magazine/Space Digest*, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.

Certain of the articles reviewed were "landmarks" or "break-throughs" in their contribution to the unclassified literature bearing upon the strategic military balance. The following six articles are in that category:

"Is Russia Winning the Arms Race?" *U.S. News & World Report*, February 6, 1967.

"The Russians Mean to Win the Space Race," by William Shelton, *Fortune*, February 1966.

"Countdown For Nike-X," by George A. W. Boehm, *Fortune*, November 1965.

"Slow-Down in the Pentagon," by Hanson W. Baldwin, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965.

"The Atomic Arsenal," (Cover Story) - *Time*, August 23, 1963 (Reprinted in *Readers Digest*, November 23, 1963, p. 67 under title "Our Awesome Atomic Arsenal").

"Now the President Must Decide on His Own," by Charles J. V. Murphy, *Life*, February 16, 1962.

We believe that sources such as those noted are responsible although it should be understood that their resources do not compare with those available to the United States intelligence community. We do believe that the "ball park" figures from these unclassified sources are adequate to support thoughtful evaluation, and that they will indicate trends and strategic postures which could not otherwise be revealed.

In reporting specifics which have come from a variety of sources, we have listed the source or sources most readily available to the general public.

For purposes of this study, strategic weapon systems are considered to be forces designed to carry out long-range strategic missions and to carry the main burden of battle in a general nuclear war.

In this study we have used the same ground rules throughout for comparison of weapon systems. We have compared *like* kinds of weapons, i.e., ICBMs with ICBMs, IRBMs/MRBMs with their like, strategic bombers with strategic bombers, and submarine-launched missiles with submarine-launched missiles. Not only are numbers compared, but

also the yield of the nuclear warheads. Those with access to classified information may readily make the necessary data substitutions should this be desired.

In assessing the strategic military balance we have considered both the number and yield of each strategic weapon system. Each of these is an important measure, but we fully agree with Secretary McNamara when he says, "... We should bear in mind that it is not the number of missiles which is important, but rather the character of the payloads they carry; the missile is simply the delivery vehicle."¹ For this reason, we use the payload as the best single measure of the strategic military balance. After all, weapons-yield as expressed in megatonnage is the measure of firepower in the nuclear age.

In this connection, it should be noted that in our classification of strategic weapon systems we have paralleled the scholarly Institute for Strategic Studies classification system. There are material differences between this approach and that used currently by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

For example, in his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara did not consider the 900-odd Soviet BADGERs in the strategic balance. Yet, the BADGERs have intercontinental range with in-flight refueling and are so classified by the Russians. The BADGER is comparable to the phased-out B-47, which was previously included in the strategic forces by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Their range is as long as the FB-111 which the OSD plans to use as a "strategic bomber."

Secretary McNamara does not consider the 750 intermediate-range ballistic missiles based in western Russia as a part of the strategic force even though they could eliminate the major defenses and cities of our NATO allies. These IRBMs are supposed to be countered by the United States submarine-launched IRBMs (POLARIS), but when comparing opposing forces, the OSD groups the POLARIS missiles with ICBMs.

Both the BADGERs and the IRBMs in Western Russia are classified as "strategic" by the Institute for Strategic Studies. We concur with this judgment.

It would be short-sighted, however, not to take into account the intentions of the Soviet leaders, for certainly it takes more than weapons to start a war. But history has revealed that the criterion of "intentions"

1. *Posture Statement* of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget, January 23, 1967, p. 41. (Hereafter referred to as *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967.)

is not as reliable as that of "capabilities" when preparing one's own defenses, for one might be deceived by intentions but never by capabilities provided his intelligence of the enemy is accurate.

If one is to examine an opponent's intentions, it is likewise important that he examine his own. The intentions of one side certainly influence the intentions of the other, not to mention the strategic stance each side takes with its weaponry. This criterion of intentions, or strategic objectives, has seemed to weigh heavily in the design of America's strategic military posture. For this reason, the strategic objectives of both sides are examined in the following section.

It should be emphasized that the purpose of this study is limited to a factual assessment and interpretation of the strategic military balance without arguing for, or against, the overall policies which have brought each side to its present strategic military posture.

signed/ General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.),
Chairman

General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.)
Lt. General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)
Prof. James D. Atkinson
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell,
USN (Ret.)
General Curtis E. Le May, USAF (Ret.)
Admiral Ben Moreell, CEC, USN (Ret.)
Prof. Stefan T. Possony
General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.)
Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
Major General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester C. Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

as special subcommittee of the
National Strategy Committee of the
American Security Council.

I. SOVIET UNION VERSUS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Trends in the Strategic Military Balance

I. SOVIET UNION VERSUS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Trends in the Strategic Military Balance

The basic frame of reference for comparing the strategic strength of the Soviet Union and the United States is an examination of their national objectives, both military and political. It is not our task here to explore Soviet political objectives *in extenso*, although it must be kept in mind that these cannot be separated from the U.S.S.R.'s military goals. For a half-century, Soviet leaders have time and again repeated that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination. But many in the Free World simply refuse to believe that the Soviet leaders mean what they say.

In the realm of strategic military weapons, the United States has, in recent years, demonstrated much the same inclination to disbelieve or to discount Soviet achievements and advances. This is particularly so with respect to the new ballistic missile defenses of the Soviet Union and to Soviet boasts of an orbital bomb capability.

Yet, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has a goal of strategic superiority designed to *win* a nuclear war rather than merely *deter* one. Once in a war-winning posture, the U.S.S.R. would be ideally situated to practice nuclear blackmail and would not even have to fight a nuclear war. Some strategic analysts assert that this is the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, and that it depends upon a defense against nuclear retaliation.

The United States has exchanged its goal of a war-winning strategic superiority for a strategy of mutual deterrence. The United States strategy of mutual deterrence is said to increase "stability" and reduce international tensions. Hence, American officials are striving to convince Soviet leaders that a race to build anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems would be pointless.

Not only has the Soviet Union already deployed an ABM system, but much evidence indicates that it is driving hard toward a goal of overwhelming superiority in the decisive field of nuclear weaponry.

Contrast Between U. S. and Soviet Political Objectives

The thoughtful words of President John F. Kennedy clearly illustrate the contrast between U. S. and Soviet political objectives.

Regarding U. S. objectives, President Kennedy said:

"Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world community of free and independent states—free to choose their own

future and their own system, so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."²

Regarding Soviet objectives, President Kennedy said:

"Where we feel the difficulty comes is the effort by the Soviet Union to communize, in a sense, the entire world. If the Soviet Union were merely seeking to protect its own national interest, to protect its own national security and would permit other countries to live as they wish—to live in peace, then I believe the problems which now cause us much tension would fade away."³

In the speech prepared by President Kennedy and intended for delivery in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, were these prophetic words:

"Our adversaries have not abandoned their ambitions, our dangers have not diminished, our vigil cannot be relaxed."⁴

In the year 1967, the Soviet Communists are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. During all of that time, Soviet leaders, both political and military, have continuously repeated declarations that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination.

Our own experience and current research fully confirms that the Communist objective is still that of world conquest. We affirm the current validity of the following statements by J. Edgar Hoover and Robert S. McNamara:

"Since the time of Lenin, atheistic communism has surged forth from Russia to enslave nearly one-fourth of the earth's surface and a third of her peoples. Nowhere are its advance battalions more active than in our own Western Hemisphere, where agents trained by the Kremlin continue to burrow deeply into countries of the Caribbean and Central and South America. Their deadly objective is to undermine legitimate governments, foment revolution and create a Soviet Union of Latin American Republics.

"I have said this before and I would like to repeat it here: We are at war with communism and the sooner every red-blooded American realizes this the safer we will be."⁵

2. State of the Union Message, January 11, 1962.

3. *The New York Times* (Interview with editor of *Izvestiya*) November 29, 1961, pp. 1, 18, 19.

4. *Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy 1963*, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 894.

5. J. Edgar Hoover, Address to Brotherhood of the Washington Hebrew Congregation, December 4, 1963.

"I do not believe that we can reasonably assume that these manifestations of a change in policy reflect a change in the ultimate objective of the Soviet leadership, which is to extend the sway of Communism over the rest of the world. Their dispute with the leadership of Communist China is not over the ultimate objective but how it is to be achieved and who is to control the world-wide Communist movement. Expansionism is so deeply engrained in Communist doctrine that it would be naive for us to expect any Communist leadership to repudiate it."⁶

In January 1967, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked in a series of questions if, in his opinion, the Soviets have abandoned their goal of world domination and were mellowing. He expressed his belief that they had not abandoned their goal of world domination. On the question of mellowing, he said:

"I don't believe they are mellowing at all. I believe they have adopted new tactics and are seeking new routes to the same objective."⁷

As Leonid I. Brezhnev, first Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said in his March 29, 1966 report to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"Ever harder times lie ahead for capitalism. The fact that it is doomed is becoming increasingly clear. But the capitalists will never surrender their rule voluntarily. The working class and the laboring masses will achieve victory only in the course of stubborn class battles. . . At our Congress today we once more repeat the appeal: close ranks more solidly for the struggle against the common enemy!"⁸

Soviet Strategic Objectives

From our analysis, it is clear that the overall Soviet military objective is to achieve absolute strategic superiority.

The main thrust of the authoritative book, *Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, was toward achieving superiority. In a discussion of strategic missile forces, attainment of qualitative and quantitative superiority was set as one of the "most important problems in

6. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Statement before Joint Session of Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, January 1964, p. 4.

7. Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 407.

8. *Pravda*, March 30, 1966, pp. 2-9.

organizing and developing the forces." It was further pointed out that establishing superiority over the enemy in modern weaponry was the material prerequisite for victory.⁹

Recently-deceased Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky made a clear-cut statement concerning strategic superiority. In a pamphlet published in late 1962 by the Soviet Ministry of Defense he wrote: "The most characteristic feature of the present stage of development in Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it rests on the superiority of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism, both in military-technical resources, and from the morale and battle standpoint. This superiority and the just goals of our Armed Forces give us a firm confidence that in a future war . . . the victory will be won by us."¹⁰

Malinovsky's pronouncement takes on added significance in the light of a 1966 statement in the authoritative Soviet journal, *Communist of the Armed Forces*, that "military-technical superiority along with moral-political superiority is one of the most important factors in our time for the reliable defense of the country . . . (T)he significance of military factors themselves, in particular military-technical superiority over the enemy, has grown in contemporary circumstances as never before." The article goes on to stress that achieving military-technological superiority is a constant process and that "the stern dialectics of development are that the struggle for superiority must be waged continually . . ."¹¹

How do the Soviet leaders define superiority? *Communist of the Armed Forces* is quite clear: ". . . Military-technical superiority is such a correlation of quantity of military equipment and weapons, of the degree of troop training in using them and also of the effectiveness of the organizational structure of the army, that the given side has the advantage before a real or potential enemy and can defeat him . . ."¹²

This same 1966 article noted that Soviet superiority is derived from mobile Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and from Soviet advances in space technology. Soviet science, it continued, has created weapons new in principle "secretly nurtured in scientific research bureaus and construction collectives."

Additional evidence of the Soviet drive to attain strategic superiority is supplied by a January 1967 statement of the late Defense Minister

Malinovsky. He hinted at Soviet expansion of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) emplacements and at a burgeoning Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program.¹³

What would they do with strategic superiority? Here's the basic doctrine:

"The essence of Soviet military doctrine is this: if a future war is unleashed by the imperialists, then it will be the decisive collision between the two opposing social orders, and nuclear rocket weapons will inevitably be used. All this pre-supposes an extremely violent and dynamic character of the conflict, high maneuverability of combat operations, the absence of continuous fronts and well-marked boundaries between front and rear, the appearance of possibilities for striking sudden blows of great force, both against the troops and the homelands of the warring nations. In connection with this, very great attention is devoted to the initial period of the war."¹⁴

In other words, if general war comes, the Soviets will try for a knock-out nuclear first strike in the initial period of the war.

Official Communist policy statements, however, emphasize their intention of winning world domination without a general nuclear war. This was expressively stated by Nikita Khrushchev in a speech in July 1963 as follows:

"Today the imperialists pretend to be brave—but only in words; in reality they tremble before the socialist world which is growing and gaining in strength. And let them tremble! So much the better for us!

"A fight is in progress between these two systems, a life and death combat. But we communists want to win this struggle with the least losses, and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall win. This is why we are striving for victory, for the triumph of communism, without unleashing a world thermonuclear war."¹⁵

Official statements of Soviet policy since that time differ only in their choice of language.

However, we can draw little comfort from such statements because, as shown hereinafter, the principal Soviet military thrust has been to develop a massive and superior capability for nuclear war.

9. *Military Strategy*, V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.) Moscow, Voenizdat-vo, 1963, (In Russian) p. 237.

10. *Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace*, U.S.S.R., Ministry of Defense, 1962.

11. "Military-Technical Superiority is the Most Important Factor in a Reliable Defense of the Country," V. Bondarenko, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 17, September 1966 (In Russian).

12. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

13. *Washington Post*, January 18, 1967.

14. "Increased Organizational and Directive Influences of the Party in the Armed Forces," L. P. Prusanov, *Problems of the History of the CPSU*, Moscow, February 1965.

15. *Soviet News*, July 22, 1963, pp. 51, 52 and 53.

United States Strategic Objectives

The latest and most authoritative unclassified statements of United States objectives are to be found in the 1967 Senate testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his principal assistants.¹⁶

The testimony of all the principal witnesses relating to U. S. grand strategy in these Senate Hearings is the most definitive in the last six years. Much of it borders on the sensational, and the divergence of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense is stated and explained far more frankly and specifically than in previous official testimony. The focus of much of the most significant testimony is on the strategic effects of the Soviet deployment of anti missile defense systems, whether and when the U. S. should deploy such a system, and the level of total U. S. strategic power required to maintain sufficient security on the U. S. side of the strategic balance.

The Secretary of Defense left no doubt that the military strategy of the United States is based on the concept of deterrence through a second strike in retaliation against a Soviet first strike. Thus he explained that:

"Our general nuclear war forces should have two basic capabilities:

1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.
2. In the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capacity.

The first capability we call 'Assured Destruction' and the second 'Damage Limitation.'¹⁷

In determining what this policy contemplates in relation to the strategic military balance, it is helpful to examine Mr. McNamara's testimony on the anti-ballistic missile. The principal reason given for

his conclusion that "we should not initiate an ABM deployment at this time" is that "the Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U. S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further..."

In explaining why he did not actually plan to deploy a damage limiting system, he said, "If the general nuclear policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U. S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we might consider an 'acceptable level') would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent (offensive) forces." (Emphasis added.)

This is consistent with McNamara's February 1963 testimony that we were about to enter a new era in strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he called an era of "mutual deterrence." At that time, McNamara said, "More armaments, whether offensive or defensive cannot solve the nuclear war dilemma. We're approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a devastating retaliatory load. This may result in future betterment..."¹⁸ 1967 was the year mentioned by McNamara as the most likely beginning of the new era.

Under questioning by Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, following the above testimony, McNamara denied that his anticipation of "mutual deterrence" could properly be equated with nuclear "parity" or "stalemate," and said he had repeatedly stated that it is his intention to "maintain nuclear superiority in terms of numbers of warheads versus the Communist bloc."

1967 testimony of Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, however, indicates that the United States policy may be to accept "parity":

"Militarily the Soviets have a very formidable missiles force. They are building missiles very fast. . . . You see, we have leveled out our missile forces. We announced how big our missile force was going to be. Our plans are that 5 years from now we will have just as many missiles as we have right now. They have known that. They have known that for a couple of years, and they keep on building.

"Now we can afford to let them build for a while, if they feel they want to 'catch up.' But there is evidence that if we stop, they don't necessarily stop. They haven't stopped. I think that

16. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, on S.666, Military Authorizations, Defense Appropriations, 1968, January 25-February 2, 1967. Included in the printed Hearings at the front of the report is Secretary McNamara's prepared statement on Military Posture and the 1968-72 Defense Program, which was released to the public on January 23, 1967. Both the prepared statement and the actual testimony of the witness have been subject to deletions stated to be for purposes of national security.

17. Ibid, p. 44.

18. The New York Times, Western Edition, February 11, 1963, p. 12.

in our position, we can afford to let this go on for awhile, without over responding."¹⁹

In the final analysis, the best way to determine actual differences between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. strategic military objectives is to compare their performances. For this purpose we will examine herein-after such key areas as development of space weapons, production of nuclear materials, strategic military budgets, attitude toward research and development and the changing strategic military balance.

Development of Space Weapons

The United States policy on space weapons was first announced in 1961 by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric:

"An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a U.S. commitment to such an effort. This we will not do."

This policy was confirmed in October 1963, when the United States announced its adherence to the United Nations General Assembly resolution banning the "Placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner."²⁰

This resolution, however, contains no provision for inspection and no penalties for violation.

Although the Soviet Union has announced its compliance with the U. N. resolution, its official publication, *Izvestiya*, noted that while the U. N. had banned the *orbiting* of rockets that constitute weapons of mass extermination, it by no means banned "the manufacture of such missiles."

On July 4, 1965, Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev declared that the Soviet's possess "orbital rockets."²¹

Brezhnev's claim was supported by the display of a three-stage missile in the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965. On November 8, 1965, both *TASS* and *Izvestiya* described it as an orbital missile. This weapon has since been code named SCRAM.

Subsequently, the Department of State announced that it had asked Moscow whether, in the light of the Soviet display of an orbital

rocket in the Revolution Day parade, the Kremlin still planned to abide by its pledges not to put such weapons into orbit.²² The Soviet answer was that the agreement did not bar *development* of such weapons.

While waiting for an official answer from the Kremlin, the Department was fit to keep our country on record (as reported by UPI):

"The State Department reiterated the U. S. position that although either the United States or Russia could put such a weapon into orbit, there would be no military sense in doing so."

The Soviet attitude should have been no surprise to anyone. After an examination of the long history of broken Soviet treaties and agreements, a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report concluded that:

"It keeps no international agreements at all unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union."²³

On March 12, 1964, at hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Dr. Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, now Secretary of the Air Force, was asked how much money was being spent on studies of orbital bombardment vehicles. This is his official answer:

"My recollection is that we have no more than *three or four* people working in one of the contract organizations studying this question. We are *not doing any hardware work*. So that I would be surprised if more than a couple of hundred thousand dollars in fiscal 1964 is being spent on this, and certainly no more than that is planned for 1965.

"There are two reasons: First, it is not a very good idea. . . . Second, there is now a U. N. resolution which we subscribe to and the Soviets have subscribed to, not to put bombs in orbit. This does not prevent people from doing the development on it, but apparently *neither the Russians nor we believe it is a very important strategic weapon*. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Late in 1966, President Johnson announced that the United States, the Soviet Union and more than 100 nations on the United Nations Political Committee had agreed upon the language of a formal treaty outlawing nuclear weapons in space. It has now been passed by the U. S. Senate. Again, no provision for inspection was included in the treaty.

The only known effective ways to assure the world that none of the nuclear-rocket powers are orbiting nuclear weapons are to inspect space rockets before launch, or to rendezvous with the orbiting rockets and

19. Senate Hearings, January 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 and February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 876.

20. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Exec. Report No. 3) Government Printing Office, 1963.

21. *Izvestiya*, July 4, 1965, p. 2.

22. United Press International dispatch dated Washington, November 19, 1965.

23. *Soviet Political Agreements and Results*, Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Third Revision, Volume I, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964, Foreword, p. VIII.

open them to inspection in space ("go up there with a screwdriver," as one AEC authority put it).

General Earle G. Wheeler's statement on the Treaty on Outer Space includes the following comment on verification:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned about the assured verification capability with regard to 'weapons in orbit.' The deployment of prohibited orbital vehicles could have serious implications, especially if it enabled an enemy to achieve effective surprise attack against our command and control facilities and military forces. Weapons in orbit could become a matter of grave consequence, particularly when utilized in conjunction with other strategic systems. The focus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concern is upon the capability which the United States would have to define and respond to such a threat. . . .

"This threat can be answered only through intensified U. S. efforts to develop capabilities to detect and verify the orbiting of nuclear weapons or those threatening mass destruction. We must develop the capability of dealing with that threat should it materialize, with or without a treaty."²⁴

Production of Nuclear Materials

Another area to examine the implementation of the respective policies may be found in the requirements and the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

President Johnson announced in January 1964, the partial shutdown of American plants producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. On January 24, 1967, it was reported that the fifth such plant was deactivated.²⁵ The Soviet Union has made no comparable moves in this direction. The Atomic Energy Commission reported in November 1965, that there is "no evidence" that the Soviet Union had carried out nuclear materials cutbacks announced on April 26, 1964. Actually, according to Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of *The New York Times*, the Soviet Union had doubled its production of weapons-grade nuclear materials during 1965.²⁶

Without access to classified material it is difficult to deal in quantitative terms with the comparative positions of the Soviet Union and the United States in the matter of nuclear stockpiles and production capacities. A generalized way of indicating Soviet interests in maximum

24. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on the Treaty on Outer Space, March 7, 13 and April 12, 1967, p. 84.

25. *The New York Times*, January 25, 1967, p. 9 (See Annex "Chronology of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material Cutbacks.")

26. *The New York Times*, July 14, 1966, p. 14.

production of nuclear fuel is to examine the expansion of Soviet gross requirements of fuel by function, and compare this in some crude way with United States requirements.

By 1960, the Soviet Union had expanded its list of uses for nuclear materials to include bombs, civilian uses, surface ships, submarines and missiles. Up to then, the gross requirements of both countries, by function, grew in parallel, with the United States slightly ahead because of its presumed lead in overall nuclear development.

Beginning in 1961, the United States' testing program was notably less active than the Soviet Union's. The Soviet Union broke the undeclared moratorium in September 1961, with a massive series which was impressive in many ways, one of them in the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material expended.

It was in this test series which extended from September 1961 into early 1962 that the Soviet Union was rumored to display an unusual interest in the anti-ballistic missile. That interest was sustained over the years and Secretary of Defense McNamara announced in December 1966, that the Soviet Union was deploying an operational ABM system.

Hanson W. Baldwin has reported that the Soviet nuclear tests were conducted in 1961 in such a way as to destroy two incoming missiles.²⁷ *U. S. News and World Report* reported a Soviet breakthrough in anti-ballistic missile defense that "produces the so-called 'X-ray effect' in intense proportions."²⁸ This effect is said to neutralize ICBM guidance equipment and fissionable material at great distance from the actual ABM explosion. Soviet ABM tests in 1961 and 1962 provided the knowledge which has permitted the U.S.S.R. to rush ahead with its ABM development and outstrip the United States. The atmospheric nuclear test ban has denied the United States the opportunity of ever catching up.

Anti-ballistic missiles, in order to be effective against many attacking ICBMs, must be widely deployed. The U.S.S.R.'s TALLINN system covers a vast area.²⁹ Although remarkable advances in anti-ballistic missile accuracy are claimed, it must still be assumed that, as in the air defense weapon systems, many defending weapons must be launched against each incoming warhead in order to achieve a high probability of destruction. In this respect, it would seem that the ABM's task will be similar to that of conventional anti-aircraft, setting up a radioactive

27. *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

28. *U. S. News and World Report*, February 6, 1967, p. 36.

29. *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

shield or screen of fire through which the ICBM must pass. Either way, an ABM system will require a prodigious amount of fissionable material.

It can be assumed, therefore, that the Soviet Union has foreseen, at least since 1961, this tremendous requirement for weapons-grade nuclear material to counter American ICBMs. In this connection it would also appear that the United States had rejected the idea of producing an extensive ABM system as long ago as January 1964, when President Johnson announced cut-backs in manufacture of fissionable materials. (See Annex.)

Strategic Military Budgets

The increases of the U.S.S.R.'s military budget for 1967 to 14.5-billion rubles, up 1.1-billion rubles or 8.2 percent over the 1966 figure, is another reflection of the Soviet drive for military superiority when it is analyzed. In 1964 and 1965, when the Soviet Union announced budget cuts, actual spending continued to rise. Much other defense spending is filed under such headings as "science" and "financing the national economy." From such evidence it is estimated that Soviet military spending in 1967 may approach 20-billion rubles, or 30 percent above the announced figure.

Also,

"... While the Russians have a much larger standing army, the United States spends a lot more to pay, clothe and equip each of its soldiers. And Soviet tanks, a basic item of ground equipment, are hard to price accurately since they are made with heavily-subsidized coal and steel.

"Because of this 'warped' pricing structure, it would be useless to multiply the Soviet defense budget by the \$1.10 official exchange rate and use the resultant dollar figure to compare with America's defense effort, it is said.

"Officials estimate that if the Russians had to enter the American market place to buy the military goods and services that go into their defense establishment, they would have to pay from \$50-billion to \$60-billion a year."³⁰

According to *U. S. News and World Report*, "Russia . . . is found to be investing almost 70 percent of the budget in strategic offensive and defensive systems."³¹

Other experts on the Soviet budget estimate that "substantial" portions of the Soviet defense effort will be devoted to three principal

30. *The New York Times*, William Beecher, December 25, 1966, p. 27.

31. *U. S. News and World Report*, February 6, 1967, p. 34.

areas: conventional forces, strategic attack forces, and air and missile defense forces, on a coequal basis.³²

Using Mr. Beecher's estimates, the Soviet strategic military budget is the equivalent of \$33½-billion to \$40-billion a year. Even at the official exchange rate, the Soviet strategic budget would be \$14.7-billion.

In his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara reported that the total United States 1967 military budget would be \$68-billion. The budget for strategic forces was \$7.1-billion or 14 percent of the total military budget.

The above budget figures show a clear difference between the U. S. and Soviet strategic military intentions.

Soviet Research and Development Objectives

"First of all, we are facing today a formidable Soviet aerospace threat and a concerted Communist effort to achieve critical scientific breakthroughs, both of which factors pose a serious challenge to the continued strategic superiority of the U. S. Armed Forces."

General John P. McConnell³³
Chief of Staff Air Force


It should be more widely understood that science and technology provide the vital impulse in the Soviet society. The Soviet leadership views each new level of technology, each new medium for political or military operations, as offering opportunities for furthering its objectives. Unanticipated technological breakthroughs may be realized for leapfrogging America's means of deterrence. Thus, the Soviets are aggressively moving forward on the frontiers of strategic weapon technology.

Space is one of the first arenas of major public interest in which Soviet industry, technology, and science gained—in fact, not in words—a leading international position. This is so despite the not inconsiderable United States achievements in space. In the public mind, apparent technological advantage in space has been readily translated into an image of military advantage.

One of the primary strengths of Soviet research and development and production programs is the use of scientific planning with cybernetics. This new technique is noted throughout U.S.S.R. weapons programs. Scientific planning, theory of games, optimum solution of com-

32. Beecher, op. cit.

33. Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Service Committee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 874.



plex programs, automatic control, and hundreds of similar subjects, all pertinent to the modern techniques of scientific planning and development of aerospace weapon systems, are featured in Soviet cybernetic literature.³⁴

An analysis of overall Soviet power must now take into account the integrated cybernetic systems optimized for Soviet military and national security purposes.

United States Research and Development Objectives

U. S. Defense Department policy toward advanced research has been perceptively and most cogently stated and explained by a scientist who is in a commanding position to know the actual facts. Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of the Weapons Division of the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, spoke at a recent Air Force Association symposium in San Francisco, on "The Technological Threat."

According to *Technology Week*:³⁵

"AEC's Dr. Harold Agnew declared that there appears to be a new concept of the balance of power.

* * *

"Agnew, whose comments drew the largest ovation at the symposium, said the present philosophy seems to be based on a concept that assumes that balance or equality is the optimum state for one nation to have vis-a-vis another state in order to have stability. . . . 'from my experience stability is gained and maintained only through superiority. Yet more and more today, we see decisions being made which have as their long range objective equality between the U. S. and other powers rather than superiority of the U. S. over other powers.'

* * *

"The apparent drift in national policy on the concept of balance of power and stability is resulting in a stifling of innovation. We find ourselves being authorized to build or to consider only those systems which respond to a clearly defined threat. As a result, we are continuously reacting on the defensive . . . since we react only to those systems or threats which have been proven to exist, and it takes several years to react, we are continually in danger of coming up with answers to threats which have changed, if indeed we come up with answers in a time frame which is relevant at all."

34. Text of the Resolution Passed at the Third All-Union Conference on Automatic Control, translated by L. A. Zadeh. (Odessa: 1965), p. 1.

35. "AEC Weapons Expert Blasts DOD Technology," *Technology Week*, March 27, 1967, pp. 15, 16.

"We are completely vulnerable to surprises, to new systems which we have not heard about, but which all of a sudden appear."

* * *

"Agnew said it is clear that the Soviet Union recognizes the increased importance of technological breakthroughs. He quoted a recent Soviet Defense ministry document which said that Russia 'is not limiting itself to those military means which the adversary already has.' He said this contrasted with the position of some U. S. committees, such as the one on arms control headed by Jerome Wiesner and Roswell Gilpatrick, that the U. S. should not innovate new weapons because this would be destabilizing.

"A specific example of this, he said, is the recommendation that we avoid an effective anti-missile system because it would upset what Wiesner and Gilpatrick called the 'delicate balance of terror.'

* * *

"One of the greatest faults of U. S. policy makers, Agnew declared, 'is that they seem not to understand that technology will never be stagnant. It will not stand still.'"

This thesis of the U. S. policy-planned stagnation of innovation in U. S. advanced research was also comprehensively stated and extensively documented by Hanson W. Baldwin, in a "landmark" article,³⁶ under a title which states his theme: "Slow-down in the Pentagon." He reports that research, development, and innovation have sunk into stagnation in the Pentagon because of three major policies or attitudes: (1) "the technological revolution is over"; (2) disarmament or arms limitation "is the only way to political salvation and that therefore continued technological military development worsens the situation"; and (3) "the requirements merry-go-round"—mandate from the Secretary of Defense that every new project has to be justified on the basis of demonstrated military requirements, that is, that there must exist in advance a clear-cut military mission for a new weapons development.

Mr. Baldwin further points out that:

"Many promising developments—particularly in space—could never be pushed, or even demonstrated, if developments had to wait for the establishment of requirements."

"Invention has never followed this path; the machine gun and the tank would still remain blueprint dreams if their development had awaited the specification of clear-cut military requirements. One cannot state a requirement for an inventor's hopes."

36. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965, p. 262.

"As Dr. Edward C. Welsh (acting Chairman of the National Aeronautics Space Council) pointed out, 'If we had required a clear-cut prior mission, we would probably have developed no airplanes, no spacecraft, or, in fact, no wheel!'"

Both Dr. Agnew and Mr. Baldwin have done an outstanding job of explaining why the strategic military balance is changing.

The Changing Strategic Military Balance

To analyze the present strategic military balance, the following sections of this study compare the numbers of delivery vehicles and the total megatonnage delivery capabilities of the various strategic weapon systems. In addition, the figure on page 31 and the table on page 32 also show the general trend in total megatonnage delivery capability from 1962 to 1971 as delineated by the range of estimates derived from unclassified sources. These performance figures are the key to determining the real strategic military intentions of the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.

The general trend was established by plotting all available responsible unclassified estimates on a graph.

The preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is succeeding in its massive drive toward strategic military superiority and that the United States is cooperating in this effort by slowing down its side of the arms race.

In 1962, the United States had a total megatonnage delivery capability ranging between 25,000 megatons and 50,000 megatons. The corresponding figures for the Soviet Union ranged between 6,000 megatons and 12,000 megatons.

The year 1967 falls in a crossover period with the U.S.S.R. estimates ranging between 16,000 and 37,000 megatons, to equal or exceed the U. S. estimated range of between 8,000 and 29,000 megatons.

It should be noted that the "nuclear capable" U. S. aircraft carriers are not included in the strategic balance either here or by Secretary McNamara.

For 1971, it appears that a massive megatonnage gap will have developed. U. S. delivery capability is estimated to range between 6,000 megatons and 15,000 megatons, whereas the estimated high for the Soviet delivery capability is 50,000 megatons, and the projection of the established Soviet range-curve indicates a low figure for the Soviets of approximately 30,000 megatons.

On the basis of this projection, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. will have reversed their roles in a ten-year period.

Using the above approach, U. S. and Soviet strategic forces are approximately equal in strength at the present time. However, measurement of the strategic balance requires consideration of many additional factors including the following:

1. The above figures are based on peacetime inventory. Since the U. S. is committed to a second strike-policy, we should count only those U. S. strategic weapons which would remain after a Soviet first strike. There is no solid basis for estimating the remaining U. S. strategic weapons because the U. S. has not tested very high-yield warheads and therefore does not know the weapons effect of Soviet super-yield weapons of 50 megatons and over.
2. Some of the remaining U. S. missiles would be destroyed by the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense. This important factor was not included in the above figures because of the lack of adequate unclassified data on the numbers and yield of Soviet ABMs.
3. Also, "a lesser amount of nuclear explosive does much greater damage to the United States than to the Soviet Union because of America's geography, urbanization and weather patterns."³⁷ The Soviet Union has three times as many square miles as the United States and its industries and cities are better dispersed.
4. Unclassified sources for the Soviet missile count appear to be based on the number of operational missile sites without consideration of refire capability. Thus, the actual Soviet missile count may be substantially larger than the unclassified estimates.
5. Many of the unclassified estimates as to Soviet strategic weapons yield are low because the sources have not given the Soviets credit for their great improvement in warhead yield/weight ratio in their 1961 nuclear tests. (See ICBM section for detail.)

Behind-the-iron-curtain unclassified sources report that the strategic military balance has changed in their favor. For example, in a compre-

hensive article analyzing the strategic military equation which he based on unclassified sources, Lt. General Khristo Dobrev concludes:


"The deciding power in the world today is the socialist states. They have at their disposal everything necessary for taming the imperialist aggressors. The bare fact that it is not Moscow but Washington which is putting forward the question of reaching an agreement on 'freezing' the anti-missile defense system speaks sufficiently clear on which side lies the military superiority."³⁸

The United States does not appear to have a superior position in deliverable strategic weapons. There is still time to regain superiority but time is on the side of the one which uses it. Because of long lead times for weapon development and production, however, the decision to do so must be made in the year 1967.

37. Arthur T. Hadley, *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control* (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 34. Hadley's study is based upon the findings of a Summer Study Seminar held in Dedham, Mass., in 1960 under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Twentieth Century Fund. The participants included physicists, psychologists, lawyers, economists, mathematicians, political scientists and weapons specialists. Among those who took part were Donald T. Brennan, Hans A. Bethe, Morton H. Halperin, Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Leo Szilard, Victor F. Weisskopf and Jerome B. Wiesner.

38. Lt. General Khristo Dobrev, "On Military-Political Subjects: Anti-missile-Defense, A New Nightmare for U. S. Imperialists," *Rabotnicheskoye Delo*, (Sofia, Bulgaria: April 10, 1967).

RANGE OF ESTIMATES FROM UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES
TRENDS OF TOTAL MEGATONNAGE DELIVERY CAPABILITY
— ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS —



HIGHS AND LOWS OF ESTIMATES FROM UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES
NUMBERS OF DELIVERY VEHICLES—TOTAL MEGATONNAGE DELIVERY CAPABILITY
—ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS—

	U. S.				U.S.S.R.			
	1962	Estimated Numbers High	Estimated Numbers Low	Estimated Megatonnage High	Estimated Megatonnage Low	Estimated Numbers High	Estimated Numbers Low	Estimated Megatonnage High
Bombers	2,500	1,570	49,000	24,470	1,500	750	10,050	5,000
ICBMs	234	90	450	450	100	50	1,000	750
IR-MRBMs	250	45	250	45	700	300	700	300
SLMs	144	96	101	67	50	0	50	0
TOTALS	3,128	1,801	49,801 MT	25,082 MT	2,350	1,100	11,800 MT	6,050 MT
<hr/>								
1967								
32 Bombers	680	600	27,200	6,000	1,110	155	24,400	11,200
ICBMs	1,054	1,054	1,470	1,270	500	340	11,550	4,000
IR-MRBMs	0	0	0	0	750	700	875	700
SLMs	656	512	656	414	280	130	200	130
TOTALS	2,390	2,166	29,326 MT	7,684 MT	2,640	1,352	37,025 MT	16,030 MT
<hr/>								
1971								
Bombers	465	435	12,300	4,350	One source predicts total megatonnage of 50,000. Several sources predict ICBM increases between 650 and 1,600 and official source predicts "very fast" increase. SLMs to increase at present rate. No sources predicted substantial increases for bombers or IR-MRBMs. U.S.S.R. curve constructed on basis of above fell within projections of curve from 1962 through 1967.			
ICBMs	1,054	1,000	2,000	1,000				
IR-MRBMs	0	0	0	0				
SLMs	656	544	656	544				
TOTALS	2,175	1,979	14,956 MT	5,894 MT				

Note: The "highs" and "lows" listed above are, respectively, the bases for the upper and lower edges of the U. S. and U.S.S.R. curves representing trends of total megatonnage delivery capability—all strategic weapons systems—depicted in the graph on the preceding page. Representative sources from which these estimates are derived are listed and excerpted, *infra*.

**SUMMARY OF SELECTED SOURCES DIRECTLY RELATING TO
BALANCE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN
TIME PERIODS 1962, 1967, 1971**

The "Range of Estimates From Unclassified Sources, Trends of Total Megatonnage Delivery Capability—All Strategic Weapon Systems—" as depicted in the graph, *supra*, was based upon analysis and evaluation of hundreds of unclassified sources published during the entire time period of 1960 through April 1967. Sources studied included military and scientific books, treatises, journals and limited distribution studies. Also employed were trade and technical journals, news magazines, newspapers and publications of general and popular circulation.

To provide a ready reference for spot-checks and parameter confirmation, however, a summary is presented here of extracts from certain of those unclassified sources which relate directly to the initial, median, and terminal years covered by the graph which depicts the trend of the strategic balance in the decade from 1962-1971. The selection includes sources documenting the derivation of the "highs" and "lows" of deliverable megatonnage presented in the table which directly follows the Strategic Balance Graph, referred to above.

Thus the sources summarized support the upper and lower edges of the U. S. and U.S.S.R. curves representing trends of total megatonnage delivery capability. They include also, however, samplings from sources which fall within the areas delineated by the edges of the respective curves, providing thereby the basis for an appraisal as to the existence or absence of a consensus. The selection of sources for summarization emphasized publications more likely to be generally available to segments of the public not likely to have convenient access to scientific, technological, or strategic libraries.

1962—BOMBERS

U. S. News & World Report—August 13, 1962

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
700 Heavy Bombers \times 50 = 35,000 MT	150 Intercontinental Bombers \times 20 = 3,000 MT
1,000 Medium Bombers \times 5 = 5,000 MT	600 Medium Range Bombers \times 10 = 6,000 MT
TOTAL 40,000 MT	TOTAL 9,000 MT

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

<p>1,700 Bombers — 49,000 MT (Estimate: 50,000 MT for all strategic systems; bomber megatonnage estimated at 49,000 megatons by subtracting from total an estimated 1,000 assigned to 200 ATLAS, TITAN and MINUTEMAN missiles and 100 POLARIS missiles.)</p>	<p>210 Long Range</p>
---	-----------------------

Newsweek—November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
Long Range Bombers	630
Medium Range Bombers	1,000

Readers Digest—March, 1963

"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
30,000 MT (all strategic weapon systems) p. 267.	

The Military Balance—1961-62. Institute for Strategic Studies.

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
630 B-52's, 850 B-47's, 90 B-58's	70 BEARS, 120 BISONS,
Total Strategic bombers 1,570	1,000 BADGERS Estimated megatonnage 1,190

The Nation's Safety and Arms Control
by Arthur T. Hadley. Viking Press. 1961

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
2,500 bombers 24,470 MT	

1962—ICBMs

U. S. News & World Report—August 13, 1962

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
ICBMs 90×5 MT = 450 MT	100 \times 10 MT = 1,000 MT; or 75 \times 10 MT = 750 MT

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
200 ATLAS, TITAN and MINUTEMAN missiles	50 ICBMs

Newsweek—November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
234	75

The Military Balance—1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
90 ATLAS 36 TITAN $\frac{3 \text{ MT}}{270} + \frac{5 \text{ MT}}{180} = 450 \text{ MT}$	$75 \times 10 = 750 \text{ MT}$

Readers Digest—March 1963

"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble

U. S.	U. S. S. R.
102 ATLAS	75
54 TITAN	

1962—IR-MRBMs

U. S. News & World Report—August 13, 1962

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
90 IRBMs	300 T-2 & T-4 (1 MT assumed) = 300 MT

1962—IR-MRBMs (Cont.)

Newsweek—November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

250	700
-----	-----

The Military Balance—1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

30 JUPITERS—Italy 15 JUPITERS—Turkey 45	$700 \times 1 \text{ MT} = 700 \text{ MT}$
---	--

Readers Digest—March 1963
“While America Slept,” by James Daniel and John G. Hubble

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

105 THOR and JUPITER	42 (in Cuba)
----------------------	--------------

1962—SLMs

U. S. News & World Report—August 13, 1962

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

POLARIS $144 \times 1/2 \text{ MT}$ = 72 MT	$50 \times 1 \text{ MT}$ (assumed)	= 50 MT
--	------------------------------------	---------

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

POLARIS 100	
-------------	--

Newsweek—November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

POLARIS $96 \times .7 \text{ MT}$ (assumed) = 67.2	
---	--

The Military Balance—1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

POLARIS $144 \times .7 \text{ MT} = 100.8$	
--	--

Readers Digest—March 1963
“While America Slept,” by James Daniel and John G. Hubble

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

128 POLARIS	50 GOLEMS
-------------	-----------

**Chronological Summary of Strategic Statistics Extracted From
THE MILITARY BALANCE—All Editions Covering Years 1961 through 1966—
As Published by THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, LONDON**

Numbers and Yield for ICBMs, IR/MRBMs and SLMs

U. S.				U.S.S.R.		
1961	54 ATLAS 9 TITANS	6 Nuclear subs— 96 POLARIS TOTAL 264.2 MT		1961	50 ICBMs 200 IRBMs	TOTAL 700 MT
1962	90 ATLAS 36 TITANS 150 MINUTEMAN	9 Nuclear subs—144 POLARIS 45 JUPITERS TOTAL 754.8 MT		1962	75 ICBM's 700 IRBMs	TOTAL 1,450 MT
1963	126 ATLAS 108 TITANS 180 MINUTEMAN	10 Nuclear subs—160 POLARIS TOTAL 1,210 MT		1963	100 ICBMs 750 IRBMs	TOTAL 1,450 MT
1964	126 ATLAS 108 TITANS 600 MINUTEMAN	26 Nuclear subs—416 POLARIS TOTAL 1,809.2 MT		1964	200 ICBMs 750 IRBMs	40 subs—120 missiles (400-mile range) TOTAL 3,750 MT
1965	ATLAS Phased out 54 TITANS 800 MINUTEMAN	31 Nuclear subs—496 POLARIS TOTAL 1,417.2 MT		1965	270 ICBMs 750 IRBMs	40 subs—120 missiles TOTAL 3,570 MT
1966	54 TITANS 850 MINUTEMAN	37 Nuclear subs—592 POLARIS TOTAL 1,534.4 MT		1966	300 ICBMs 750 IRBMs	40 subs—120 missiles TOTAL 3,870 MT
1967	54 TITANS 1,000 MINUTEMAN	41 Nuclear subs—656 POLARIS TOTAL 1,729.2 MT		1967	311 ICBMs 750 IRBMs	45 subs—135 missiles TOTAL 3,995 MT

Sources: 1961—*The Mil. Bal. 1961-62*, ISS, 1961, pp. 2, 3, 8, 9
 1962—*The Mil. Bal. 1962-63*, ISS, 1962, pp. 3, 9, 10
 1963—*The Mil. Bal. 1963-64*, ISS, 1963, pp. 3, 11
 1964—*The Mil. Bal. 1964-65*, ISS, 1964, pp. 3, 5, 23
 1965—*The Mil. Bal. 1965-66*, ISS, 1965, pp. 2, 3, 5, 23, 24
 1966—*The Mil. Bal. 1966-67*, ISS, 1966, pp. 2, 3, 5, 25
 1967—*The Mil. Bal. 1966-67*, plus ISS Strategic Survey
 published April 1967

Payloads:	U. S.	U.S.S.R.
ATLAS-3 MT		ICBM-10 MT
TITAN-5 MT		IR/MRBM-1 MT
MINUTEMAN-1 MT		SARK-SERB fired from subs-1 MT
POLARIS-0.7 MT		ISS Summary-1
JUPITER-1 MT		

NUMBERS AND BOMB LOADINGS FOR STRATEGIC BOMBERS
BOMB LOAD CAPACITY IN TONS OF CONVENTIONAL BOMBS

		U. S.				U.S.S.R.			
		B-52's	B-47's	B-58's	Totals	BEARS	BISONS	BADGERS	Totals
1961	No. Units	600	1,000	30	1,630	70	120	1,000	1,190
	Agg. Payload	22,500	10,000	180	32,680	1,400	1,200	10,000	12,600
1962	No. Units	630	850	90	1,570	70	120	1,000	1,190
	Agg. Payload	23,625	8,500	540	32,665	1,400	1,200	10,000	12,600
1963	No. Units	630	600	90	1,320	70	120	1,000	1,190
	Agg. Payload	23,625	6,000	540	30,165	1,400	1,200	10,000	12,600
1964	No. Units	630	380	90	1,100	70	120	1,000	1,190
	Agg. Payload	23,625	3,800	540	27,965	1,400	1,200	10,000	12,600
1965	No. Units	630	225	80	935	80	120	900	1,100
	Agg. Payload	23,625	2,250	480	26,395	1,600	1,200	9,000	11,800
1966	No. Units	600	Phased	80	680	100	110	900	1,110
	Agg. Payload	22,500	Out	480	22,980	2,000	1,100	9,000	12,100

Sources Used: 1961— <i>The Military Balance 1961-62</i> , ISS, 1961, pp. 3, 8	Payloads in tons
1962— <i>The Military Balance 1962-63</i> , ISS, 1962, pp. 4, 9	B-52 37.5
1963— <i>The Military Balance 1963-64</i> , ISS, 1963, pp. 4, 11	B-47 10
1964— <i>The Military Balance 1964-65</i> , ISS, 1964, pp. 3, 22	B-58 6
1965— <i>The Military Balance 1965-66</i> , ISS, 1965, pp. 3, 24	BEAR 20
1966— <i>The Military Balance 1966-67</i> , ISS, 1966, pp. 3, 25	BISON 10
	BADGER 10
	ISS Summary—2

1967—BOMBERS

Statement of Secretary of Defense—Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on S. 666—Military Authorizations—Defense Appropriations, 1968; January 25, p. 47

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
680 (no estimate of megatonnage)	155 (strategic medium-range Soviet bombers not counted in McNamara's statement despite refueling capability)

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
600	

The Military Balance—1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
600 B-52's 80 B-58's	100 BEARS 110 BISONS 900 BADGERS and BLINDERS

Space/Aeronautics—September 1966
“Strategic Missiles and Air Defense,” by Leon H. Dulberger

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	125 with round-trip ability 25 supersonic—non-round-trip

Washington Post—April 8, 1967
“Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin”
by George C. Wilson

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
680 “U. S. Nuclear Bombers carry about 4 bombs each.”	155

See 1962 listing and *Military Balance* summary *supra*,
for bomb loading examples.

1967—ICBMs

Statement of Secretary of Defense—Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on S. 666—Military Authorizations—Defense Appropriations, 1968; January 25, p. 47

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,000 MINUTEMAN 54 TITAN II	340 (although listed under the date October 1, 1966, a footnote states the figures are for "mid-1966" which would be June-July 1966)

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,054	500 (now 400—end of year 600)

The Military Balance—1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
54 TITAN II × 5 MT = 270 MT	300-500 (Assumed) 400 × 10 MT =
1,000 MINUTEMAN	4,000 MT
800 MINUTEMAN I × 1 MT = 800 MT	
200 MINUTEMAN II × 2 MT = 400 MT	
Total	1,470 MT

New York Times—November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
800 MINUTEMAN I 130 MINUTEMAN II with 70 more MINUTEMAN II for 1967 and 54 TITAN II	400-450 (as of October)

Associated Press—December 7, 1966
Dispatch dated Washington, by Bob Horton

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
U. S. maintains 3- or 4-to-1 advantage 1,600 ICBMs (Presumably including POLARIS)	450

1967—ICBMs (Cont.)

Space/Aeronautics—September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	500

Washington Post—April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin" by George C. Wilson

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,446 (including SLBM)	470 (including SLBM)

The New York Times—November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
800 MINUTEMAN I	400-450
130 MINUTEMAN II	A 3-stage liquid-fueled missile
70 MINUTEMAN II in early 1967	"may carry a warhead ranging from 30 to 60 MT"
54 TITAN II	

"Soviet Missile Power"—a 'Credible Threat Now,' by Xenophon, *Triumph Magazine*, February 1967; Reprinted *U. S. News & World Report*, February 20, 1967 under title "The Danger is Very Grave"—Russia's Growing Arms Threat

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	<p>"Few of the Soviet ICBMs have a lift capability of less than 7 megatons and most are 10 MT or more." The Soviets "may be on the brink of deploying an ICBM capable of lifting the weight of their 100 megaton warhead."</p> <p>"The U.S.S.R. with as few as 20 such missiles equipped with multiple warheads of 1 megaton each—could acquire the capability of striking 2,000 targets, more than the entire existing U. S. strategic missile arsenal can now cover."</p>

1967—ICBMs (Cont.)

Space/Aeronautics—September 1966

"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

Of the several classes of land-based strategic missiles in the Soviet inventory, the most powerful, most sophisticated ICBM's are SAVAGE . . . SCRAM . . . and the so-called PROTON booster, with a thrust of over 2-million pounds and easily able to loft a 100 MT warhead."

Technology Week—March 27, 1967

"Soviets Narrowing ICBM Gap," p. 33

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

"Brown told the committee that the United States 'does not have a 3-1 superiority in ICBM payload over the Soviet Union, because their missiles carry somewhat more than our own do.' But," he added, 'I think that as of this moment we probably have more total missiles. I think that ratio won't be true in another year or two.'"

"Air Force Secretary Harold Brown has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Soviet Union is rapidly closing the missile gap and may equal the U. S. in numbers of ICBMs in a year or two.

"Brown, questioned at length on the Soviet ICBM threat by the committee, said that the Soviets have a very formidable missile force and that they are building new missiles 'very fast.'

"In explaining what amounts to a Soviet attempt to close the missile gap, Brown said 'we leveled out our missile forces. We announced how big our missile force was going to be. Our plans are that five years from now we will have just about as many missiles as we have right now. They have known that. They have known it for a couple of years, and they just keep on building.'

"Now we can afford to let them build for a while, if they feel they want to 'catch up.' But there is evidence that if we stop, they won't necessarily stop. They haven't stopped."

"I think, 'Brown told the committee, 'that in our position we can afford to let this go on for a while without over-responding.'"

1967—MR-IRBMs

The Military Balance—1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

700-750
SKEAN = 1-2 MT
SANDAL = 1 MT
Assume 1/3 SKEAN:
500 SANDAL \times 1 MT
250 SKEAN \times 1.5 MT
500 + 375 MT = 875 MT

Washington Post—April 8, 1967

"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

750

1967—SLMs

Statement of Secretary of Defense—Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on S. 666—Military Authorizations—Defense Appropriations, 1968; January 25, p. 47

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

512	130
-----	-----

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

656	130
-----	-----

The Military Balance—1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

592 POLARIS \times .7 MT = 414 MT	120 SLBM \times 1 MT = 120 MT
	160 SLCM \times .5 MT = 80 MT (.5 MT est.)
	200 MT

1967—SLMs (Cont.)

The New York Times—July 14, 1966
"U. S. Lead in ICBMs is Said to be Reduced," by Hanson Baldwin

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
592	250 (including 100 "winged" cruise missiles)

The New York Times—November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
608 POLARIS \times 1 MT "Slightly less than 1 MT"	120-150 = 608 MT

Space/Aeronautics—September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	150 SLBMs 100 SLCMs

1971—BOMBERS

Department of Defense Testimony—Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 666, Military Appropriations, Defense Appropriations, 1968; January 25-February 2, 1967, p. 248.

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before Senate Armed Services Committee that there would be 255 B-52G-Hs through fiscal year 1972 and 210 FB-111s	

Space/Aeronautics—September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	<p>125 with round-trip capability 25 supersonic non-round-trip Soviet Mach 2.35 supersonic trans- port now in development could be- come supersonic intercontinental bomber.</p>

1971—ICBMs

Department of Defense Testimony—Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 666, Military Appropriations, Defense Appropriations, 1968; January 25-February 2, 1967—(all MINUTEMAN are replaced by IIs or IIIs) pp. 64, 240.

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,054	

U. S. News & World Report—February 6, 1967

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,054 MINUTEMAN and TITAN II 5,000 MT (all weapons)	1,000 + missiles 50,000 MT (all weapons)

The New York Times—July 14, 1966

"U. S. Lead in ICBMs Said to be Reduced," by Hanson Baldwin
U. S. U.S.S.R.

1,054	600 in 1968
-------	-------------

U. S. News & World Report—December 19, 1966

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,600 (including SLM)	Now 400, + 300 to 400 a year additional through 1970—est. 400 - 300 a year for 4 years = 1,600

Washington Post—April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
1,000 MINUTEMAN \times 1 MT = 1,000 MT	650-1,000 Some missiles of 1 MT but "hundreds of missiles with warheads between 7 and 25 MT." "Some military leaders say privately that the U. S., not Russia, is faced with a 'megatonnage gap.'"

1971—ICBMs (Cont.)

The New York Times—November 13, 1966
“Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles,” by William Beecher

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
	Rate of increase of numbers "roughly 100 or more a year over the last 2 years." (est.) $450 + 100$ a year for 4 years = 850.

1971—MR-IRBMs

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
None	All sources quoted for 1967 statistics tend to indicate same numbers maintained through the years—consensus is 700 to 750 in numbers and 700 to 875 MT in explosive power.

1971—SLMs


U. S.	U.S.S.R.
<p>Secretary of Defense Testimony is that there will be no increase in the present number 41 of Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines—but that in the 1970 period the present POLARIS submarines will be reconstructed to carry the POSEIDON missile at a cost of 60 percent of new submarine construction. <i>Senate Hearings on S. 666 Military Authorizations—Defense Appropriations, 1968</i>, January 25–February 6, 1967, p. 62. This “retrofit” program is to be spread over a period of years on a schedule tied to the regular overhaul cycle. Note: If 7 were converted at a time, and the process required 2 years for each group of 7, some 12 years would be required, and the deployable force would be proportionately reduced for that period.</p>	<p><i>The Military Balance 1966-67</i>, Institute for Strategic Studies, does not project any figures for 1971, but says that present production of nuclear submarines is “at the rate of at least five a year.”</p>

II. THE STRATEGIC

MILITARY BALANCE

ICBM BALANCE

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES



Note: Although the U.S. has more weapons, the U.S.S.R. has heavier warheads. Effects of high-yield explosions on our ICBM systems are largely unknown because of the inability to make atmospheric tests. U.S. has reached a numbers plateau. USSR force continues to grow. Mr. McNamara has said he believes Soviets continue to increase ICBM deployment.

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
<p>950 MINUTEMAN I (1 MT) 50 MINUTEMAN II (1 MT) 54 TITAN II (5-18 MT)</p> <p>Deliverable warheads approximately 1,650 MT. With TITAN II warhead calculated at 5 MT instead of 12 MT, the deliverable warheads approximately 1,270 MT.</p> <p>Most recent official office of Secretary of Defense figures show total of 934 ICBMs in mid-1966.</p>	<p>300-500 ICBMs of various models, including: SCRAG, a three-stage, liquid propellant ICBM, 30 MT first displayed on May 9, 1965 in Moscow has a range of about 8,000 miles as ICBM. Also has orbital capability.</p> <p>SAVAGE, a three-stage solid propellant missile like our MINUTEMAN with a range of over 5,000 miles.</p> <p>SCROOGE, a solid propellant rocket on a SCAMP erector-launch vehicle.</p> <p>SASIN, a two-stage liquid propellant rocket.</p> <p>Most recent official office of Secretary of Defense figures show total of 340 ICBMs as of mid-1966.</p> <p>Soviet ICBMs deployed in quantity have a minimum of 10 MT warhead capability.</p> <p>Deliverable warheads approximately 4,000 MT.</p>

SAMPLE SOURCES

The Military Balance 1966-1967, ISS, 1966, pp. 25, 44.
 "Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," Leon H. Dulberger, *Space/Aeronautics*, September 1966, p. 62.
Missile/Space Daily, December 6, 1966.
Military Review, November 1966, pp. 106-107.
 Secretary of Defense, Senate Testimony, January 25-February 2, 1967, p. 47.

II-A. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM)

The 1,000th American MINUTEMAN intercontinental ballistic missile will be deployed in a site that has just been activated near Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. This site will contain 50 new MINUTEMAN II missiles, a considerable improvement over MINUTEMAN I, which comprise the remaining MINUTEMAN force. Warheads of MINUTEMAN I are reputed by unclassified sources to yield one megaton. MINUTEMAN II may have somewhat higher yield, or a trade-off with penetration aids.

The United States has also deployed 54 TITAN II missiles with a warhead yield of over 5 megatons.³⁹ There are no plans to increase this ICBM force. In fact, on February 12, 1967 the Department of Defense let it be known that the TITAN II would be phased-out beginning in 1970⁴⁰ and Secretary of Defense McNamara revealed in his 1967 Posture Statement that he had ended procurement of new TITAN boosters "with the FY (Fiscal Year) 1966 buy." In other words, the TITAN II phase-out has already begun.

The Soviet Union has between 300 and 500 ICBMs, all of which are reputed to have a warhead yield of at least ten megatons.⁴¹ This estimated yield is probably low for some Soviet missiles, such as the new SCRAG which mounts a 30-to-50 megaton warhead and can be used either as an ICBM or as an orbital space weapon.⁴² Some sources attribute 500 missiles to the Soviets.⁴³

In his Posture Statement of January 23, 1967, Secretary McNamara credited the United States with 934 ICBMs and the Soviet Union with 340 as of mid-1966.

The total yield of the United States ICBM force is estimated at 1,650 megatons, while Soviet missiles can yield at least 4,000 megatons.

However, these unclassified estimates are probably low for Soviet missiles. Few unclassified sources have revised their Soviet warhead

39. *The Military Balance 1966-67*, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 25.

40. *The New York Times*, February 13, 1967, p. 1.

41. *The Military Balance*, op. cit. p. 44.

42. *Ogonock*, No. 20, May 1965.

43. *Business Week*, January 14, 1967, p. 88.

yield figures to reflect the dramatic gains in yield/weight ratio from the 1961 Soviet nuclear tests. Typically, the Institute for Strategic Studies still shows Soviet missile warheads at the same yield as they did in 1961—10 megatons.

In their 1963 paper submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the debate on the Test Ban Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that as a result of the 1961 tests:

"The U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in the high-yield—tens of megatons—technology . . . and in the yield/weight ratios of high-yield devices . . . if the Treaty goes into effect . . . the U. S. would not be able to overtake the present advantage . . ."⁴⁴

An authoritative appraisal of U. S./U.S.S.R. position as to high-yield weapons after the 1961 Soviet tests gains was made by Charles J. V. Murphy, a long-established expert in the area of nuclear weapons. His article was published in *Life*, February 16, 1962, and its accuracy has never been challenged. Although Mr. Murphy carefully refrains from stating exact yield/weight ratios, he does say that the Soviet gain was "several fold" and makes the following comparison:

"The (Soviet) 100 megaton warhead, according to some nuclear scientists, probably does not weigh more than 15 tons and may even weigh less than 10 tons . . . By comparison, the warhead of our largest rocket, the TITAN, weighs nearly half as much as the lowest estimate for the Soviet warhead while its yield is probably less than 1/10 as high."

Thus it would appear that since 1961, the Soviets have had a 5-to-1 advantage over the U. S. in yield/weight ratio in contrast to their pre-1961 inferiority.

It seems reasonable to assume that this improved capability has by now been used in upgrading missile warhead yield.

Some American planners believe that the numerically larger American force is superior on the premise that a one megaton warhead is powerful enough to destroy any city and accurate enough to take out a hardened Soviet launching site.

They also believe that most Soviet launching sites are "soft" and extremely vulnerable to a MINUTEMAN warhead. However, the softness or hardness of Soviet launching sites has little relevance unless America strikes first, something present U. S. policy would never permit.

44. *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings*, Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 273.

There is questionable value in destroying a Soviet ICBM site which has already expended its first missiles unless the site has a reload capability. It is argued that for logical deterrence, which is the U. S. strategy, the city-busting potential of the MINUTEMAN force, backed with a few heavy TITAN II missiles, appears to be adequate at the present time.

Even if numbers were to be considered as more important than power, Secretary McNamara in his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement estimated that in a future nuclear war about half of our missiles would be knocked out if the Soviets strike first.

Even if our remaining ICBMs were to function perfectly, it is difficult to estimate how many might be destroyed by Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense. (See ABM section of this study.)

The high yield of Soviet ICBMs leads one to question the invulnerability of our own hardened ICBM sites. None of the American sites has been tested against such great explosive power as the Soviets demonstrated in their 1961-62 nuclear tests, although various smaller-scale tests have been conducted. The Department of Defense is confident that scaling up of the smaller underground explosions can lead to accurate prediction of the effects of massive multi-megaton explosions. However, some scientists question this concept. They assert that when an explosion is scaled up beyond a factor of ten, entirely new effects can be expected.

It is conceivable, therefore, that the electro-magnetic pulse or some unexpected effect of a high-yield Soviet warhead might knock out an entire MINUTEMAN complex regardless of the hardening and shielding attempted. Many scientists express concern that very high-yield explosions may cause a total communications blackout and thus prevent the transmission of a presidential order to retaliate. The Soviet Union has tested very high-yield warheads. The United States has not. Under the restrictions of the atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, the United States can only guess at what unique effects might occur when very high-yield weapons are exploded. But the Soviets *know*.

Considering the above, Soviet missiles might well be able to deal a first-strike knockout blow to our hardened ICBMs—if not today, some time in the future as the Kremlin leaders continue to upgrade their force in quality and numbers. Should the Soviet Union be convinced of this capability and should it have determined a way to nullify the United States POLARIS missiles (see SLM section of this study), the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to exercise nuclear blackmail. War

might become unnecessary for Soviet victory. In such an eventuality, only an anti-ballistic missile defense or *surrender* could save American lives.

Some questions have even been raised concerning the credibility of a strategic deterrence based solely on "second-strike" retaliation. For example, Paul Nitze, presently Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of Defense until he was appointed to the Navy, presented a paper at the National Strategy Seminar at Asilomar, California in April 1960 in which he said:

"The principal problem . . . with this alternative, (an invulnerable second-strike, purely retaliatory capability) is that it provides us with no rational military strategy if deterrence fails . . . *If deterrence fails, the only reaction open to us is retaliation in support of a purpose that no longer exists—the purpose of deterring the enemy from taking the action they have already taken.*"⁴⁵

Suppose the Soviets use this as the basis for estimating the credibility of our stated intention of retaliating? Might they not reason somewhat as follows:

Secretary McNamara has testified that a Soviet first strike against the United States could result in 120 million U. S. fatalities.⁴⁶ After this has happened, Secretary McNamara says that the United States would strike back at the Soviets, and that enough of our strategic weapons would have survived the Soviet strike to enable us to strike back and kill 120 million people in the U.S.S.R.

The target of our retaliation would be *people*. Secretary McNamara revealed this expressly for the first time in his 1967 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, as follows:

"If we were to strike after they struck us, the question is, what would we launch our missiles against? I think all would agree that we would launch against their cities. They have already launched all their missiles against us."

With most of the American population dead, would it then be rational to launch a retaliatory strike with their surviving strategic forces? If the 70 million survivors prefer to remain as survivors, they might forego a retaliatory strike, so as not to invite a Soviet mop-up attack by their follow-on bombers and missiles from sites with refire capability. A retaliatory strike certainly would not help the 120 million Americans

already dead. Disregarding the fact that the Soviets, upon launching their first attack would have evacuated their cities, and assuming that Secretary McNamara's figures are correct, namely, that the American retaliatory strike could kill 120 million Russian people, why should the remaining Americans launch such a futile attack? The people whom they would kill had no say in their government's decision to strike.


We are confident that the remaining Americans would retaliate, but the key question is whether the *Soviets* believe this.

45. *Proceedings, Asilomar National Strategy Seminar*, p. 6 (Emphasis added.)

46. *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967, p. 53.

IRBM/MRBM BALANCE

INTERMEDIATE/MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES



Note: Soviets have missiles deployed in western U.S.S.R., threatening NATO cities and military installations. This is a strategic deployment and must be considered in context with ICBM balance and SLBM balance. NATO has neither adequate warning nor retaliatory system. Also, many Soviet MRBM/ICBMs are mobile and will be difficult to target.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE—MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
NONE	750 of various models dating from 1956 deployed principally in western U.S.S.R. Warhead average approximately 1 MT. Latest model SCAMP, first shown in Moscow in May 1965, appears to be completely mobile, including its firing platform.

SAMPLE SOURCES:

The Military Balance 1966-1967, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966, p. 3; *Military Review*, November 1966, p. 107.

II-B. INTERMEDIATE/MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES (IRBM/MRBM)

The Soviet Union has at least 750 intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles (1500-to-2500-mile range), mainly in western Russia. These are code-named SANDAL, SKEAN and SCAMP. The latter was first shown in May 1965 and is a mobile version, which indicates that the Soviet Union continues to upgrade IRBM/MRBMs. The United States has no comparable missiles nor is it developing any.

NATO assumes that the 750 Russian missiles are targeted at the major military installations and population centers in Western Europe, including London, Paris, Frankfurt, the Ruhr, Hamburg, Munich, and the NATO headquarters and bases. Because they presented a major threat to NATO, the United States provided IRBMs, THORS and JUPITERs in England, Italy and Turkey. These missiles became operational just before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. After the crisis, the United States dismantled its entire NATO IRBM operation.

Nothing is now left of the extremely expensive U. S. complex of THORS and JUPITERs which were capable of countering Soviet IRBMs. The reason given for removing them at the time was that the IRBMs were obsolete and were being replaced by POLARIS missiles. (See SLM section.) The fact is, however, that U.S. IRBMs in Europe had hardly been installed when they were removed. Many strategists do not accept the explanation that the missiles had become obsolete so quickly.

The principal counters to the Soviet IRBMs at this time are the POLARIS submarines operating in the Mediterranean and other waters within range of the Soviet Union, and NATO fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense McNamara has announced that we have 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe⁴⁷, many of them no doubt capable of being carried by fighter-bombers but most of them tactical weapons which would be used only in the event the Soviets attacked with ground forces.

Since the western powers have no intention of launching a first strike, fighter-bombers can be considered reaction weapons. How many

47. *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967, p. 68.

airfields would be left operational after a Soviet first strike with nuclear missiles? Airfields certainly would be a prime target for the 750 Soviet IRBM/MRBMs.

The American nuclear-capable PERSHING, a tactical missile with a range of perhaps 400 miles, is available in Europe but could not be considered as a counter to the Soviet IRBM/MRBMs because of its short range. PERSHING cannot reach into the Soviet Union from European bases, no matter how close it is placed to the Iron Curtain.

Europe's confidence in the United States' pledge to defend it against Soviet nuclear attack has understandably been shaken by our failure to maintain a counter-force to the Soviet IRBMs. After the U. S. removed its THOR and JUPITER missiles, there followed the long, abortive give-and-take debate about providing NATO with sea-based intermediate range ballistic missiles. But many NATO powers believe that the United States is no longer certain it would use its POLARIS missile and ICBMs if the Soviet Union launched its IRBM/MRBMs against Europe.

The pull-out of THORs and JUPITERs, the failure of discussions on the multilateral nuclear force to bear fruit, the quibbling by American officials in NATO discussions of strategic nuclear retaliation have combined to raise doubts, (first in France, and more recently, in Germany) about the reliability of the American deterrent against Soviet attack in Europe.⁴⁸

Soviet military writers and Soviet publications have indicated repeatedly that Moscow policymakers consider Western Europe to be the Soviet Union's hostage because of the intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles poised in western Russia. For this reason, in weighing the *strategic* balance, one must consider Russian IRBM/MRBMs as strategic weapons in the same context with United States POLARIS and ICBMs.

As Red China moves into a position where it has an intermediate-range or medium-range ballistic missile capability of its own, Peking may similarly view Japan, Korea, Formosa, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan and India, as its hostages. If these nations find themselves virtually defenseless against Peking's nuclear forces, they will inevitably drift—or be driven—into Communist China's power orbit. Thus, the sacrifices of American men-at-arms in Korea and Vietnam may ultimately prove to have been made for naught.

48. General Johannes Steinhoff, "NATO Crisis: A Military View," *Survival*, November 1966, p. 8.


It has been reported that the United States has moved three POLARIS submarines to the Western Pacific area. Presumably this is intended to counter the present Chinese Communist nuclear threat. However, this raises the interesting question as to whether Red China and the other Asian Communist countries consider the POLARIS submarines a real threat. In two wars in Asia since the United States obtained nuclear weapons, they have not been used. Indeed, American policymakers have made it abundantly clear that the U. S. would never use nuclear weapons against Communist aggressors in Asia. Although this policy might change if Red China develops a serious nuclear threat of its own, the United States' credibility with its Asian allies, at least so far as our will to use strategic weapons is concerned, has already been seriously damaged.

It is perhaps crucial to the future of the Free World in Asia that the Communist powers respect U. S. nuclear strength in the Pacific.

For the time being, however, it is obvious that Soviet IRBM/MRBMs constitute the greater threat to the Free World's security and, particularly, the security of Western Europe. Our NATO allies need positive reassurance that the United States still firmly intends to provide them with a nuclear umbrella against a possible Soviet attack. NATO has already been severely hurt, if not crippled, by the withdrawal of France from the military alliance. And there is strong evidence that President DeGaulle took this drastic step, at least in part, because of France's withering confidence in the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Certainly, DeGaulle was not unmindful of the Soviet missiles aimed at his country when he ordered NATO forces from French soil.

ABM BALANCE

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE



Chairman Khrushchev announced U.S.S.R. ABM capability in 1962. Long suspected by unofficial sources, the existence of a Soviet ABM System was confirmed by Secretary of Defense McNamara in November 1966. The extent of this system and its capabilities are unknown although Mr. McNamara asserts that offensive penetration aids would nullify it. What assurances does the Secretary have of this?

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM)

USA	USSR
NIKE-X (SPRINT and SPARTAN) Under development since 1965.	GRIFFON—first displayed in Moscow in November 1963. Said by Soviets to be an anti-missile missile. GALOSH—first displayed in Moscow in November 1964. Described as an anti-ballistic missile missile. TALLINN—described as an anti-ballistic missile system.

Sample source: William E. Howard and James Barr, *Spacecraft and Missiles of the World—1966*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966), pp. 83-84.

Sample sources: *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1965-1966*, p. 442; *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1966-1967*, p. 468; *Business Week*, January 14, 1967, p. 79; *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

II-C. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM)

Although both the United States Army and Air Force began studies for missile defense as early as 1955, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) did not authorize the NIKE-ZEUS program before 1957.⁴⁹ Preliminary tests on Kwajalein Island of Army's NIKE-ZEUS system against ATLAS ICBMs launched from the mainland proved successful in 1962. OSD, however, noted that NIKE-ZEUS could not discriminate between warheads and decoys where interception took place above the atmosphere from 50-to-200 miles out, and that decoys and other penetration aids were within the state of the art for engineers of the U.S.S.R. Thus NIKE-ZEUS was not put into production even though the Soviet Union did not have penetration aids at that stage. In other words, ZEUS would have been effective for a limited time until the U.S.S.R. had developed penetration aids but OSD believed a short effectiveness period would be impractical.

In 1963, the Army designed the NIKE-X system. This was to include the ZEUS and another missile, SPRINT, which would fire rapidly and intercept at close range (20-to-30 miles) those incoming warheads missed by ZEUS. It was conceived that lighter decoys would fall behind or burn up in the atmosphere and a new Multifunction Array Radar (MAR) system would be able to discriminate and handle many targets simultaneously.⁵⁰ This NIKE-X system has proved out in what tests could be run without actually exploding nuclear warheads in the atmosphere. Tests of SPRINT are still being made at White Sands. Still, NIKE-X has not been put into production, although about \$400-million each year (\$421-million in FY '68) for ten years has been invested in ballistic-missile defense, or \$4-billion.⁵¹ An advanced version of ZEUS, now called SPARTAN, with a 400-mile range, is now under development.⁵²

The U.S.S.R. displayed the GALOSH ABM in its case at a Moscow parade in November 1964.⁵³ It is believed to compare with NIKE-ZEUS. In October 1961, at the 22nd Party Congress, Marshal Malinov-

49. *Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs*, Hearings, Senate Preparedness Committee, 1958, Part I, p. 381.

50. *DOD Appropriations for 1965*, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 186-188.

51. *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967, p. 47.

52. *Business Week*, January 14, 1967, p. 79.

53. *Ibid.*

sky made the claim that the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been solved by Soviet scientists. In 1963, the GRIFFON, a short-range ABM was unveiled which has been said to compare with the United States SPRINT. Unofficial reports were frequent in 1963 of Soviet ABM deployment. By 1966, the reports were corroborated when Secretary of Defense McNamara announced on November 10, 1966, that the United States had "considerable evidence" that the Soviet Union had indeed deployed at least a limited ABM system.

In his annual Posture Statement to the Congress, the Secretary took cognizance only of "a deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system around Moscow."⁵⁴ In the published version of his statement, at least, he did not refer to what Hanson W. Baldwin, calls "the far more widespread (ABM) installations in other parts of the Soviet Union known as the TALLINN system."⁵⁵

According to Mr. Baldwin, "launching sites and radars of this system extend in a wide arc across the northwestern part of the Soviet Union covering the missile window, or angle or arc, through which United States missiles, launched from land bases, would have to approach their targets." In addition, he said, "installations of the TALLINN type have been discovered east of the Ural Mountains." He added that there were reports of more such installations "in the southern part of the Soviet Union in position to defend against attacks from the Mediterranean area."

Although there is a difference of opinion within the U. S. intelligence community on the type of missiles employed in these TALLINN-type systems, some experts believe the Soviets are probably deploying ABM weapons capable of producing "X-ray effects." Let loose by ultra-high energy nuclear explosions, pulsed X-rays cause "violent reactions within materials" that can destroy or neutralize attacking nuclear warheads. According to the publication, *Technology Week*, the shielding materials currently used to protect U. S. warheads would fail to offset the X-ray effect.⁵⁶

The policy of the United States, at this writing, is to defer deployment of an ABM system pending an appeal to Moscow by Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson for an agreement on a mutual moratorium on ABM deployment.⁵⁷

54. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 40.

55. *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

56. *Technology Week*, January 2, 1967, pp. 10-12.

57. *The New York Times*, January 18, 1967, p. 3.

There is disagreement in the intelligence community over the extent and effectiveness of the Soviet ABM system. But there is no disagreement over the fact that the Russians have something and the United States has nothing.⁵⁸ Under these conditions the Soviet leaders will find themselves in a favorable bargaining position as they did during the Cuban missile crisis. That side with most negotiating capital is likely to come out ahead.

Even if deployment is finally ordered, the Administration in Washington is talking about a limited system costing from \$4-to-\$5-billion over a period of four or five years. This system would be specifically designed to defend against missiles aimed at the American long-range offensive system and would probably have little effect on saving lives.⁵⁹

ABM Deployment: Arguments Pro and Con

Some of the central arguments concerning the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system are:

1. Against ABM

A principal argument used by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) against a U. S. commitment to production and deployment of an ABM system is summed up in an ancient military rule, i.e., that the best defense is a good offense.

The OSD contends that offensive systems are cheaper and more effective in modern warfare than countervailing defensive systems. Missile penetration aids are far less expensive than an ABM. ABMs cannot defend everywhere because of the prohibitive cost and the terrible destructive capability of nuclear warheads but ICBMs can be targeted anywhere. Thus, the Secretary of Defense argues, the U. S. should devote its efforts and resources to improving offensive systems to deter potential enemies from attacking.

In his 1967 Posture Statement, Defense Secretary McNamara spelled out his position clearly: "It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves. . . . Once sufficient forces have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our Assured Destruction Objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and industry *in the event deterrence fails.*" (Emphasis added.)

58. *Washington Star*, Richard Fryklund, January 11, 1967, p. A-20.

59. *Baltimore Sun*, January 25, 1967, p. 1.

For ABM

Obviously, if deterrence fails it is then too late to build an ABM—too late for the 120 million Americans whom the Secretary estimates would be killed in such an attack.

The *only* deterrent value in our offensive weapons is the credibility an enemy places in our will to use them in defense, not merely of the United States, but of our Allies and our global interests generally. There is a serious question, which probably cannot be answered; unless and until, the Soviets conclude they are ready for an all-out attack or a final face-down, as to whether U. S. credibility has not already been seriously undermined by America's adherence to a "second-strike" policy. (See ICBM section for further discussion on this point.)

Despite our total strategic reliance on offensive weapons, the "second-strike" policy casts United States military posture in a fundamentally *defensive mold*. In the absence of an ABM, and with our offensive weapons restricted to a wholly defensive role, the danger of a general nuclear war is greatly increased. An enemy who knows he is guaranteed the advantage of a first strike that would, according to Secretary McNamara, kill 120 million Americans—and who has himself deployed an effective ABM that might cut his own losses to an acceptable level—might in the future be sorely tempted to attack America in the hope of winning "the final victory" with one massive blow.

In short, the argument that the best defense is a good offense is not applicable here because the U. S. has elected to take the defense. We have given the Soviet Union the first strike in the event of nuclear war. Yet we have no *defense* other than our threat to strike back. (See ICBM section for further discussion.)

2. Against ABM

The expense of the ABM is prohibitive, and at the very least, would place a tremendous strain upon the U. S. economy.

For ABM

Stretched over a ten-year period, the \$40-billion which OSD now estimates is required for a comprehensive ABM system would be only \$4-billion per year and could be readily borne by the American economy. Our total defense budget in 1967 will top \$75-billion with supplemental requests for the Vietnam War and the economy has still proved viable. Vietnam costs alone came to more than \$25-billion in 1966 and the stakes there do not begin to compare with the stakes in an intercontinental nuclear war which would kill tens of millions of our people.

Secretary McNamara has estimated that even a \$20-billion expenditure for deployment of NIKE-X, supplemented by a fallout shelter program, would save 70-to-90 million American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in property.

It should be noted, however, that OSD's \$40-billion figure represents the "maximum feasible protection" in a total defensive system that includes \$5-billion for a fallout shelter program and a \$15-billion for beefing up the aging air defense system. It is argued that there is no point in guarding against one kind of attack if another kind of attack can get through. Nevertheless, these other expenses are not part of the ABM system any more than is a necessary ICBM system. The remaining \$20-billion would be for the ABM.

If \$20-billion over a period of ten years can protect 70-to-90 million lives, then the "insurance" cost for each year per individual protected would amount to \$67 per year, or about \$5 per month. Should one choose the \$40-billion figure, even \$10 per month seems cheap insurance for such protection.

It must also be noted here what several recent offensive weapons systems have cost. Building these was a burden which the United States bore without complaint: ICBM system: \$20-billion; POLARIS system: \$11.8-billion; B-52 system: \$8-billion.

3. Against ABM

An American commitment to build an ABM would accelerate the arms race, thereby reducing our security.

For ABM

The Soviets have already opted for acceleration, not only with their current deployment of an extensive ABM system but by increasing their ICBM force, and in the development and deployment of many other military components, including a nuclear submarine strike force capable of delivering missiles on American cities.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that on January 15, 1966, Charles M. Herzfeld, Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency in the DOD, told a European Study Commission conference in London that the U.S. argument against deployment of ABMs, (i.e., that it would accelerate the arms race) was "put to the Russians at least three Pugwash Conferences ago. On the first two occasions the Russians did not even understand the argument that there might be an advantage in not having a defense; the third time they said it was too late."

Secretary McNamara admits that "two significant changes have occurred during the last year in our projections of Soviet strategic forces. The first is a faster-than-expected rate of construction of hard ICBM silos; the second is more positive evidence of a deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system around Moscow."⁶⁰

The concomitant argument that an arms buildup would reduce U. S. security is difficult to understand. Every Soviet arms development which is not at least matched by a U. S. effort *reduces* our nation's security. Since we have made it abundantly clear that the U. S. will maintain a second-strike policy, there is no need for the present Soviet buildup—unless they intend to use their new strategic weapons for nuclear blackmail or a first strike.

4. Against ABM

U. S. deployment of an ABM would be a provocative measure which would heighten world tensions.

For ABM

It should by now be clearly understood that an ABM is a purely defensive system, particularly in the hands of a nation which religiously adheres to a second-strike posture. However, if a nation was indeed preparing for all-out war, it would naturally place a high priority on an effective ABM so that it could protect itself after delivering a first strike.

An ABM itself cannot logically be provocative. But, coupled with an offensive buildup such as the Soviet Union is now pushing, it could indeed increase world tensions, whereas a U. S. ABM effort would now tend to stabilize the strategic balance and ultimately *reduce* tensions.

During his February 1967 visit to Great Britain, Soviet Premier Kosygin openly defended the U.S.S.R.'s action in deploying an ABM on the grounds that a country has the right to provide for its own defense. If this argument were used by the United States, a non-aggressive nation, the logic of this view would be difficult to dispute. Used by a leader of a nation firmly committed to world domination, it certainly appears provocative.

Although an effective defense system strengthens any military posture by protecting the base from which offensive forays can be made, defensive systems that cannot threaten a potential enemy will not provoke an attack unless the adversary already has designs for conquest.

60. *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967, p. 40.

Throughout history, defensive works and fortifications have tended to stabilize the political environment because they lend a sense of security to those behind the fortifications which makes it less demanding for them to destroy their enemies.

Today, America's continued emphasis on *offensive* strategic weapons does much more to strain world tensions than deployment of an ABM. As Soviet Major General Nikolai Talenski puts it, "only the side which intends to use its means of attack for aggressive purposes can wish to slow down the creation and improvement of anti-ballistic defense systems. For the peace-loving states, anti-missile systems are really a means of building up their security."⁶¹

By placing our sole reliance for deterrence on ICBMs, POLARIS and POSEIDON missiles, and the remaining manned bomber force, the United States places itself in the dangerous position of having only one option left if it is faced with a Soviet ultimatum to surrender. It must either fire its offensive nuclear weapons or give up its sovereignty. An ABM would at least strengthen the hand of the President if he were confronted with such a fateful decision, and it might well stay the hand of an enemy at a critical moment in history.

5. Against ABM

An ABM would be of little use without a concurrent fallout shelter program, which would also greatly burden the economy and frighten the American public.

For ABM

In his 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara says: "A significant amount of fallout protection exists today. By the end of the current fiscal year, we expect that this effort will have identified about 160 million shelter spaces. . . ." Although Secretary McNamara concedes that a "substantial portion of our population would still be left without adequate fallout protection," he adds that "much of the shortfall, we believe, could be met by making, *at little or no cost*, relatively minor changes in the design of new buildings."⁶² (Emphasis added.)

This "significant" present protection has been achieved with a relatively low expenditure for Civil Defense, an expenditure which the Secretary estimates at \$111-million for Fiscal 1968. However, to provide a really effective fallout shelter program the DOD previously esti-

61. *Technology Week*, March 27, 1967, p. 16.

62. *Posture Statement*, January 23, 1967, p. 63.

mated the cost at \$5-billion. Spread over the ten years needed to deploy the concomitant ABM system this would average out to about \$500-million per year. Certainly, this is a modest price tag to put upon a program that even *without* an ABM could save many millions of American lives, particularly when the U. S. is spending 50 times that amount annually on the Vietnam War.

As for the argument that an accelerated shelter program would frighten the public, it would seem that Americans would be far better off knowing the facts if ultimately their lives could be forfeited through ignorance and lack of preparation. For many years, the U.S.S.R. has *required* every Soviet citizen over 18 years of age to take intensive courses in Civil Defense. In comparison, the American effort is indeed puny.

In 1966, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the Joint Chiefs favored *both* an ABM and a fallout shelter program. General Wheeler believed that a low-key approach, coupled with intelligent public education, would overcome the fears that might be associated with a shelter program.⁶³

6. Against ABM

We are not certain how far the U.S.S.R. has gone with its own ABM, which may only be intended as a defense against Communist China.

For ABM

The major U.S.S.R. ABM deployment is known to be along its north-western borders, anchored on the Baltic city of Tallinn. This is in the path of the known route most American ICBMs would take in a retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union—not in the path of any present or likely future strike from China.

Secretary McNamara says that it "appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970's, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack."⁶⁴ Is it possible that the Soviets view Communist China's strategic threat with greater alarm than does our own Secretary of Defense? If so, America had better look to its own defenses and build an ABM system to intercept a possible attack from China.

63. House Appropriations Committee Hearings for Fiscal Year 1967, Part I, pp. 88-89.


64. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 42.

As to the extent of Soviet ABM deployment, the USSR "had progressed well beyond the deployment of ABMs around a major city or several cities; it had developed a comprehensive, advanced and expensive system. Even more important, the Soviet system is evidently not a 'point' defense system, but an 'area' defense system. It is geared, that is to say, not only to defend cities and concentrations of weaponry, but to protect military installations that have already been widely dispersed..."⁶⁵

Moreover, Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated in public that their nation has an effective ABM. On April 23, 1966 United Press International reported from Budapest that Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky claimed the U.S.S.R. had already "introduced" a defense system capable of intercepting whole squadrons of attacking bombers and knocking out incoming missiles.

SLM BALANCE

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES



Note: The U.S. SLBM System is more sophisticated than the U.S.S.R. System. However, the U.S. System is a counter to the 750 Soviet IRBMs. Considering that about 50% of the U.S. Force is kept on station, this amounts to 352 Polaris missiles, only 22 of which might be fired at one time.

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES (SLM)

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
208 POLARIS 2 (0.7 MT)	149 Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (1 MT warheads)
448 POLARIS 3 (0.7 MT)	98 Submarine-launched CRUISE missiles (0.5 MT warheads)
92 Total deliverable warhead yield: 460 MT	Total deliverable warhead yield: 198 MT

Sources:

Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-67, pp. 433, 434.

The Military Balance 1966-1967, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1966, pp. 5, 25.

Military Review, June 1966, pp. 105-108.

D. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES (SLM) AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES (ASW)

U.S.S.R. SLM Capability

A move to the sea is in progress for the Soviet Union's rocket forces as a part of the U.S.S.R.'s determination to gain domination in hydro-space, precisely as it seeks supremacy in aerospace.

From an examination of *Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967*, it is clear that the U.S.S.R. plans to use submarines as launching platforms for a substantial portion of its missile arsenal. Indeed, as Captain H. B. Sweitzer, USN, has pointed out in the *Proceedings* of the U. S. Naval Institute (September 1966), "Seventy-seven Soviet (missile-firing) submarines, both conventional and nuclear-powered, are in operation, including 10 "E" class, 13 "H" class, two "J" class, 30 "G" class, 10 "Z" class, and 12 "W" class; each carries from two-to-six guided or ballistic missiles." *Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967*, also reports that an additional 30 submarines are under construction in Soviet dockyards.⁶⁶

The "H" type submarine for example, is a nuclear-powered ballistic missile type, with a displacement of 3,500 tons. Armament consists of three ballistic missile tubes for missiles with a reported range of 600-to-3,000 miles.

Space/Aeronautics concludes: "For the present, with all its various limitations, the U. S. Navy's attack submarine force is in generally better overall shape than the U.S.S.R.'s, as nearly anyone this side of Moscow can figure. Yet the intentions of the Soviet Union are clear: to wipe out our present lead in submarine technology; to threaten the POLARIS-POSEIDON strategic deterrent; to interdict both our commerce and our naval power by its submarine force should it come to war."⁶⁷

This journal also pointed out, that while what the U. S. knows about the Soviets' nuclear submarines "is very sparse," it is possible to project certain characteristics from knowledge of submarine technology. If the Soviet submarines aren't as good as U. S. craft yet, the journal said, "they certainly can become that good."

66. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967*, pp. 433, 434.
67. *Space/Aeronautics*, July 1966.

In appraising the Soviet seaborne missile threat, the overall Soviet effort at sea should be taken into consideration. Paralleling the Soviet rocket effort of the 1950's and 1960's has been an enormous oceanographic program. To conduct successful submarine missile attacks, Soviet naval commanders require detailed information of the sea bottom in critical areas. Indeed, it long has been believed, and frequently reported, that the Soviets have marked the sea bottom in certain places as possible firing points. While the under-ice operations of certain American submarines, notably the SKATE, have received widespread attention, it should be appreciated that the Soviets have been studying Arctic navigation for decades. One danger is that Soviet submarines, intent on making missile attacks against the North American continent, would enter Hudson's Bay which would enable them to make a deep penetration of the continental land mass.

Any appraisal of the Soviet submarine missile threat should not downgrade the menace because of the limited range of the U.S.S.R.'s submarine-launched missiles. On the west, the Soviet Union can only be approached through narrow or arctic waters. Thus it is necessary that U. S. missiles have a greater stand-off capability, whereas the Soviets, could be expected to employ their missiles in a first strike, and could deploy their submarines close to the shores of the United States.

It should be borne in mind that the military applications of hydro-space are only beginning to be made. Even as satellites in space offer a potential for military action, the seabed offers opportunities for launching platforms of the future. The advanced nations currently are developing deep submergence technology which will enable men to live and work at great depths. This will lead, initially, to undersea mining and oil drilling beyond the continental shelf—on submerged lands which have no sovereign claims at present. It also will lead, one can be sure, to the development of missile-firing bases on the seabed.

The United States needs to look ahead, both in terms of submarine technology and the law of the sea, to undersea defense zones from which Soviet submarine forces would be excluded.

Space/Aeronautics has observed that "looking toward the future of submarine warfare, submariners feel that the force in being in the late 1970's may include small reconnaissance craft, and 'bomber' types even larger than the 425-foot LAFAYETTE class of FBM boat. Armament may include more sophisticated missiles and torpedoes; the 'bomber' types may operate with drone escorts. Ocean-bottom armories and fueling stations, and fixed-site (or crawler-mounted) launch platforms, may

also be part of tomorrow's undersea force."⁶⁸ Obviously, the United States cannot permit the Soviet Union to have superiority in such undersea strategic weapon systems. This is all the more true in that, at this time—as The Institute for Strategic Studies has noted—missile-bearing submarines have an increasingly important role in Soviet strategy.

Many Russian submarines and surface ships, it should be noted, carry air-breathing missiles with a range of about 300-to-500 miles.

The Soviet Union has 46 submarines which carry 149 ballistic missiles and 17 submarines which carry a total of 98 CRUISE missiles.⁶⁹

The United States, of course, is precluded from destroying Soviet submarines in peacetime. During the Cuban missile crisis we were made aware of Soviet submarines cruising near United States shores. If they had been firing missiles, their mode of attack would probably have been to surface at night, fire their missiles, and quickly submerge. In a peacetime environment they would not have been subject to attack until they had taken the act of war by firing their missiles.

We can take little comfort in the fact that Soviet SLMs are of shorter range than our POLARIS missiles. Ours must be long-ranged to reach Russian targets, while Soviet vessels can approach well within range of the principal coastal cities of the United States. Also, the new Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles have a range comparable to our POLARIS.

United States SLBM Capability

When the last of the 41 POLARIS submarines is operational in the early fall of 1967, the United States will be in a position, theoretically, to deploy a total of 656 POLARIS missiles at sea—or 16 per submarine. Due to overhaul and refit, however, only 22 POLARIS submarines will be on station at any one time, or, an actual figure of 352 POLARIS missiles available for launch. Seven of the 41 boats will be assigned to the Pacific, according to latest reports, and the rest will be on duty in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Thirteen submarines are equipped with the A-2 missiles, and the remainder with the A-3 missiles. The latter is a rocket with a range of 2,500 miles, and will have superior accuracy. L. Edgar Prina, editor of *NAVY Magazine*, reports that the A-3 "is believed capable of carrying a warhead of one megaton or an equivalent of one million tons of TNT."

68. *Space/Aeronautics*, July 1966.

69. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967*, pp. 433, 434.

The Secretary of Defense has announced that \$5-billion will be devoted to the POSEIDON submarine-launched missile. This will cover development of the missiles and fitting them in some of the nuclear-powered FBM boats.

With only 22 POLARIS submarines actually on station at any one time, the United States which has, after all, a four-ocean defense responsibility can hardly be said to have a fully adequate at-sea missile force. A reasonable number of POSEIDON submarines on station in the Indian Ocean would, for example, not only enhance U. S. deterrence of a nuclear war but would create an additional heavy burden to the Soviet ASW effort and might force them to withdraw ASW units now deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific and thus move them further away from U. S. shores.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES

Even as advocates of aerospace preparedness insist on prompt deployment of an American ABM defense and development of a military capability in space, so do students of seapower emphasize the need for swiftly augmenting U. S. anti-submarine warfare forces to deal with the growing Soviet undersea threat.

The Soviet position with respect to sea warfare was first enunciated at the Communist Party Congress of 1956 when Marshal G. Zhukov stated: "In a future war the struggle at sea will be of even greater importance than it was in the land war." In the decade since that statement was made, the Soviet Union (a land power by tradition) has embarked on massive programs aimed at upgrading all aspects of its sea power. These programs have massive merchant ship construction, full utilization of fisheries vessels, combination of the former separated Black Sea, Baltic and Northern fleets into a single high seas fleet, establishment of a powerful task force in the Mediterranean, and—most significantly—the crash drive for a missile-firing nuclear submarine force.

Not only has the Soviet Union pushed ahead with missile submarines, but it has developed nuclear attack submarines for anti-submarine warfare purposes. Typical of these new boats is the "N" class sub—LENINSKY KOMSOMOL 270. This is a fast (30 knot) nuclear-powered fleet submarine designed as a hunter-killer. It is armed with 21-inch torpedoes which are launched through six bow tubes. Such craft undoubtedly would be employed against American missile-firing submarines, if the latter could be detected.⁷⁰

70. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967*, p. 433.

Dealing with the danger of Soviet submarines has long been a high-priority concern of the United States. To this end, the U. S. in the 1950's stepped up its oceanographic research and refined the techniques of searching for submarines by helicopter-lifted sonar and by airborne sensors. In both the 1950's and 1960's, the U. S. Navy also emphasized development of stand-off weapons as well as detection devices. The ASROC anti-submarine rocket is now in general use, and gives surface ships a nuclear punch—if the enemy submarine can be located. However, its effectiveness today lies in the fact that it uses a non-nuclear MARK 46 torpedo, which has been shown to be effective against submarine targets. Other advanced detection devices and weapons include the SQS-26 Sonar and a Variable Depth Sonar, plus new torpedoes and drone helicopters. Destroyers are specifically configured for ASW, and the Navy continues to build special anti-submarine escort ships.

The devices available for detection of conventional diesel boats include sonobuoys dropped from carrier-based aircraft and magnetic anomaly detectors. But ASW commanders generally admit that these devices are, at present, grossly inadequate against fast, deep-diving, nuclear-powered submarines.


In rough weather, the "nukes" are well able to run away from surface attackers. Airborne detection systems now in operation cannot pinpoint a nuclear submarine. It is now agreed, therefore, that the most effective means of dealing with Soviet nuclear submarines is another submarine, though the U. S. has a valuable aid in fixed long-range submarine detection systems in the Atlantic.

At present, however, the Navy's force of attack submarines—submarines designed to fight other submarines—is a mixed diesel nuclear force of only 105 boats. Seventy of these boats are of basic World War II design, with improvements. They provide excellent submerged listening platforms, but cannot deal with nuclear subs on a competitive basis. By fiscal 1969 there will be 64 effective SSNs authorized. Even more significant, however, is the fact that the projected 64 SSN force would be thin indeed in view of the multitude of Soviet missile-carrying surface ships and the large and growing Soviet merchant fleet ships all of which would constitute targets in the event of war. And these would necessarily be targets for a submarine force operating in Soviet-controlled waters where our submarines would be able to operate only in a war situation.

This force is meager, especially in view of the need to divide the force between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The SKIPJACK class boats are the fastest in the world, with an estimated top speed of close to 40 knots; but these and other attack boats are few in number.

The limited size of the presently programmed attack submarine force is all the more disturbing in that changes in surveillance of the oceans almost certainly will produce the need for boats which can operate at vastly greater depths. New passive sensors which can observe radiation in all portions of the electromagnetic spectrum may, in the future, enable reconnaissance satellites to "see" submarines operating at current depths. The deep submergence of submarine forces is desirable because of the problems it raises in the enemy's ASW effort. With the need for true deep-diving submarine forces will come a parallel need for missile weapons capable of being fired from the depths. The U. S. Navy has pioneered SUBROC, a nuclear rocket for use against sub-surface targets. But naval commanders would like to see SUBROC equipped with an airburst-nuclear warhead.

STRATEGIC BOMBER BALANCE



Note: Bomb load of each type is noted in tons of conventional bombs normally carried by that type of bomber. The total tonnage is that which all strategic bombers in the national inventory could carry at one time. Converted to nuclear yield, the figure would be higher by a factor of 1,000,000 or more. The Soviet conversion factor—that is, their nuclear explosive yield/weight ratio—is higher than that of the U.S.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

U.S.A.		U.S.S.R.			
Payload (lbs.)	Aggregate Payload (lbs.)	Payload (lbs.)	Aggregate Payload (lbs.)		
600—B-52's	75,000	45,000,000	110 BISON	20,000	2,200,000
80—B-58's	12,000	960,000	100 BEAR	40,000	4,000,000
			900 BADGER	20,000	18,000,000
			? BLINDER*	12,000	
680	Totals	45,960,000	1,110	Totals	24,200,000

SOURCES

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 89th Congress, 2d Session, 1966, Part 1, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 55.

Aviation Week and Space Technology. Forecast and Inventory Issue, March 6, 1967.

The Military Balance—1966-1967. London, Institute for Strategic Studies 1966, pp. 2-5, 25.

Secretary McNamara's "Position Statement" released by the Department of Defense January 26, 1967, credits U.S.S.R. with only 155 "intercontinental bombers."

* The 900 figure for BADGERs includes some BLINDERs which are considered replacements for the BADGERs.

E. STRATEGIC BOMBERS

The Soviet Bomber Force

The Soviet Union has the numerically largest strategic bomber force in the world today. This is because the U.S.S.R. has retained its air-refuelable medium bombers (900 BADGERs and BLINDERs) while the United States has scrapped a large force of over 1,000 B-47's. Thus the Soviets now have 1,110 strategic bombers versus 680 United States strategic bombers.

This change in the balance of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic bomber forces represents a reversal of the United States' former numerical preponderance in manned bombers, and poses a threat to the United States which is largely overlooked because the spotlight has been focused on the ICBM threat.⁷¹

The Soviet strategic bomber forces are composed of the following types and numbers of aircraft:⁷²

About nine hundred Soviet Air Force BADGERs (TU-16). Operational since 1955, the BADGER is a twin-turbojet subsonic medium bomber similar to the former U.S. B-47 and equipped for in-flight refueling. The BADGER has a bomb load capacity of 20,000 pounds and some versions carry the KIPPER standoff nuclear missile, with a range of 450 miles. The BADGERs are expected to be replaced by the BLINDER (TU-22) which has supersonic capability and a bomb load capacity of 12,000 pounds. The BLINDER was operational in 1962 and carries a KITCHEN air-to-surface missile. A few BLINDERs are included in the above estimate of the BADGER force.

One hundred and ten BISONS (M-4's). Operational since 1956, this four-engine turbojet bomber is comparable to our long-range B-52. It has a bomb load capacity of 20,000 pounds.

One hundred BEARS (TU-95). This is a huge four-engine turboprop bomber with a range of 7,800 miles. Its commercial version, the TU-114, is the largest aircraft in the world. A BEAR-type aircraft flies

71. Major Arthur J. Ruppert, USAF, "The Soviet Long-Range Bomber Force," a thesis submitted to the Air Command and Staff College, June 1965, *Space/Aeronautics*, November 1966, p. 63.

72. *The Military Balance* Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966, pp. 3, 44.

a weekly nonstop flight from Moscow to Havana transporting passengers and freight. First operational in 1956, the BEAR has a bomb load capacity of over 40,000 pounds and carries a KANGAROO standoff missile.

Despite pronouncements of Soviet officials that the bomber is obsolete, it appears that bombers still play a major role in Soviet strategic planning. Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolovsky has written that the long-range bomber force would "deliver blows" after a first strike by Soviet ICBMs. Air-to-surface missiles would be used first in the attack, launched from a point beyond the range of anti-aircraft fire.

The U. S. Bomber Force

The United States has phased out all of its medium B-47 bombers and retains an aging force of 600 B-52's and 80 B-58's.⁷³ Air Force planners had expected to replace obsolete strategic bombers with more modern counterparts such as the supersonic B-58's and the XB-70, but these plans were discarded as the result of unfavorable OSD cost-effectiveness studies. The requirements for an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) continues to be advanced by the United States Air Force to provide strategic flexibility and optimum options for deterrence or retaliation.⁷⁴

Current Department of Defense philosophy considers the manned strategic bomber to be "provocative" for two main reasons: First, it is thought vulnerable to surprise missile attack when sitting on an air-base. In order to use it at all, it must be launched before the enemy missile strikes. Thus, it hints of a "first strike" strategy. Second it is believed that the bomber is subject to less positive control than are missiles and may attack without authority through accident or madness of its crew.

These two philosophical objections to bombers by modern defense strategists have probably affected the objectivity of cost-effectiveness studies. Few military planners accept the "provocative" argument and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have always approved of a follow-on bomber, the AMSA. Some point out that strip and air alerts will reduce vulnerability probably to the degree available for hardened sites or POLARIS missiles, and that the "accident" or "madness" arguments, if

73. Hearings on S.666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, pp. 835, 836.

74. House Appropriations Committee Hearings on the Department of Defense, 1967; Part I, pp. 518, 525-528.

valid at all, apply equally well to individuals in silo command posts or on POLARIS submarines.

Other arguments used against the AMSA are:

1. Their relatively long time of flight as compared to the ICBM.

Rebuttal: This is being cut down with advances in hypersonic flight and could be made comparable to ICBMs with SKYBOLT-type, stand-off missiles. With a long-range standoff missile, the AMSA would become as invulnerable an IRBM launcher as the POLARIS submarines.

2. Vulnerability to SAM missile defenses.

Rebuttal: Experience over North Vietnam has indicated that SAM missiles have been highly over-rated in past cost-effectiveness studies. Against low-flying aircraft using evasive tactics and others countermeasures, SAM-2 missiles have had less than a 6 percent effectiveness. SAM-3 missiles now guarding Russia, but not yet in North Vietnam, may be more effective. New countermeasures carried on an AMSA could reduce SAM accuracy still more.

Arguments for the AMSA include:

1. The AMSA's broader operational flexibility will provide a spectrum of strategic options. It can attack on an infinite number of unpredictable flight patterns, high and low, thus making enemy air defense extremely costly. It would outflank any Soviet anti-ballistic missile system and penetrate where missiles might be stopped.

2. Over friendly territory, aircraft are the least vulnerable of any strategic vehicle and can only be attacked by long-range interceptors which do not now appear in the Soviet inventory.

3. AMSA would provide a reaction to crisis, *short of an actual nuclear attack*. AMSA can be launched on alert and recalled; ICBMs must proceed to the target once they have been launched or be destroyed in flight. AMSA thus provides a strong psychological *tour de force* in crisis management.

4. AMSA can deliver nuclear weapons with greater discrimination and more last minute corrections than can ICBMs thus reducing the probability of unnecessary population destruction and permitting tighter, more effective crisis management.

5. AMSA can carry exotic sensors and collect invaluable reconnaissance information for relaying to command posts. The best of these sensors is the human eye backed by human intelligence and utilizing electronic and optical aids. Human faculties are not found in ICBMs or reconnaissance satellites.

6. Rapid intelligence feedback is possible with an AMSA. In a fast-moving nuclear war neither side will know who is winning without AMSA. The manned strategic vehicle is protected at all times by the infinite capabilities of human judgment which can perceive and react instantly to unprogrammed enemy deceptions or other unforeseeable events where a spot decision may mean the success of the mission. The acknowledged value of a man-in-space program for overcoming mechanical malfunctions is illustrative of the validity of maintaining human control over strategic weapon systems.

With the continued thinning-out of continental radar systems and air defense aircraft, the United States is being exposed to attack by Russian airbreather weapon systems as a follow-on to a first-strike missile attack. The only Improved Manned Interceptors (IMI) under development, but *not* scheduled for procurement, are F-12's built around a larger SR-71 airframe.⁷⁵ Present flying and radar equipment is becoming obsolete and is wearing out.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is modernizing its strategic bomber force with supersonic, medium-range BLINDERS and continues to deploy an extensive air defense system. The possibility of replacing B-52's with the 210 FB-111's, as proposed by Secretary McNamara (a modification of the TFX variable-wing fighter built by General Dynamics) in the 1970's, will be a stop-gap measure because of the inability of such a small bomber to carry adequate sensing devices, navigation equipment and penetration aids—not to mention its light bomb load and relatively short range without refueling. In any event, the Soviets would still retain their numerical superiority after the full deployment of the FB-111.

Secretary McNamara neglects to consider Soviet medium bombers in the number of 155 Soviet intercontinental bombers listed in his Posture Statement of January 23, 1967. Yet, 900 BADGERs are assigned to the Soviet strategic air command and with in-flight refueling, they have an intercontinental range. It is reasonable that they be considered in this strategic category as were the United States' B-47's before their phase-out.


It might be noted that perhaps all the BADGERs do not carry bombs and that some would be used for in-flight refueling. This would reduce the overall bomb payload capability of the total force. But it still leaves the BADGER as a formidable force to be reckoned with

and one that certainly should not be arbitrarily removed from the strategic balance.

The explosive power carried by the respective bomber forces is a more accurate measure of their respective strengths. On the basis of bomb loadings measured by weight of bombs carried, the United States has nearly a 2-to-1 advantage with 22,980 tons for the U. S. and 12,100 tons for the U.S.S.R. However, the Soviet advantage in yield/weight ratio for nuclear bombs (see ICBM section) would give them parity in delivery capacity as measured in megatonnage.

75. *Washington Post*, January 20, 1967.

SPACE WEAPON BALANCE



Note: Soviet leaders have publicly noted that the U.N. Resolution against space weapons does not deny the development of such weapons and the Soviets have frequently boasted of their capability to employ orbital nuclear weapons, the Scrag, specifically. Nonetheless, the U.S. has not developed a military capability in space though the Gemini series clearly shows it could do so.

SPACE WEAPONS

U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
NONE	SCRAG Shown in Moscow 1965 Capable of delivering a 30 MT warhead from fractional orbital or orbital trajectory.

Sources:

The Military Balance 1966-1967, ISS, 1966, p. 2.
Military Review, November 1966, p. 106.

F. SPACE WEAPONS*

The United States Program

The United States has conscientiously avoided the development of space weapons and has been the leader in resolutions and agreements to ban weapons of mass destruction in space. It is generally held that ICBMs which enter space on a ballistic curve are not space weapons, but rather that orbital weapons alone apply to the space category. The Soviet Union's designation of "global" rockets which follow Keplerian elliptical trajectories the long way around the earth, (but short of a full orbit) have not been designated as space weapons, yet would logically appear to be so.

When the successful rendezvous of GEMINI 6 and 7 demonstrated, in small part, the great military potential of space, the Department of Defense officially ruled out any idea of a strategic weapons system involving satellites with nuclear warheads.

"There are two reasons for this, the Pentagon stated: U. S. defense experts insist that better accuracy, reliability, and warhead load can be obtained with long-range ballistic missiles; and there is agreement between the major nuclear powers not to use satellites as weapons."⁷⁶

The American space effort is one of civilian exploration in the interest of science under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The United States, to date, has spent some \$30-billion on its space effort. Of this total, some \$9-billion has gone into military space programs. This does not include any space weapons systems or even their development. NASA's ultimate goal is to land men on the moon rather than to exploit the region near earth for military purposes. The DOD's position is that there is "no requirement" to put military men in space.⁷⁷ In fact, the United States halted its promising DYNASOAR development in December 1963. The military Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) will not be launched before 1968. American military satellites are for reconnaissance, for missile-launch warning, for communications, for precise navigation, and for weather reconnaissance. Thus, as far as United States satellites are concerned, they are all defensive; none are offensive.

* See also the Space part of the Strategic Objectives section of this study.

76. Associated Press dispatch dated Washington, December 17, 1965.

77. *U. S. News and World Report*, June 21, 1965, p. 42.

The Soviet Program

In the Soviet Union, space programs are run entirely by military men with military goals foremost in mind. Several official Soviet sources claimed explicitly in connection with the display of a 3-stage missile in the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965, that they now possessed a "monstrous new terrible weapon." Both TASS and *Izvestiya*⁷⁸ described it substantially as an "orbital missile [whose] warheads can deliver their surprise blow on the first or any other orbit around the earth." This weapon has since been code-named SCRAG. Stress was laid on the capability of the new weapon "delivering its blow unexpectedly."⁷⁹ The May 1965 issue of *Ogonock*⁸⁰ contained an article describing the perfection of an orbital missile capable of carrying a 100-megaton warhead. Unclassified sources give the orbital version of SCRAG a 30-megaton warhead.⁸¹ The Chief of the Soviet Air Force, Konstantin Vershinin, said in 1964, that the Soviet Union is developing space craft that could take-off and land at any airfield and "could knock out any foe."⁸² This sounds much like the cancelled U. S. DYNA-SOAR, and if true, points the Soviet Union far ahead in the military man-in-space program.

Effectiveness of Orbital Bombs

What are the advantages and disadvantages of orbital nuclear weapons compared with ICBMs or other delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads? First, delivery time for weapons in orbit, assuming the weapon is over the intended target area, is much less. Consequently, under certain controlled conditions, the reaction time available to the defending power may be cut significantly from about 15 minutes for an ICBM to from four-to-six minutes for an orbital missile.

The ground-based ICBM, on the other hand, is considered to have three advantages over orbital bombs: (1) numbers available for firing, (2) accuracy, (3) positive control. A large number of orbiting space-craft might bring on a war that home-based ICBMs would not. Many officials also point out that the orbiting weapon is at a disadvantage because it must be near the target area to be a faster-firing weapon

78. *Izvestiya*, November 8, 1965, p. 2.

79. United Press International dispatches, dateline Moscow, November 8, 1965 and November 11, 1965.

80. *Ogonock*, No. 20, May 1965, pp. 6-7.

81. *The Military Balance 1966-1967*, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 44.

82. *The New York Times*, August 18, 1964, p. 17.

than the ICBM. A normal orbit takes about 90 minutes. So an orbital weapon might be half way around the world or 45 minutes plus de-orbiting time from its target when ordered to fire. An ICBM, on the other hand, although it may take longer to travel (32 minutes to strike a target 10,000 Km. away) is always the same distance away and hence more predictable.

Those who counsel against development of an orbital bomb by the United States also say it is less accurate than ICBMs. This is illustrated by the de-orbiting of astronauts in their re-entry capsules. It should be pointed out that the accuracy of de-orbiting American astronauts has been increasing in each of the GEMINI flights and can be expected to continue to improve. Little has been stated publicly about the accuracy of de-orbiting Soviet launches, but it is generally conceded that the Soviet Union has a sophistication comparable to that of the United States.

Orbital nuclear weapons systems can be used in other ways. A nuclear bomb of high enough yield, detonated in space while still in orbit over a target area, could be a devastating prelude to an ICBM attack. A possible effect of such a very high-yield weapon exploded in space would be the searing of a large area of the earth beneath. American scientists have stated that the Soviet Union is, in fact, capable of producing 100-megaton weapons, as she claims. There can be little doubt that its boosters have the capacity to orbit a bomb of this size or even larger. The Soviet BIG BROTHER booster demonstrated its ability in 1965 to put a 13.5 ton payload in orbit.⁸³

The heaviest object orbited by the United States was a 21,000 pound satellite launched by a TITAN III-C rocket. The non-military SATURN V, due to become operational in 1967, will have a thrust of 7.5-million pounds—over three times as powerful as the TITAN III-C.

An orbital high-yield detonation would certainly impair communications to some degree and possibly damage the United States' offensive missile system over a wide area. It has been publicly acknowledged that the space tests by the United States from Johnston Island in 1957 and 1958 blacked out most communications in the Pacific for an hour or more.⁸⁴

Thus, if the Soviet Union chose to use orbital nuclear weapons in conjunction with a first strike with ICBMs, the orbital weapons could

83. *U. S. News and World Report*, August 30, 1965, p. 25.

84. William E. Howard and James Barr, *Spacecraft and Missiles of the World—1966*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966), p. 41.

well cripple the United States "second-strike" capacity by disrupting communications necessary to retaliate, or by other phenomena such as heat, blast and various electromagnetic effects.

If the Soviet Union is developing the option of orbital nuclear attack, it is unlikely that launching of orbital weapons would be announced as such. Orbital rockets could be launched under various covers, as scientific satellites, space explorations, or manned satellites if the planned attack were imminent.

If the United States were to discover that the Soviet Union had been indeed launching nuclear weapons into space orbit, there would be two experimental weapons designed to knock them out: a THOR modification and a NIKE-ZEUS based on Johnston Island and Kwajalein in the Pacific. Yet, there are some possible orbits from Soviet Union launch sites which would be out of range for these two weapons. In 1964, it was reported that the Soviet Union launched two satellites in orbits which would take each over Johnston Island and Kwajalein. This occurred shortly after the Presidential announcement of the United States' anti-space weapons.⁸⁵

A prerequisite to attacking a Soviet satellite in space, of course, would be verification that it was actually carrying a nuclear weapon. Shooting down a peaceful manned or scientific satellite would probably be considered a provocative act of war unless it occurred over friendly territory. If, however, it were widely believed that a nuclear payload was truly in orbit, the country which destroyed it would be applauded by all the other countries over which the orbital bomb had traveled.

That the Soviet Union would dare to risk the deployment of orbital bombs is at least credible in view of experience during the Cuban missile crisis. Surprise would be complete since the United States has no way of determining if an orbital vehicle is bearing a nuclear weapon. Surprise is also possible with the so-called global Soviet rockets which could attack from over the South Polar regions and completely out-flank America's continental Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).

The Soviet Union could hint that certain orbiting craft were capable of immobilizing our ICBM system. Combined with a means of countering the American POLARIS missile force, this might be the ultimate nuclear blackmail.

In the United States we argue variously that space offensive nuclear delivery forces are less efficient, less accurate, and less credible,


than ICBMs. But if the Soviet Union is dedicated to offensive world objectives, the special effects of space-military offensive forces may appear very useful. Such effects are, for example, prestige, terror, pursuasion, coercion, pressure, psychological warfare, and demoralization. The sight and electronic signals coming from Soviet military-orbital forces in the free skies of the world day and night, with communist satellite TV and propaganda tuned into Western sets around the world, would not be attractive to contemplate in view of the Soviet goals of world-wide communist domination.

Speaking at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics at San Francisco on July 29, 1965, Dr. Albert C. Hall, Deputy Director for Space, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering of the OSD, said, "We could no more go unprotected against the masters of space than we could dare go unarmed on land, sea or in the air."

Nevertheless, we are doing just that—going unprotected. The exceptional accomplishments of the GEMINI program and those expected of the APOLLO will not assure much military protection.

85. *Washington Journal* (German Language Weekly), October 23, 1964, p. 1.

SOVIET AND U. S. REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL



ANNEX

Chronology of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Materials Cutbacks

December 1962 President Kennedy on the "overkill" thesis in the course of a radio-TV program, "There is just a limit to how much we need, as well as how much we can afford, to have a successful deterrent . . . I would say when we start to talk about the megatonnage we could bring into a nuclear war, we are talking about annihilation. How many times do you have to hit a target with nuclear weapons?" (*The New York Times*, January 5, 1962, p. 14.)

November 1963 Oak Ridge Laboratory graphite reactor to be shut down in November after 20 years' operation. Dr. Linus Pauling puts U. S. nuclear arsenal at 240,000 megatons, U.S.S.R.'s at 80,000; says U. S. has 12 times stockpile needed to wipe out U.S.S.R. (*The New York Times*, September 29, 1963, p. 51.)

January 1964 President Johnson, ordering cutbacks in manufacture of fissionable materials and manufacture of arms, urges U.S.S.R. do likewise as step toward "eventual abolition of arms," State of Union Message; suggests move is possible because building of arsenal is at point where it is becoming excessive; administration officials note arsenal has increased 50 percent in last 3 years, now includes tens of thousands of weapons; AEC sees cutback saving \$50-million in fiscal '65, \$70-million in next year. (*The New York Times*, January 9, 1964, p. 1.)

January 1964 Two uranium-processing plants to close; operations at two others cut. (*The New York Times*, January 12, 1964, p. 33.)

February 1964 U.S.S.R. Marshal Krylov holds U. S. stockpile exceeds needs. (*The New York Times*, February 23, 1964, p. 21.)

June 1964 AEC stresses stockpile increases but at reduced rate, comment of President Johnson statement on cut. (*The New York Times*, August 21, 1964, p. 1.)

December 1964 Seaborg reports AEC will cut outlays for production of fissionable material, news conference after conference with President Johnson. (*The New York Times*, December 31, 1964, p. 1.)

January 1965 As part of the U. S. plan for curbing the spread of atomic weapons, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in February 1964, that the U. S. was "prepared to permit international inspection" of one of the four plutonium production reactors scheduled to be shut down by the U. S. Since then, two of the reactors have been shut down, one at Savannah River, S. C., summer of 1964, and one at Hanford, Wash., on January 2, 1965. The two remaining at Hanford were scheduled to be shut down in May and June of 1965, leaving the AEC with 10 reactors producing plutonium for atomic weapons. (*The New York Times*, January 11, 1965, p. 13.)

February 1965 Excerpt from *AEC Authorizing Legislation*—1966, p. 1919. (Summary of operating programs Fiscal Year 1966) "... Production of special nuclear materials will decline somewhat in 1966 as a result of reduced cascade power and the first full year of operations after the shutdown of four production reactors during 1964 and 1965. Work will continue on process improvements to assure continuity and safety of operation and more economical methods of production Weapons program.—Operating costs for the weapons program are estimated at \$705.4-million in 1966 compared with 1965 estimated costs of \$753.3-million and 1964 actual costs of \$754.9-million. The weapons program encompasses the production of atomic weapons; the maintenance of stockpiled weapons in a state of constant readiness; the design, development, and underground testing of new weapons types; preparation for and maintenance of a readiness capability to resume atmospheric testing; and participating with the Department of Defense in the development of test detection methods."

April 1965 President Johnson's comments on AEC program, April 17, 1965, letter to Chairman Seaborg, "The orderly cut-back in the production of fissionable materials is a significant example of this realism . . ." (*AEC Authorizing Legislation*—1966, p. 1886.)

November 1965 AEC reports "no evidence" U.S.S.R. has carried out nuclear materials cutbacks announced April 20, 1964. This question has been raised by Senator Jackson. (*The New York Times*, November 25, 1965, p. 15.)

January 1966 President Johnson's Budget Message puts AEC appropriations and estimated expenditures below Fiscal 1966 level; expenditures down \$90-million. (*The New York Times*, January 25, 1966, pp. 18, 22.)

January 1967 The Administration, in a budget-motivated gesture toward slowing the atomic arms race, announced today (January 24, 1967) a further cut-back in the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. On July 1, 1967, AEC will shut down the plutonium production reactor at Hanford, Washington. This will be the fifth reactor closed since 1964. Senator Henry M. Jackson expressed concern over the decision "particularly in light of the substantial requirements that could develop if a decision is made to produce and deploy an anti missile system." Senator Jackson observed that the Soviet Union has been "expanding its output" of fissionable materials. (*The New York Times*, January 25, 1967, p. 9.)

100-425828-109

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 8/11/67

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages H10371-H10378. Congressman Rarick, (D) Louisiana, advised that the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council has recently released their report 'The Changing Strategic Military Balance' which should be read and analyzed by every citizen of our country." He inserted portions of the report in the Record. The report quoted from an address by Mr. Hoover before the Brotherhood of the Washington Hebrew Congregation, December 4, 1963.

American Security Council

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1/MAC/SC

Original filed in:
66-1231-1350

REC-10

100-425828-110

NOT RECORDED

141 NOV 30 1967

EX-108

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 8/11/67 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

57 DECK 1967

DO-6 ~~SECRET~~ OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. DELOACH _____
MR. MOHR _____
MR. BISHOP
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. FELT _____
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/12/88 BY SP27m

DATE 11/21/88 BY SP/ML/CHC

REC 8 100-425828-111

REC 8 100-425828-111

13 NOV 30 1967

~~53 DEC 6 1967~~



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY *Sp1mac/HC*

Washington, November 20, 1967

WR 67-46

THE GROWING THREAT OF SOVIET SEA POWER

"They've never before felt the need for carriers as contrasted to the United States or Britain because they didn't have many overseas commitments. Apparently their thinking is changing... The Russians have really gone to sea."

Vice Admiral William E. Ellis
Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic
October 21, 1967

With the above words Admiral Ellis dropped a considerable naval bombshell on the Western world. The Soviet Union, he revealed, has at long last begun to construct aircraft carriers. By this move Russia is finally taking the last step toward providing herself with a fully balanced navy which already poses a formidable challenge to U.S. supremacy at sea. In combination with a tremendously expanding merchant marine, the Soviet fleet has indeed taken to the oceans of the world. Both strategically and tactically Soviet maritime power has become a most important factor in the world's politico-military arena. No longer can the navy be regarded as the weak sister of the Soviet military machine. For a United States vitally dependent upon control of the sea, the remarkable growth of Soviet sea power has become a matter of the gravest concern.

The Development of the Soviet Navy since World War II

During the war against Hitler Soviet naval forces played only an auxiliary role and their performance was generally undistinguished except for some daring submarine forays through the German blockade of the Gulf of Finland. As a result, the Soviet Navy tended to be downgraded by Western military strategists as of little importance. As early as 1939, however, it had been made plain that Stalin had major ambitions for his Sea forces. In that year Molotov announced that the Soviet Union must have a first class navy second to none. Besides cruisers, destroyers and submarines, two 46,000 ton battleships and three 30,000 ton battlecruisers were laid down before the outbreak of war. By the time of the German invasion the Soviets were embarked on a major naval expansion program far beyond the needs of a mere supporting role for the Soviet Army.

The new alignment of world power that emerged after World War II caused the Soviets to realize more than ever that naval power would be vital to complete the Soviet program of world conquest. There was no doubt now who their future enemies would be—the United States and Britain—both great naval powers. It was clear to them that the battleship as such had lost its usefulness; no further effort was made to complete the battleship and battlecruiser hulls, which had been largely destroyed by the Germans anyway. The idea of large ships, however, particularly cruisers, was still prominent in Soviet thinking. The new Navy chief, Admiral Kuznetsov, was a proponent of a balanced, high seas fleet able to challenge the West for maritime superiority.

100-425828-111
ENCLOSURE

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

Kuznetsov urged upon Stalin a continuation of the pre-war policy, minus the battleships. The new Soviet Navy would comprise a huge fleet of submarines, capable of severing the sea lanes between Eurasia and America, large numbers of destroyers and smaller craft to preserve Soviet hegemony over the Baltic and Black Seas, and a fleet of cruisers, "heavy cruisers" and, eventually, aircraft carriers, for high seas operations. Still unwilling to admit that the atom bomb had changed the nature of war, Stalin approved the program.

The Sverdlov class of 20,000 ton "light cruisers" (because they mounted only 6" guns) was begun in 1948-49, along with the Skory class destroyers and the first of the post-war design, long range submarines. By the time of Stalin's death in 1953 a total of 18-20 Sverdlovs had been completed or laid down. And there is evidence that two out of a programmed 4-6 "heavy cruisers" designated Stalingrad class had also been started. These were to have been 44,000 ton ships. The final step in the program, aircraft carriers, had not yet commenced due to the lack of technical expertise in their construction.

After Stalin's death in 1953 a reevaluation took place in Soviet military thinking in keeping with the advances in missile and nuclear technology. This had a particular effect on the navy.

The most basic decision, which was made by 1953 at the latest, was to abandon plans for aircraft carriers. The Soviets apparently calculated that it would take them another ten years before they could construct and develop carrier power to the point where it would do them any good. By this time, they felt rapidly developing technology would make carriers obsolete.

The decision concerning the carriers made further construction of the Sverdlovs and Stalingrads pointless. These ships were originally programmed on the assumption that they would have carrier support. Without such support their primary mission of high seas operations would be suicidal, and even as surface raiders they could have only a limited usefulness. They could still be used in a defensive role, but this function no longer justified the heavy expenditures being made on them.

Consequently, it was decided, about 1954, not to proceed any further with the construction of the Stalingrad heavy cruisers and to put the Sverdlov cruiser hulls which were then on the ways in "conservation," after launching, pending a decision on what to do with them. The ultimate size of the submarine fleet, once planned at over 1,000, was probably scaled down at this time in favor of the development of more advanced types which changing circumstances were making necessary.

The Soviet decision to cease construction of large surface ships in no way reflected any lessened emphasis on the navy as a whole. Rather, with Stalin out of the way, naval strategists were more free to follow the lead of Western navies in developing the types of ships dictated by the nuclear age. It was decided to concentrate in the future on a surface fleet of small, missile armed ships and a submarine arm smaller than originally planned, but packing much more striking power due to the addition of missiles and nuclear power.

There is little doubt where Khrushchev stood on the question of the navy. In March, 1956, he remarked to the British ambassador that it had been decided to rearm the navy with "quite different and more modern weapons." He said further, "I am not interested in ordinary submarines with torpedoes etc. We are now interested in submarines with guided missiles and atomic heads." In a *Pravda* interview on 8 September 1957 Air Marshall Vershinin asserted that "The submarine fleets have now become a formidable weapon. They can bombard coastal cities . . . and other objectives with rocket weapons with hydrogen warheads. Now submarines, which formerly were confined to destroying warships and other surface ships will play a more important role." And in 1959 Khrushchev remarked to Vice President Nixon that cruisers and aircraft carriers were "sitting ducks" and the U.S.S.R. had stopped building them. Meanwhile Admiral

Kuznetsov, who apparently opposed the quantitative reduction in the navy, was fired in 1955 and replaced by Admiral Gorshkov, who remains Navy CINC to this day.

It was one thing to create a radically new navy and quite another to get these new ships into commission. The old naval building program ground to a virtual halt before the new one could be fully put into production. The last Sverdlov hull was launched in late 1955, and perhaps five or more were ultimately scrapped. Submarine production built up to a peak of 86 in 1956 and then fell off sharply in 1957. Destroyer and escort construction terminated in the same year. This 1955-58 period, now known as the "transition phase" in Soviet naval construction, was followed, however, by the emergence of the modern Soviet Navy that faces us today.

Late in 1958, the first positive confirmation that missiles had been introduced into the Soviet Navy was achieved. Three "Z" class submarines were observed to have been converted, to launch ballistic missiles, and the first conversion of a destroyer into a surface-to-surface missile ship was also spotted. Since these early conversions a whole new navy of missile ships has been built from the keel up. In the surface fleet these include large guided missile destroyers of the Kashin and Kynda classes (called "cruisers" by the Soviets) patrol boats of the Komar and Osa classes (one of which fired the missiles that sank the Israeli destroyer Elath) and the reequipment of some of the Sverdlov cruisers with surface-to-surface missiles. These ships give the Soviet surface fleet tremendous conventional firepower plus a nuclear punch if they elect to substitute nuclear warheads for conventional explosives.

The Soviet submarine fleet has decreased somewhat in total numbers to less than 400 from a peak of over 500, but at least 300 of these are capable of long range cruising and 40-50 are now nuclear powered. Of these the 5,600 ton E class carries six launching tubes, and a new class, with eight missile launching tubes is expected shortly.

The Soviets may now have as many as 60 ballistic missile firing submarines, plus 50 others which carry cruise type missiles for use against shipping. In addition, a class of nuclear submarines—the N class—is designed for anti-submarine work. This adds up to a formidable force in any man's navy.

While all this has been going on the Soviet merchant marine has increased from 3.6 million deadweight tons in 1949 to 9 million today, with a fleet of 20 million tons planned by 1980. This will make it the world's largest.

Carriers mark shift in Soviet Policy

During the late fifties and early sixties Soviet strategists continually disparaged aircraft carriers, asserting that they were too vulnerable to missile attack. Soviet naval exercises in the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic seemed in fact to be directed chiefly against the NATO carrier strike fleets. Soviet guided missile destroyers and Badger bombers with air-to-surface missiles were evidently the weapons with which the Soviets planned to attack these carrier forces.

It is too early to say whether the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 had anything to do with the Soviet decision to begin carrier construction; but in any case the Soviets have reversed themselves and have decided that these ships now have a role to play in their politico-military policy.

The carriers now under construction are not large and do not appear capable of carrying jet aircraft. Rather, they carry helicopters which could be used to carry troops or for anti-submarine work. Most likely the Russians have built them with this dual role in mind. It is highly significant also that the naval shipyards are producing quantities of large ocean going amphibious landing ships. This is another wholly new naval development which indicates a clear Soviet intention to project their military influence more directly into some of the world's trouble spots which have hitherto been immune to such intervention. Southern Africa and the

Indian Ocean area are two possible targets. This has already occurred on one occasion in the highly sensitive Eastern Mediterranean: at the time of the Israeli advance into Syria last June, Russia warned Israel against going any further, and backed up the threat with the presence of at least one troop-laden landing ship in her Mediterranean flotilla.

Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, who is both NATO commander in the Atlantic and the head of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, has speculated that the current class of helicopter carriers may be followed by large attack carriers similar to those in the United States Navy. Certainly the Soviets have been rueful observers of the usefulness of these ships to the U.S. in the Vietnam war, long after Soviet propagandists had scornfully written them off as "sitting ducks."

For the time being, the most certain conclusion we can draw is that these new ships in the Soviet Fleet are yet another indication that the Cold War with Russia is *not* over. Besides the 800 million Chinese about whom Secretary of State Rusk so eloquently warned us (thus opening the way for the "yellow peril" controversy) there is also the 200 million strong Russian Empire, which is armed with an arsenal vastly more dangerous than anything available to Peking. Secretary McNamara's grudging revelation that the Soviets are developing the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) should come as an even more sobering reminder that we face a continuing and deadly contest with Moscow across the whole spectrum of political and military power. Soviet seapower is an often overlooked but integral and growing part of the Soviet-challenge to America.



FRANK J. JOHNSON
Foreign Editor

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief	John M. Fisher
Associate Editor and Secretary, National Strategy Committee	Anthony Harrigan
International Politics Editor	Dr. James D. Atkinson
Economics Editor	Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Foreign Editor	Frank J. Johnson
National Editor	William Gill
Research Director	William K. Lambie, Jr.
Associate Editor, Radio Producer	John F. Lewis
News Editor	Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Chief, Washington Bureau	Lee R. Pennington
Strategy and Military Affairs Editor	Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Law & Space Editor	Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)

OFFICERS

President	John M. Fisher
Senior Vice President	Kenneth M. Piper
Vice President	Stephen L. Donchess
Vice President	John G. Sevcik
Vice President	Russell E. White
Secretary-Treasurer	Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman Co-Chairmen	Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell, USN (Ret.) Clifford F. Hood
General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.) Loyd Wright	Wayne A. Johnston James S. Kemper, Jr. William H. Kendall General Curtis E. Le May, USAF (Ret.) A. B. McKee, Jr. Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.) Dr. Robert Morris Dr. Stefan T. Possony
General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.) Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)	General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.) Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.) Major General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.) Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.) Dr. Edward Teller Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.) General Albert W. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.) Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
Bennett Archambault Dr. James D. Atkinson Lloyd L. Austin General Mark Clark Charles S. Craigmire Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.) Henry Duque Wade Fetzer, Jr. Patrick J. Frawley, Jr. Fred M. Gillies	Dr. Anthony Kubek Rev. Daniel Lyons, S.J. Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer Dr. T. L. Shen
Karl Baarslag Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren DeWitt S. Copp	Duane Thorin Stanley J. Tracy Michael J. Ward

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Copyright © 1967 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

January 25, 1968

m7
The attached copy of the Washington Report, January 22, 1968, was sent to the Director from the American Security Council, 123 North Wacker Chicago, Illinois 60606.

Reference is made to the FBI on page 3 of the attached report.

MR. TOLSON ✓
MR. DELOACH ✓
MR. MORR ✓
MR. BYRNE ✓
MR. CASPER ✓
MR. CALLAHAN ✓
MR. CONRAD ✓
MR. FELT ✓
MR. GALE ✓
MR. ROSEN ✓
MR. SULLIVAN ✓
MR. TAYLOR ✓
MR. TROTTER ✓
MR. JONES ✓
TELE. ROOM ✓
MISS HOLMES ✓
MRS. METCALF ✓
MISS GANDY ✓

pp

nm



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

123 North Wacker, Chicago, Illinois 60606

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REC 55 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/00 BY SP/ma/ffc

100-425828-2712
2-2

9 JAN 30 1968

ENCLOSURE

F64

39FEB1 21968

felt

CORRESPONDENCE



WASHINGTON REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/88 BY SP7mac/Hc

Washington, January 22, 1968

WR 68-3

THE TRUE MEANING OF THE OTEPKA CASE

The long-awaited report on the Otepka Case has at last been issued by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. In mid-January, after five interminable years of abortive attempts to settle the matter amicably with a defiant Dean Rusk and his obdurate Department of State, the patience of the Subcommittee finally wore out. The report was released in four separate volumes totalling 409 pages documenting what Arthur Krock of the New York *Times* long ago branded as "the deceitful, and worse, State Department procedures in the Otepka case."

Predictably, the Senate report vigorously defended Otto F. Otepka, the former working chief of State's world-wide Office of Security (SY). The report also had high praise for the seven other security officers sent into exile with Otepka during the massive purge which gutted SY in 1963.

Sad to say, however, nowhere in the 409 pages did the Subcommittee once come to grips with the real problem posed by the purge of Otepka and his associates. That problem was quite simply stated by one Subcommittee member, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, nearly a year ago. Asked by this writer what he thought was the main motivation of the State Department in going to such pains to rid itself of Otepka, Senator Dirksen replied:

"Why, it is perfectly obvious what their motivation was. The ultra-Leftists in the Department of State saw Otepka as an obstacle to their plans. They had to remove him — and they did."

What are those plans? Briefly, they comprise all of the disarmament measures, all the treaties and decisions restricting U.S. development of new strategic and space weapons, all the limitations placed upon American forces to bring a quick and successful end to the Vietnam War, all the tenuous bridges being built to the Soviet Bloc—in short, every single step taken since 1961 to create a New World Order of nationless states under the ambiguous suzerainty of an ill-defined global government.

How did Otto Otepka stand in the way of those plans? It is an axiom that plans cannot be implemented without people. From the outset, Otepka made it plain that he would refuse to issue security clearances to people who could not stand the test of Executive Order 10450.

This landmark directive, handed down by Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, required that whenever there was any reasonable doubt as to a Government employee's, or applicant's, loyalty or suitability, that doubt was to be resolved in favor of the national security, rather than the individual.

It was recently disclosed that Otepka outlined his position to Dean Rusk and the incoming Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, in a confidential meeting soon after the 1960 election. At this meeting, the case that Rusk and Kennedy used to test Otepka concerned the possibility of a clearance for Walt W. Rostow, who today holds what Lyndon Johnson calls "the most important job in the White House, aside from the President."

Otepka, having denied Rostow security clearances in 1955 and 1957, made it abundantly clear that he would still not grant him one in 1960. Rostow was then appointed to the White House staff as an assistant on national security to President Kennedy. Towards the end of 1961, with Otepka's authority seriously undermined, Rostow was brought into State as chief of the policy planning committee where he served until returning to the White House in April 1966.

During that fateful year, 1961, Otepka was put on the shelf. He was placed in charge of a special project far removed from the day-to-day business of issuing clearances to incoming presidential appointees. It was during this period that Secretary Rusk personally signed 152 security "waivers" permitting new appointees to take over virtually all key policy positions in the Department, based only on National Agency checks and without prior investigation. To be sure, investigations were conducted *after* the appointments were made. But as everyone in the security field knows, it is virtually impossible to make a questionable official walk the plank once he is on board. It is worthy of note that in the entire eight preceding years of the Eisenhower Administration only *five* security waivers were issued at State.

With the State Department thoroughly repopulated at the policy level, the New Breed moved forcefully to effect what amounted to a revolution in U.S. foreign policy. In November 1961, they took steps to get rid of Otepka entirely. An ersatz "reduction-in-force" demoted Otepka from Deputy Director of SY to Chief of the Evaluations Division, a position he held years before.

The apparent purpose of this move was to force Otepka to quit in disgust. But he decided to hang on. Back on the beat in the critical Evaluations Division, where security clearances originate, Otepka uncovered all manner of malpractices effected during the year he had been gone. Among many others, he discovered that nearly a third of the security "waivers" signed by Dean Rusk had been redacted to make it appear as if full field investigations had been made prior to the employment of the officials in question.

When Otepka exposed these questionable procedures before the Senate Subcommittee, a number of State Department officials attempted a cover-up via a seemingly unending stream of evasions, half-truths and outright lies. One of them, John Francis Reilly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, went so far as to question Otepka's sanity.

It was at this point, in the spring of 1963, that Otepka delivered certain technically classified, but actually innocuous, documents to the Subcommittee in order to prove that he was telling the truth. Even before this he had been placed under close surveillance by his superiors. His telephone was tapped, his office safe cracked, the contents of his "burn bag" trash regularly examined, and he was surrounded by the New Breed's spies.

On June 27, 1963 Otepka was summarily drummed out of the Division of Evaluations by Reilly, who then proceeded to have the FBI investigate Otepka for possible violation of the Espionage Act. (This action was based on Otepka's having delivered information to the United States Senate!) When the FBI could find nothing to substantiate the espionage charge, the State Department ordered Otepka's dismissal and he appealed.

In the meantime, the Senate Subcommittee unearthed evidence that Otepka's phone had been tapped. This, in turn, triggered a running duel with what the Subcommittee Report calls "the lying trio"—John Reilly; his assistant, David I. Belisle, and Elmer Hill, an erstwhile admirer of V. I. Lenin, and beatnik who had been placed in charge of SY's electronic counter-espionage division. Reilly and Hill were permitted to resign in November 1963, although Belisle remains on State's payroll even now. After the 1964 election, it was learned that Reilly had been given a plush job in the Federal Communications Commission, which continues to afford him a privileged sanctuary today.

Otepka, on the other hand, was forced to wait until June 1967 for his departmental hearing on the 1963 dismissal charges. On the very first day of the hearing the Department dropped the ten "criminal" charges relating to "mutilated" classified documents which Otepka says were planted in his burn bag in a deliberate attempt to frame him. All that remained were three charges pertaining to alleged violation of President Truman's 1948 directive, issued on the eve of the Alger Hiss case, forbidding Government employees to divulge information from personnel security files.

In December 1967, Secretary Rusk upheld the remaining charges against Otepka, reprimanding him severely and demoting him still further to a job completely outside the security field. Otepka, already barred from his chosen profession for nearly five years, patiently appealed once more, this time to the Civil Service Commission.

In their forward to the Subcommittee Report, Chairman James O. Eastland and Co-Chairman Thomas J. Dodd state: "The subcommittee, the Senate, the Congress, and the country owe a debt of gratitude—a debt which today remains still unpaid—to Otto Otepka. Neither the committee nor the Senate nor the Congress should be willing to consider the Otepka case closed until Mr. Otepka stands free of all continuing punishments or harassments of any kind."

The American Defense Fund, operated on a voluntary basis by James Stewart of Wood Dale, Illinois, is still seeking donations towards Otepka's legal defense. But as the case drags on year after year, Mr. Stewart finds it increasingly difficult to raise funds.

Thus, Otepka has been forced to go deeply into debt to pay his ever-mounting legal fees. Despite his new demotion, which cut his annual salary more than \$5,000, he recently borrowed money to pay the bulk of his attorney's latest bill of \$8,500. "Big government is using all its power to literally drive me into the poor house," he told this writer.

Meanwhile, the people who saw in Otto Otepka "an obstacle to their plans" continue to formulate the foreign policy of the United States. Tragically, many of their plans have long since been implemented. As Otepka now remarks: "All that has followed since 1961 has been anti-climactic." Nor, one might add, will the trend of recent history be reversed until sane internal security practices are restored in Washington.



WILLIAM J. GILL
National Editor

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief John M. Fisher
 Associate Editor and Secretary, National Strategy Committee Anthony Harrigan
 International Politics Editor Dr. James D. Atkinson
 Economics Editor Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
 Foreign Editor Frank J. Johnson
 National Editor William R. Lambie, Jr.
 Research Director William R. Lambie, Jr.
 Associate Editor, Radio Producer John F. Lewis
 News Editor Edgar Ansel Mowrer
 Chief, Washington Bureau Lee R. Pennington
 Strategy and Military Affairs Editor Dr. Stefan T. Possony
 Law & Space Editor Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)

OFFICERS

President John M. Fisher
 Senior Vice President Kenneth M. Piper
 Vice President Stephen L. Donchess
 Vice President John G. Sevcik
 Vice President Russell E. White
 Secretary-Treasurer Cyril W. Hooper

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. It reports on national and international developments affecting the nation's security for the information of the Council's over 3500 member companies and institutions. Annual subscription rate \$12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman
 Co-Chairmen
 General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.)
 Loyd Wright
 General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.)
 Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond,
 USA (Ret.)
 Bennett ÁArchambault
 Dr. James D. Atkinson
 Lloyd L. Austin
 General Mark Clark
 Charles S. Craigmire
 Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.)
 Henry Duque
 Wade Fetzer, Jr.
 Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.
 Fred M. Gillies
 Karl Baarslag
 Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren
 DeWitt S. Copp

Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell, USN (Ret.)
 Clifford F. Hood
 James S. Kemper, Jr.
 William H. Kendall
 General Curtis E. Le May, USAF (Ret.)
 A. B. McKee, Jr.
 Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
 Dr. Robert Morris
 Dr. Stefan T. Possony
 General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.)
 Brig. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, USAF (Ret.)
 Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
 Major General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
 Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
 Dr. Edward Teller
 Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
 General Albert W. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
 Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Dr. Anthony Kubek
 Rev. Daniel Lyons, S.J.
 Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer
 Dr. T. L. Shen

Duane Thorin
 Stanley J. Tracy
 Michael J. Ward

Copyright © 1968 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
 Washington Bureau: 1101 - 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036



COUNCIL NOTES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP1mac/HC

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC-MILITARY BALANCE

Since its publication last July, the American Security Council's study, "The Changing Strategic Military Balance, U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R." has continued to be the subject of news and feature articles in publications throughout the country. I think that two of the most recent items to have appeared are of particular interest since together they present an accurate summary of the present unfavorable status and trend of our strategic-military balance.

Needless to say, we're pleased with the continuing coverage being given to the study and I wanted to share the two items with you. I'm enclosing copies of them, one from Barron's, the other from the Reader's Digest. I think you'll find them interesting and I hope that they will serve as a reminder that the present trend can be reversed if an informed and enlightened public clearly expresses the belief that it must be.

Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
John M. Fisher
President

EX-113

REC-15

100-425828-13
NOT RECORDED

4 MAR 1 1968

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

2 ENCLOSURE

30 AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL 3 *File 6*
62 MAR 7 1968 125 NORTH WACKER DRIVE • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. TOLSON _____
MR. DELOACH _____
MR. MOHR _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CASPER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. FELT _____
MR. GALE _____
MR. ROSEN _____
MR. SULLIVAN _____
MR. TAVEL _____
MR. TROTTER _____
MR. JONES _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MISS HOLMES _____
MRS. METCALF _____
MISS GANDY _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/88 BY SP7mac/tbc

SJ: file sub

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/12/87 BY SP/ma/cb

100-425828-113
ENCLOSURE 24

BARRON'S

50 CENTS

National Business and Financial Weekly

FEBRUARY 5, 1968

Balance of Terror

The "McNamara Gap" Will Cost the Nation Dear

WITH apologies to C. Northcote Parkinson, whose word is invariably Law, we would like to profound the following tentative rule of thumb: the weight of kudos heaped upon a public figure these days varies inversely with the size of his achievement. On this score, for the historically minded, we might cite the sudden rediscovery of Crispus Attucks, hitherto obscure Negro stevedore, whose sole claim to fame—he chanced to stop a bullet during the Boston Massacre—has gained him a place among the "Founders of Our Nation" in the Bobbs-Merrill "Childhood of Famous Americans" series, as well as a newly established school holiday in Newark, N.J. There is also the man whose announced resignation as Secretary of Defense last fall evoked an equally extravagant appraisal of net worth. One Democratic Senator, who may as well be nameless, hailed Robert S. McNamara as: "One of the finest public servants ever produced by this country . . . the finest Secretary of Defense . . . a man for all seasons (who) leaves behind him a legacy of accomplishments in the defense complex which will stand for many years."

* * *

In a day and age of rapid change, technological and otherwise, some weapons may be obsolete before they leave the drawing board. By the same token, barely eight weeks after the lawgiver's salute appeared in print, the quick-march of time has made a shambles of the Secretary's service record. Shortly after Mr. McNamara handed in his resignation, Great Britain dropped its option on the controversial TFX, a command decision which the U.S. Navy is maneuvering adroitly to follow. By pulling out of the Middle and Far East, moreover, the British have exposed not only the weakness of their own position but also the folly of a U.S. strategy in Europe based heavily upon their crumbling strength. With friends like these, Mr. Secretary, who needs enemies?

"Which ones are the enemy?", in effect has come the reply. Under Mr. McNamara the civilians in the Pentagon have overridden unanimous decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undercut the authority of field commanders and subordinate strategic and tactical imperatives—the lives of Americans in uniform, to be blunt—to the dictates of dubiously programmed computers. Some Whiz Kid — with what a House Armed Services subcommittee later condemned as "bordering on criminal negligence" — decided to substitute a cheaper powder for the in-

tricately designed M-16 rifle, thereby causing repeated malfunction. The vulnerable Pueblo, operating 13 miles off North Korea, had standing orders to ignore harassment and not to fire. Finally, by urging the doctrine of nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, refusing to deploy an effective anti-ballistic missile system and stifling weapons development, the "finest Secretary of Defense," perhaps more than any other man in Cabinet history, has come alarmingly close to tipping the balance of terror against his own country. Unlike the fraudulent missile gap of 1960, which helped him to office, what the American Security Council flatly labels the "McNamara gap" today looms perilously real.

The gulf between image and reality shows up perhaps most starkly on the fighting fronts. McNamara apologists like to boast of their man's skill at cost-effectiveness and "a far-reaching managerial revolution" which he brought to the Pentagon. To all of which we say "Tell it to the Marines"—and to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The rifle which lacked the right kind of cartridge has been cited. Two years ago (Baron's, December 13, 1965) on-the-scene observers reported "serious miscalculations of needs and shortages of equipment . . . Dozens of M-13 military personnel carriers, for example, have been red-lined for lack of parts. To keep some vehicles running, the Automotive Tank Command has begun to cannibalize others." Since then, thanks to some management genius' urge to slash

inventories, U.S. forces have run dangerously short of combat aircraft, to the point where the Pentagon reluctantly had to authorize the re-opening of shut-down assembly lines. Air support wasn't available for the Pueblo because the few planes close enough to help were rigged to carry nuclear bombs. Since cost effectiveness ruled out nuclear escorts as inefficient, the U.S.S. Enterprise, now cruising off Wonsan, remains tied to a slow-moving conventionally powered fleet. Further flare-ups anywhere in the world will find the U.S. defense posture dangerously strained.

Emergencies aside, the nation's long-range military planning somehow has gone awry. For decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization served the Western world as shield; U.S. nuclear power was the sword. However, under Mr. McNamara (who really hated to waste money on arms and should be happier ladling it out at the World Bank), both shield and sword have fallen into disrepair. Largely at the behest of the so-called defense intellectuals, and with scarcely a by-your-leave to its NATO allies, the U.S. in 1961 began a unilateral retreat from the policy of massive retaliation, and toward a new doctrine of graduated response, which envisions the use of nuclear power only as a last, and long-deferred, resort. In mid-December, as he was emptying his desk at the Pentagon, Mr. McNamara had the satisfaction of seeing his brainchild promoted to official NATO strategy.

Few others in the free world will

celebrate. For graduated response, perhaps more than any other issue, alienated Charles de Gaulle, who quite correctly viewed it as a softening of the U.S. resolve to defend the Continent, and led France to withdraw its forces from NATO's military command. The security of Europe thus has come to rest on a dwindling band of U.S., British and miscellaneous troops, which, instead of reinforcements, as official reliance on conventional weaponry might seem to demand, gradually are getting transportation home. This winter, Washington and London withdrew some 40,000 men, or over 10% of their total contingent, from the Continent; the Canadians and Belgians soon may follow suit. Manpower aside, graduated response, as the bloody stalemate known as McNamara's War suggests, simply is no substitute for victory.

* * *

Secretary McNamara, to be sure, rarely speaks in such terms. Instead, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union—which remains the would-be architect of U.S. destruction—he stubbornly clings to the hope of disarmament and detente. Time after time he has shown an otherwise inexplicable willingness to give the Communist world the benefit of the doubt long after grounds for reasonable doubt had vanished. Last summer, in a grim appraisal titled "The Changing Strategic Military Balance, USA vs. USSR," the American Security Council, a blue-ribbon group which includes a number of retired admirals and generals, estimated that the Communists were adding 400 missiles per year to their nuclear arsenal. After repeated denials, Mr. McNamara last week cited the same figure. The Council also averred that "the delivery capability of U.S. strategic weapons systems, as measured in megatons of nuclear yield, has been going down steadily, while the Soviet capability has been steadily growing." Hence, it concluded that by mid-1968, if not before, a dangerous "megaton gap" would begin to open in favor of the Reds. The Pentagon scoffed at the claim. Last week, however, in a significant statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, it struck a different note. Specifically, it urged modernizing the Minuteman missile force; defending all Minuteman emplacements with Sprint antimissile systems; and developing a deadlier successor. After seven years of appeasement, retreat and defeat, maybe even the icy Secretary of Defense has lost his cool. It's high time somebody got mad.

In This Issue

ARTICLES

LOCAL TALENT
Regional Securities Firms, Says Lee Adler, Know How to Exploit It . . . 3
WANT TO GET RICH QUICK?
An Expert Gives Some Friendly Advice on Conglomerates . . . 5
AGGRESSIVE SWISS
Brown, Boveri & Co. Is Challenging GE, Westinghouse on Their Own Ground . . . 9
"HOT-METAL MAGIC"
Ferroalloys Are Expanding Their Markets Faster Than Steel . . . 11
DEPARTMENTS


THE TRADER by H. J. NELSON . . . 4
THE WORLD AT WORK . . . 7
UP AND DOWN WALL STREET
By Alan Abelson 25
COMING FINANCING 30
SPEAKING OF DIVIDENDS 31

DEPARTMENTS

NEWS AND VIEWS OF INVESTMENTS
Pittsburgh Plate Glass 26
Gilbert Shoe Stores 26
White Motor 27
California Liquid Gas 29
Roadcraft Mfg. & Leasing 30
COMMODITIES 33
WITH THE INVESTOR'S INVESTOR
By Armon Glenn 35
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS 67
STATISTICAL SECTION
NEW HIGHS AND LOWS IN STOCKS 63
COMPLETE STOCK QUOTATIONS 45
MUTUAL FUNDS 44
REGIONAL, FOREIGN SECURITIES 58
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET 59
BOND QUOTATIONS 64
MARKET LABORATORY 66
PULSE OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE 67



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
123 North Wacker, Chicago, Illinois 60606



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/2/08 BY SP1mac/HC

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

C

25 DIRECTOR

FEB 23 1968

100-425828-113

A
Reader's Digest
REPRINT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/22/02 BY SP/SP

The Threat of Russia's Rising Strategic Power

According to highly informed sources, the cold war has taken a chilling new turn: as a result of miscalculations and misconceptions, our shield of nuclear supremacy is slipping from us—and military ascendancy may soon pass to the Soviet Union. Because the hour is late, an informed citizenry must act—*now*

BY JOHN G. HUBBELL

IN 1962 the United States had the capability of delivering two and a half to ten times as much nuclear firepower as the Soviet Union. By 1967, the estimate is that the Soviets had drawn roughly equal to us, possibly even ahead in terms of deliverable *megatonnage*, that is, the explosive power of the warheads. (One megaton equals one million tons of TNT.) Present indications are that the Soviets, with their larger rockets and more powerful warheads, will have a clear lead by 1969, and will open a massive gap by 1971—with the capability to deliver from twice as much to perhaps ten times as much nuclear megatonnage. In other words, the situation by 1971 will be almost ex-

actly the reverse of what it was in 1962, when our strategic supremacy was such that the Soviets had no choice but to accede to our demands during the Cuban missile crisis.

Such was the startling picture presented last summer to Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D., S.C.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, by a distinguished panel of 17 military and weapons experts of the American Security Council. Chaired by Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.), the officer most responsible for development of our intercontinental-ballistic-missile (ICBM) force, the panel, at Rivers' request, confined itself to a study of unclassified sources, obviously drawing on those it knew to be sound. In

94 grim pages, the panel detailed the decline of American strategic power as against the Soviet Union's visible, across-the-board drive for overwhelming strategic supremacy. They advised that we virtually had forfeited the initiative to the U.S.S.R. in the rapidly accelerating field of military technology.

The experts concluded that there still is time—short to be sure—to re-establish an American strategic posture that can provide us with freedom to take appropriate action during crises and ensure that this country will prevail should a nuclear attack ever occur. But the panel noted the long lead times needed for new weapons development and production, warned, "Time is on the side of those who use it."

Last fall, two more authoritative studies appeared. One was *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge*, by an equally distinguished panel* at the highly respected Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University. The other was *Peace and the Strategy Conflict*,** an impressive book by William R. Kintner, a former member of the Planning Staff of the National Security Council, now deputy director of the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute. These two new studies confirmed that unless present trends are quickly reversed the United States seems certain in the 1970's to find itself in a markedly inferior strategic position to the Soviet Union, with possibly disastrous military-political results.

Calculated Risk. What comes through in these studies and from many additional interviews is that

United R. Kintner, a former member of the Planning Staff of the National Security Council, now deputy director of the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute. These two new studies confirmed that unless present trends are quickly reversed the United States seems certain in the 1970's to find itself in a markedly inferior strategic position to the Soviet Union, with possibly disastrous military-political results.

Calculated Risk. What comes through in these studies and from many additional interviews is that

United States had "mellowed," that continued American military supremacy could only provoke the Soviets to block the building of "bridges of understanding." Since the Soviets had "mellowed," the United States had a chance to seize the initiative in "stabilizing" the international political climate. The best way to do this would be to exchange U.S. military superiority for U.S.-Soviet military equality.

When the Soviets were shown in so dramatic a way that we are not bent on war and conquest, they would halt their side of the arms race.

This idea was supported strongly by members of the academic community and a few scientists influential at powerful positions in the Defense Department and in the

White House. They argued that

military technology had reached a "plateau," with no new technological mountains to climb and an inevitable nuclear stalemate.

Against this position was ranged the argument that, however much the United States had hoped that the Soviets had "mellowed," they had not done so in fact. Until concrete evidence was forthcoming that they had abandoned their goal of world dominion—until, for example, they stopped fomenting "wars of national liberation," permitted free elections in captive states and agreed to on-site inspections of their nuclear and space activities—the United States had no choice but to guard jealously its military supremacy. Because no technological "plateau" was in sight, that continued

supremacy depended on maintaining a technological lead over the Soviet Union.

In any case, Congress and the public were given no real chance to debate the issue. Says a recently retired senior officer, "For seven years the Defense Department has been deliberately implementing policies whose aim appears to be to achieve only strategic equality with the Soviet Union. The rationale is that this would help bring about a political détente with the Soviets and de-escalate the arms race. This policy has not been carried out in the open, but under the guise of a super-efficient cost-effectiveness. The result is that the American people have been cost-analyzed into a dangerous strategic position."

In entering into the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty barring all above-ground nuclear testing, still haited by Administration officials as the greatest step yet toward ending the cold war, the United States took what many knowledgeable men regarded as a dangerous calculated risk. The Soviets decided to sign the treaty, which permits no on-site inspection, only after completing their 1961-1962 test series, the most extensive and sophisticated ever. In this series they surged far ahead of us in very-high-yield nuclear weapons technology*; thus the treaty served to safeguard their lead.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee held 29 closed hearings on this treaty, taking exhaustive

testimony from 19 key witnesses.

Significantly, four of the seven

members of the subcommittee voted

against ratification. Senior officers

and nuclear scientists involved be-

lieve that had they and the dissent-

ers been able to say publicly what

they knew—they could not and still

cannot because their information is

secret—the Senate might not have

ratified the treaty. Moreover, some

now insist that, because certain safe-

guards proposed by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff have not been fully kept, it

would take a long time—perhaps

too long—for the United States to

*For instance, the Soviets must know—

and we, since we have not tested in the very-

high-yield field, can only guess—what effect

tremendous bursts of hot X rays from super-

megaton shots in space would have on

incoming ICBMs.

**Published by Frederick A. Praeger.

B-52s. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advising the Defense Department and Congress of an increasingly urgent need for an advanced aircraft which would carry at least as heavy a bombload as the B-52, but which would be much superior to it in performance and filled with devices to enable it to thwart present enemy air defenses.

Engineering development for such an advanced bomber has long been ready. Congress has appropriated the funds and urged the Department of Defense (DOD) to proceed. But DOD has persistently refused to act; it sees no need for a new manned bomber. At the same time, it has spent huge sums beefing up later-model B-52s so that they can perform against Soviet air defenses through the mid-1970s. By 1975, General Schriever explains, "The B-52 will represent a nearly 30-year-old technology," and it is difficult to understand how it could by that time be considered an effective strategic weapons system."

Also baffling is the Pentagon order for 210 FB-111As for the strategic bombardment force. The

FB-111A (a modified version of the TFX, a fighter bomber) will be

small, able to carry only a light

bombload and an inadequate num-

ber of sensing devices and penetra-

tion aids, and will require midair

refueling for intercontinental range.

Hence, despite its protestations,

DOD seems to agree that we *will* need a manned bomber force. If so,

we ought to be building a modern

bomber force designed specifically for the strategic mission.

According to the American Security Council Panel, one of the main reasons the Pentagon has refused to order a new manned bomber is that the whole idea of a manned bomber force is considered "provocative"—to keep such a force from being wiped out by an enemy missile before it would have to be launched. United States. The Pentagon worries that this smacks of a first-strike strategy, and we must do all we can to convince the Soviets that we never would strike first.

• *By developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.*

In late 1966, the Administration revealed that the Soviets have been widely deploying ABM defenses. Many strategists find it difficult to believe the Soviets would be investing in so hugely expensive an undertaking without high confidence that their system is effective or can be made effective by the kind of modest ICBM attack Red China will be able to launch by 1972 or 1973.

The Administration emphasized that it has no intention of building a full-scale ABM defense, the explanation being that this would only be the best offensive deterrent to Soviet forces. The Soviets will be devising new ways to penetrate with their offensive forces. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense said, "They have been building up their strategic missile forces. We had no choice but to take some additional steps to maintain the adequacy of our own deterrent."

Thus, since we have been unable to argue the Soviets out of deploying an ABM defense, we are to deploy one designed to blunt an attack from Red China, one reason being that the Soviets are expanding their strategic missile force. Such woolly rationalizing is difficult to follow. The fact is that the ABM field is one wherein major breakthroughs are

parcel of their ABM capability. The electromagnetic radiations from their very-high-yield blasts might disrupt our command-control communications by burning out circuits and fusing wires together, thus impairing our strike-back missiles. For nearly a year, the U.S. response to the Soviet ABM deployment was to try to talk them out of it, an effort which is continuing but which thus far has proved unsuccessful. Last September, it was announced that we will build a limited ABM defense. Its primary purpose, we are told, will be to defend against the kind of modest ICBM attack Red China will be able to launch by 1972 or 1973.

The Administration emphasized that it has no intention of building a full-scale ABM defense, the explanation being that this would only be the best offensive deterrent to Soviet forces. The Soviets will be devising new ways to penetrate with their offensive forces. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense said, "They have been building up their strategic missile forces. We had no choice but to take some additional steps to maintain the adequacy of our own deterrent."

Thus, since we have been unable to argue the Soviets out of deploying an ABM defense, we are to deploy one designed to blunt an attack from Red China, one reason being that the Soviets are expanding their strategic missile force. Such woolly rationalizing is difficult to follow. The fact is that the ABM field is one wherein major breakthroughs are

possible and where we, with our still substantial lead on the Soviets in advanced electronics and computer technologies, still could achieve superiority. Since the evidence war-rants our entry into this field, we would be well advised to work as rapidly as possible toward breakthroughs which will give us the best possible ballistic-missile defense against *all* potential enemies.

Apart from provoking the Soviets, reluctance to proceed with a full-scale ABM system was based on the

United States' plans a good offense for the future. "But we haven't done this for the past six or seven years," says Schriever. "The Defense Department has refused to give the nation the best offensive deterrent to Soviet aggression. We are placing ourselves in a position where the Soviets might be able to make cold, hard calculations about the possibility of knocking out our offensive capability with a surprise attack. This position should be unacceptable to all of us."

The Decision Is Ours. The American Security Council and Georgetown Center studies and the Kintner book, and indeed, the Soviets themselves make it clear that the U.S.S.R. has no intention of settling for "mutual deterrence," but is aiming instead for military supremacy; in fact, the evidence has become so ominously convincing that we must worry about the years just ahead.

Leading Soviet strategists time and again publicly have insisted that victory in nuclear war will go to the side that is best prepared to wage nuclear war, and that the Soviet Union is so preparing itself; and Kintner finds that the Soviets lay great stress on the value of a pre-emptive surprise attack—with no formal declaration of war. Moreover, says Kintner, America will be their main adversary.

It was inevitable that the Soviets, having mastered their own nuclear and missile technologies, would gain on us. It is *not* inevitable that they achieve supremacy. But, should they score breakthroughs in the offensive or defensive technologies we know that they are developing, or come up with highly reliable new strategic systems we have not yet heard of, it could overnight shift the balance of strategic power to the Soviet Union. Even if this did not mean that the Soviets would launch a nuclear war against us—a possibility that no longer should be considered remote—the Georgetown Center spells out what we surely could expect: a far more aggressive

Soviet foreign policy; U.S. concessions on many issues long in contention; a greatly inhibited U.S. response to communist-inspired wars of liberation; greater support for the Soviet Union from non-aligned nations. In short, it would mean an end to the cold war, with victory to the Soviet Union.

Congress is charged by the Constitution with the maintenance of the armed forces, and for years the armed-services committees of Congress have been pleading with the Defense Department to proceed with the development of the strategic-weapons technologies that our military professionals and all logic insist must be developed. But the Defense Department has consistently refused to act. Congress' armed-services committees need the support of an informed American public. The decision to retain military supremacy still rests with the people—but the hour is very late.

Reprints of this article are available. Prices, postpaid to one address: 10-75¢; 50-83¢; 100-\$4.50 500-\$15; 1000-\$28. Address Reprint Editor, The Reader's Digest, Pleasantville, N.Y. 10570

REPRINTED FROM THE FEBRUARY 1968 ISSUE OF THE READER'S DIGEST
©1968 THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PLEASANTVILLE, N.Y. 10570 PRINTED IN U.S.A.

100-4125828-113

TRUE COPY

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Stanley, Virginia 22851
June 27, 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/15/88 BY SP7/MAC/HC

Dear Frank-

I am somewhat concerned over an influx of solicitations for membership, contributions, signing of petitions, questionnaires, etc. Just this week I have received such requests from the Young Americans for Freedom and the American Security Council.

I am certainly not opposed to helping reputable organizations in their effort to swing us back some from the so-called liberal or left-wing course on which our country has been apparently heading. However there should be some degree of caution.

100-425828-
NOT RECORDED

184 JUL 10 1970
Can and will the Department of Justice advise on this? Are there approved and/or disapproved lists available to the public?

My apologies for addressing this to you, Frank-- but I know you won't mind and I do not know who else to contact there. Will you pass/inquiry on for me? this

Best regards to you, Jean, and the family.

Mr. Frank Walkart
1970
22851
FRANKLIN MURKIN
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

rely,

18 JUL 7 1970

[redacted]

[Signature]

Route 2, Box 275, Stanley, Virginia 22851

TRUE COPY

ORIGINAL FILED 100-42345/6-391

AC
7-6
7/15/88

100-425828

July 6, 1970

W/H

b6
b7C

Stanley, Virginia 22851

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/13/88 BY SP7moc/lhc

Dear [redacted]

Inspector Waikart has shown me your letter to him of June 27th.

Although we would like to be of assistance, this Bureau is strictly an investigative agency of the Federal Government and, as such, neither makes evaluations nor draws conclusions as to the character or integrity of any organization, publication, or individual. I regret it is not possible to be of help to you in this instance.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

b6
b7C

NOTE: [redacted], Virginia.

The American Security Council is an organization financed and operated by private industry as a national research and information center on subversive activities for the use of its members. Its President, Mr. John M. Fisher, is a former Special Agent and is on the Special Correspondents List. The Young Americans for Freedom is self-characterized as endeavoring to provide the American public with educational material regarding threats upon American institutions by socialist and communist groups.

FMG:bjm (3)

F320 m
08 JUL 15 1970

MAILED 2
JUL 6 1970
COMM-FBI
Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-434516-391

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 31

Page 5 ~ Duplicate

Page 18 ~ Duplicate

Page 19 ~ Duplicate

Page 20 ~ Duplicate

Page 21 ~ Duplicate

Page 22 ~ Duplicate

Page 23 ~ Duplicate

Page 24 ~ Duplicate

Page 91 ~ Duplicate

Page 92 ~ Duplicate

Page 93 ~ Duplicate

Page 94 ~ Duplicate

Page 95 ~ Duplicate

Page 96 ~ Duplicate

Page 97 ~ Duplicate

Page 132 ~ Duplicate

Page 133 ~ Duplicate

Page 134 ~ Duplicate

Page 135 ~ Duplicate

Page 136 ~ Duplicate

Page 137 ~ Duplicate

Page 138 ~ Duplicate

Page 139 ~ Duplicate

Page 140 ~ Duplicate

Page 141 ~ Duplicate

Page 142 ~ Duplicate

Page 143 ~ Duplicate

Page 144 ~ Duplicate

Page 145 ~ Duplicate

Page 146 ~ Duplicate

Page 147 ~ Duplicate